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The present thesis concerns an ontology-based paradigm for data science in the 
context of Big Data. The generation of knowledge from big amounts of data is 
discussed in order to create a clear formal distinction between the notions of data and 
knowledge. To accomplish this goal, the process-philosophical ideas of A.N. 
Whitehead presented in his magnum opus Process and Reality (PR) are analyzed formal- 
ontologically. This analysis comprises a categorization of the main types of entities in 
PR, which includes the notion of actual entities and the notion of entities that are the 
various parts of actual entities, as well as the fundamental relations between these 
entities. Since PR is focussed on processes rather than static substances with changing 
accidents, entities emerge and are in a temporal flux, which is called the process.  
The emergence of entities can be distinguished into: (1) the emergence of the 
entities that form the inner structure of a single actual entity and (2) the emergence of 
actual entities—independent of their parts—in a spatiotemporal context, in which 
they are referred to as actual occasions. (1) is referred to as the microscopic perspective 
of the process and (2) is referred to as the macroscopic perspective. The microscopic 
perspective is being analyzed prosaically and the results of this analysis are 
implemented into an ontology written in the Web Ontology Language (OWL). This 
ontology serves as metalanguage to describe knowledge and is used to address an 
example of a learning information system in the context of medical data science based 
on the notion of a prehension, which is an entity that binds all data and knowledge that 
an actual entity conceives. The outlined information system is able to judge the 
possible truth of its conceived knowledge in comparison to its acquired data. This 
description of knowledge creation as well as its subsequent judgement is discussed 
against a direct representation in OWL.  
The macroscopic perspective is analyzed formally in order to grasp the temporal 
aspects of PR that can be used to model the change of knowledge resp. belief revision 
of autonomous and distributed learning information systems. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Monadic Second Order Logic. They represent a novelty in 
contemporary Whitehead research since other formal approaches to PR restricted 
their scope to the theory of extensiveness only, which yields applications in 
mereotopology. The presented results are discussed against these approaches and the 
theory of extensiveness reconstructed as a possible extension. Additionally, we 
present an alteration that allows to draw a connection to the theory of relativity that 
influenced PR substantially. This discussion shows how the formal interpretation of 
the macroscopic perspective can be used to model the phenomenon of time 
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The investigation of a research object comprises the acquisition of various data 
that is either captured as sense data of a scientist or as measurements of an instrument. 
Data acquisition is nothing that happens instantaneously. It is a process, in which the 
set of acquired data is changing continuously (van der Aalst & Weijters, 2004). 
However, these datasets are not growing continuously but are rather characterized by 
different states that are mutually contradictory since enduring objects have changing 
properties despite being persistent. Drawing conclusions is a dialectical  task as 
acknowledged by Baumann et al. (2014) that must consider that statements made at a 
particular point in time are necessarily valid at this timepoint only. However, at a later 
point in time the truth of a proposition is not obvious anymore since the data upon 
which this proposition has been made was acquired at an earlier point in time and a 
new evaluation according to the most current data is inevitable. 
The acquisition resp. mining of data itself is a well analyzed research topic, the 
techniques of which can be traced back until the 18th century (Lee, 2012). The 
theorem of Bayes & Price (1763) or the method of least squares as developed by Gauß 
(2015) laid the foundations for the analysis of data and algorithms that were yet to be 
developed. In the middle of the 20th century computers were made available for 
research and allowed analysing data sets that were far too big for an evaluation by 
hand. Neural networks (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) and the automatic creation of 
decision trees (Morgan & Sonquist, 1963) marked the beginning of what is called 
knowledge discovery in databases. This knowledge can be understood as propositions about 
data. There are various possibilities for a representation of these propositions 
depending on the use-case for the derived knowledge, which is usually to create a 
meaning that leverages a research hypothesis or enhances a company’s products, 
processes and services.  
During the last fifty years, the sheer amount of collected data has grown 
exponentially. The contemporary development can be seen in figure 1. The analysis 
and handling of this amount of data has been called the research of Big Data (Manyika 
et al., 2011) and is considered one of the technological frontiers of science today. 
Frameworks have been developed to mine these huge chunks of unstructured content 
in a highly efficient parallelization (Dean & Ghemawat, 2008) and to analyze them 
with search engines that can handle the missing structure (Gormley & Tong, 2015). 
Likewise, research started to be more and more data-driven, too. These developments 
in mathematics and computer science gave birth to a new kind of interdisciplinary 
science that focusses on the techniques necessary to master the growing amounts of 
data and to extract their meaning in order to create real value. 
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Fig. 1. This statistic published by Statista (2017) provides a forecast of data storage demand and 
supply worldwide, from 2009 to 2020. 
1.1. Data Science and Semantic Web 
Driven by the dawn of Industry 4.0 (Lasi et al., 2014), companies try to digitalize 
all data events that occur during their business processes. These data events comprise 
(1) content that can be found in documents, e.g. manuals, white papers or quotations, 
(2) social information that can be found in communication, e.g. e-mails, instant messages 
or social media, (3) device information that is collected by all physical devices connected 
with the enterprise network resp. internet and (4) location information which reflects all 
geospatial attributes that data events can possess. According to van der Aalst (2014), 
a data scientist is hired by a company to interpret these data in order to gather insights 
about their business processes. Typical insights include: (1) reports that describe 
which things have happened, (2) diagnoses that answer why things have happened, 
(3) predictions that forecast which things will happen and (4) recommendations that 
suggest what has to be done in order to effect the best outcome. Such insights are 
deemed more accurate than the results of analytical investigations according to Salvi 
et al. (2016). It is also more time efficient to create them instead of decomposing the 
business process instances until the same propositions can be made.  
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Business insights are considered a pragmatic alternative to conventional business 
analysis, which explains the growing demand for data scientists as shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. This statistic published by Tech Partnership (2014) shows the annual demand to fill job 
vacancies for big data scientists. 
 
Apart from the already discussed techniques that belong to realm of data mining 
and machine learning, a core task of a data scientist is to find a visualization of the 
data events that directly allows a human judgement without any statistical methods. 
This integration of data processing and its meaningful visual representation is referred 
to as visual analytics by Keim et al. (2008) and it is the center of manifold research that 
is ongoing in data science, of which we want to mention the works of Thomas & 
Cook (2005) and Fekete et al. (2008). The value of such visual representation lies in 
its usage in face-to-face communication and a tool to strengthen the credibility of an 
argument in strategic discussions about a company’s future orientation.  
It is easy to understand that the main foundation of good visualization are well-
structured data, which does not pertain to Big Data that is by definition unstructured. 
Although it is possible to work with unstructured data as shown by Uciteli et al. (2014) 
and Brauer et al. (2010), it is inevitable to use relational databases with meaningful 
data models or to rely on ontological data management, which is the current state-of-
the-art will be addressed hereinafter.  
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The term ontology has been introduced into computer science by Gruber (1993) 
as explicit specification of a conceptualization and has been borrowed from 
philosophy. An ontology is a common vocabulary used to specify the content of 
distributed knowledge bases in a unified manner. Thus, allowing a high reusability in 
different contextual settings. The distributed knowledge bases can be highly 
specialized but are still adaptable to each other if the content of more than one 
knowledge base is necessary to answer a query. There have been early applications of 
ontologies, namely the Platform for the Automated Construction of Intelligent 
Systems (PACIS) (Simons, 2002), OntoClean (Guarino & Welty, 2004), the general 
ontology language (GOL) (Degen et al., 2001) or Cyc (Lenat & Guha, 1989).  
These projects had a strong foundation in the philosophical discourse about the 
being of reality. However, it was not until the dawn of Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et 
al., 2001) that ontologies achieved their breakthrough. The Semantic Web movement 
advocates the transition from a Web of Documents to a Web of Data, i.e. from 
unstructured to structured data. Large ontology-based knowledge bases were created, 
e.g.  DBPedia (Auer et al., 2007), Yago (Suchanek et al., 2007), Freebase (Bollacker et 
al., 2009) or OpenCyc, which is the open source version of Cyc. The Linked Open 
Data Cloud (LODC) (Abele et al., 2017) was created as an attempt to integrate all 
these openly accessible datasets and currently comprises 1163 datasets.  
To create and define such datasets various technologies have been developed, the 
most basic of which is the Resource Description Framework (RDF) (Lassila & Swick, 
1999). RDF is a representation language for databases that, in contrast to relational 
databases, is based on graphs rather than tables. Such RDF-graph is a set of 
statements. A statement is a triple that consists of (1) a subject, which is a Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI) referencing to some resource, (2) a predicate, which is a 
URI, and (3) an object, which is some literal or a URI. A database that contains an 
RDF-graph is called triple store. As of 2017, the most important products were 
Virtuoso1, Stardog2, Apache Jena3 and Eclipse RDF4J4. This enumeration excludes 
more current products by Amazon or Microsoft and proprietary solutions included 
in comprehensive solutions like IBM Watson. 
An RDF-graph is usually accompanied by an ontology specified in the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) (Hitzler et al., 2009) based on description logics (Baader, 
2005). This language specifies general resources like classes or predicates and allows 
expressing axioms that define the semantics of an RDF-graph. A reasoner like Pellet 
(Sirin et al., 2007) or Hermit (Glimm et al., 2014) is then used to apply these axioms. 
This application results into a so-called knowledge graph (Singhal, 2012).  
 
1 See https://virtuoso.openlinksw.com/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
2 See https://www.stardog.com/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
3 See https://jena.apache.org/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
4 See http://www.rdf4j.org/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
Introduction 5  
 
To transfer the content of Big Data into knowledge graphs is an important task 
for data science that has been considered in the works of Volz et al. (2009), 
Augenstein et al. (2012) or Röder et al. (2017). Since it does not only allow statistical 
analysis and leverages good visualization, it also support the usage of question 
answering tools like HAWK (Usbeck et al., 2015). However, the results of other 
scientific disciplines, e.g. Knowledge Organization (KO), that investigated similar 
topics have been neglected by the semantic web community as it has been pointed 
out by Dahlberg (2014). The same applies for the foundation in philosophy that 
distinguishes the semantic web community from the early pioneers of the application 
of philosophical rationale into computer science.  
In the mentioned communities, the precipitated sentiment predominates that a 
theoretical foundation is not necessary to gain knowledge with data mining techniques 
as it has been claimed by Box & Draper (1986) much earlier. More and more tools 
are released that work without any empirical analysis of their intended domain of 
usage; such methods can be categorized as learning with latent features (Miller et al., 
2009). We mention the Microsoft Cognitive Toolkit5, Google TensorFlow6 and 
Deeplearning4j7 as examples for this development. Nevertheless, the disadvantages 
of these black box approaches has already been recognized by industrial users (Sculley 
et al., 2015) that advocate a demand for more sustainable solutions in the long run. 
1.2. Formal Ontology 
Independent to the notion of an ontology that has been adopted by the semantic 
web community, there are more complex applications of such philosophical findings 
in contemporary computer science. The field of formal ontology is a highly innovative 
field of scientific research that incorporates the findings of cognitive psychology, 
mathematics and logics into a novel notion of artificial intelligence. It is based on the 
classical philosophical discipline of ontology that can be traced back to works of 
Platon (2007), Aristotle (2001) and Anaximander (Kahn, 1994). Ontology is the study 
of reality and, thus, a part of analytical philosophy that copes with the fundamental 
being of the universe. One of its main subjects is the search for the most basic 
categories that allow to describe everything that exists. In its simplest form, this 
abstraction can be conducted based on two relations: (1) Instantiation (resp. ∷) and (2) 
Subsumption (resp. 𝑖𝑠_𝑎). This quite radical reduction expresses that everything is 
something or an instance of something. It entails that any other notion that 
characterizes reality can be deduced from these two relations.  
 
5 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cognitive-toolkit/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
6 See https://www.tensorflow.org/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
7 See https://deeplearning4j.org/ (Accessed on 19th of April 2019) 
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Although this approach seems incomplete, it is possible to use it to model basic 
categories of a domain. The subsumption relation is the basis of every taxonomy, i.e. 
a hierarchy of concepts that describe this domain’s complete nomenclature. It can be 
used to say that a concert hall is a building or that a cat is a mammal. The proposition 
𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) denotes that 𝑎 is a 𝑏, both of which are called categories. This relation is 
a partial ordering, which means that it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. 
Formally this can be expressed by the following first-order logic (FOL) axioms: 
 
∀𝑥(𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑥, 𝑥)) (1) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑦, 𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (2) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑦, 𝑧) → 𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑥, 𝑧)) (3) 
 
However, it is implausible to say that a category is another category. Thus, the 
instantiation relation can used to define a proper semantics for 𝑖𝑠_𝑎. A category is an 
abstract entity that is predicated on some entity and, hence, this entity, on which a 
category is predicated on, is its instance. For instance, we can say that my cat Daisy is 
an instance of the category cat or that the Gewandhaus is an instance of the category concert hall. 
The proposition 𝑎 ∷ 𝑏 denotes that the entity 𝑎 is an instance of the category 𝑏. If 
some entity does not have an instance, it is referred to as an individual. We can then 
postulate that if 𝑎 is a 𝑏 and 𝑐 is an instance of 𝑎, that 𝑐 is also an instance of 𝑏: 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑧 ∷ 𝑥 → 𝑧 ∷ 𝑦) (4) 
 
This semantic notion can be used to deduce that the subsumption relation is 
transitive, i.e. it follows that the Gewandhaus is an instance of building and that my cat Daisy 
is an instance of mammal. Antisymmetry and reflexivity do not follow from this axiom 
but we can prove that the facts 𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑎, 𝑏) and 𝑖𝑠_𝑎(𝑏, 𝑎) entail the proposition  
𝑐 ∷ 𝑎 ↔ 𝑐 ∷ 𝑏 for arbitrary 𝑐. This theorem can be accompanied with the axiom of 
extensionality from set theory (Devlin, 1993) and, therefore, entail the antisymmetry 
of 𝑖𝑠_𝑎 leading to the Identity of Indiscernibles (Wreen, 2015). There is a strong 
resemblance that leads to the belief that categories can be understood as sets. In this 
interpretation, ∷ resp. 𝑖𝑠_𝑎 would be encoded as ∈ resp. ⊆. Strictly speaking, 
categories are no sets but rather descriptions of a class definition and the class of 
entities that instantiate a category is the extension of this category, which resembles 
the abstraction principle (Frege, 1998). This indicates that ∷ can relate two categories 
since a class can be element of another class. Indeed, a category can be instance of 
another category. For instance, the category mountain gorilla is an instance of the 
category endangered species. In fact, an instance of the category mountain gorilla is not an 
instance of the category endangered species and it will not be correct to say that the 
extension of the category mountain gorilla is a subset of the extension of the category 
endangered species. This entails the proposition that subsumption is not transitive, too. 
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An example for the expressiveness of such vocabulary is the Microbial Ontology 
(Biswas et al., 2013). However, ∷ and 𝑖𝑠_𝑎 are rarely a complete vocabulary but rather 
the backbone of any ontology resp. its minimal constituents. To obtain an ontology 
that is more expressive than a taxonomy it is important to include the notion of 
parthood (resp. ≤). The proposition 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 denotes that 𝑎 is a part of 𝑏. The formal 
analysis of this relation is called mereology and can be traced back to Leśniewski (1992), 
Tarski (1983) and was brought into a highly conclusive form by Simons (2000). The 
main axioms of parthood pertain to reflexivity, antisymmetry, as well as transitivity 
and can be formulated the following way: 
 
∀𝑥(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥) (5) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (6) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑧) (7) 
 
These axioms describe the same requirements of the partial ordering behind 𝑖𝑠_𝑎. 
However, it is doubtful if the parthood of categories can be compared to the parthood 
of classes ⊆, investigated by Lewis (1991), since the part 𝑎 of a category 𝑏 entails that 
an instance of 𝑏 will have an instance of 𝑎 as its part according to Herre (2010). 
Moreover, the parthood of individuals describes the structure of the material world 
and is thus, the proper foundation for any ontological realism that advocates the 
purpose of formal ontology to represent the character of anything that exists 
physically. To support such purpose, more axioms are necessary than the ones stated. 
A complete system does not only express how parts are connected to form a bigger 
whole. Their ability to be composed into such whole as well as the nature of their 
partitions are an integral part of mereology that can be applied in formal ontology. 
To utilize the results of a formal ontological discourse in artificial intelligence, the  
axiomatic descriptions that have been created are implemented into top-level 
ontologies, e.g. the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) (Smith et al., 2004), the General 
Formal Ontology (GFO) (Herre et al., 2006), the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic 
and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE) (Gangemi et al., 2002) and the Suggested Upper 
Merged Ontology (SUMO) (Niles & Pease, 2001), that are mostly available in OWL 
and hence, easily applicable in the semantic web context. Top-level ontologies are 
mainly used to streamline the development resp. automatic creation of domain 
ontologies. They have a broad field of applications that does not only comprise the 
community of biomedical science, from which we mention the following ontologies: 
the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) (Rosse & Mejino, 2008), the Gene 
Ontology (GO) (Ashburner et al., 2000), GFO-BIO (Hoehndorf et al., 2008) and 
BioTop (Beisswanger et al., 2008). Moreover, as shown by Hoehndorf et al. (2009), 
top ontologies can also be utilized in an architectures as task ontologies and therein, 
steer data platforms. In ontology-driven software built in the vein of this architecture, 
knowledge in domain ontologies is easily reusable by any other software component.  
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1.3. Motivation 
All mentioned research topics and approaches in data sciences and the semantic 
web community have one aspect in common. They basically create, approximate or 
work on structured data and exploit implicitly contained knowledge. How this implicit 
knowledge can be made explicit is not a topic of data science at all. A novel notion of 
knowledge needs to be developed and should be closely connected to knowledge 
graphs but needs to go further and explain the semantics of knowledge. The 
organization and creation of knowledge is an empirical process incorporating several 
techniques that help to iteratively abstract from the granularity of data. Specific 
information must be transferred to generic and applicable propositions about them. 
Complex theories like the general theory of relativity obviously cannot be expressed 
as single links in a dataset; they presume a dedicated vocabulary and theoretical 
assumptions, the sources of which are not hidden in the physical empirical data.  
1.3.1. Scope 
The intention of this work is to present a paradigm for data science that is 
diametrically opposed to the already mentioned black box approaches. It is necessary 
to explicate the connection of data and the inductively reasoned insights about these 
data. Data analysis should deliver sustainable knowledge rather than insights that just 
answer highly precise questions and neglect the complete picture that is yielded by the 
data. A new awareness for the importance of theories and models is necessary, rather 
than their rejection that leads to a complete dissociation of data and knowledge. Data 
science must find a way to not only integrate data events consistently with one another 
but also conceive a notion of knowledge that allows interoperability and addresses the 
temporal aspects of validity. We argue that the foundation of such paradigm lies in 
the notion of a proposition in the sense of Wittgenstein (2006). Furthermore, a theory 
needs to be developed that explains how propositions can be composed from other 
propositions to obtain higher knowledge. 
A complete theory of propositions must comprise the notion of truth, which is 
not defined in a universal sense but in a subjective sense since knowledge, as we know 
it, is always dependent to some individual that has evidence for its validity and, thus, 
believes that a proposition is true. This second notion of truth is an individual’s 
subjective judgement and dependent to the data this individual has access to.  
Moreover, the temporal aspects pertaining to this validity need to be considered. As 
the available set of data events is continuously growing, the judgement about the data 
can either be corroborated or changed completely if contradictory data events occur. 
This topic that has been investigated by Siemoleit et al. (2017) in the context of the 
BIOPASS project (Bieck et al., 2016). 
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Members of other communities, notably from psychology, are more aware of 
problems pertaining to the relation between data and knowledge. The psychologist 
Mausfeld (2010) addresses the fundamental problem of perception theory. He notes 
that an explanatory gap occurs in the standard model of perceptual psychology, which 
is used in computer vision, because this model borrows concepts, such as surfaces, 
shadows, boundaries or illuminations, implicitly from the output of the perceptual 
system. Here arises the problem where these concepts come from and how the 
perceptual system integrates the sensory input with these concepts to create a 
perceptual object. We will address this problem as the leap from data to knowledge, which 
a perceiving individual is able to leverage based on the abstraction from physically 
perceivable data. 
The philosophy of Process and Reality (PR) expounded by Whitehead (1929), which 
is the foundational work of process philosophy, provides an approach to elucidate 
this challenging problem. This way of information processing is an upcoming topic 
in recent research of brain modelling. Khrennikov (2015) proposed a model that 
matches the similarity of conscious systems and quantum based modelling, which is 
mentioned in PR. On the other hand, his approach is purely statistical; it does not 
discuss any ontological aspects of the topic. In contrast, the neuroecological model 
of the brain described by Northoff (2016a, 2016b) does not only withstand an 
impressively successful comparison to empirical data, but also an exhaustive 
ontological discussion. This model is based on the Whiteheadian notions of subject 
and object and explains how they are subsequent phases of perceiving entities. 
Albertazzi (2015) presents the argument that the consideration of subjectivity, i.e. 
the view of a perceiving individual, will lead to a natural semantics in an advanced 
ecological theory of perception. We state that the same is valid for data processing, 
too. As Albertazzi accentuates, it is necessary to express phenomenal qualities not in 
an objective manner but rather in the way they are perceived subjectively. 
Whiteheadian subjective forms are the key to representing how contemporary entities are 
perceived. Subjective forms are the result of a sense-making process and how sense 
data are interpreted according to a perceiver. Their descriptive character not only 
allows representing appearances as dispositions but also functionality and affections.  
An ontological analysis of the aforementioned concepts will lead to a novel 
vocabulary that is able to semantically represent the results of contemporary machine 
learning approaches into knowledge bases augmenting data science and semantic web 
with the findings of formal ontology. If such bridge over the gap between data and 
knowledge can be established, the implicit knowledge that lies in Big Data can be 
explicated, which will eventually lead to the invention of a new kind of artificial 
intelligence that can produce scientific results as predicted by Kitano (2016). A first 
step to reach this goal has been elaborated formally (Siemoleit & Herre, 2016) and an 
applicable extension of this analysis will be an integral part of the presented work.  
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1.3.2. Structure 
This investigation starts with a summary of the various aspects of GFO. These 
aspects include the integration of processes and objects into a unifying framework as 
discussed by Herre (2015). This integration is the distinguishing feature to these top-
level ontologies. The foundation is also remarkable differing to contemporary works 
in process philosophy; we mention the works Stell & West (2004) as well as Seibt 
(2009), in which a process monism is defended that contradicts the existence of three-
dimensional objects. We, moreover, analyze dedicated extensions of GFO that cope 
with the characteristics of time, i.e. GFO-Time, and data, i.e. GFO-Data, the 
discussion of which are unique to other top-level ontologies. In this work, we use the 
introduced nomenclature to give a preliminary analysis of the most basic elements of 
PR and the temporal relations in this work to elucidate the notion of a process that is 
presented therein. Moreover, we give a use-case in medical data science that will be 
used as a proof of concept to show that the philosophical discourse of this work is 
indeed applicable in medical research. 
Based on the Whiteheadian concepts of a process, two types of relational 
structures are introduced that allow grasping data and knowledge as well as the change 
of truth over time. (1) Knowledge structures capture the notion of a prehension, which is 
the reification of a subjective understandings. It also materializes entities into a mental 
representation of learning entities. Furthermore, it is outlined how these mental 
representations are analyzed into abstract wholes that represent informational unities 
about which propositions can be made with statistical methods like machine learning. 
Thus, an approach is presented to bridge the leap from data to knowledge from a 
formal ontological perspective. (2) Process structures describe how these prehensions 
change over time. Such a relational structure captures the temporal relations of data 
events in distributed learning systems that do not only comprise one compute unit, 
but rather an arbitrary number that can change over time.  
A formal language based on monadic second-order logic (MSO) as well as an 
axiomatization of this language is proposed, which does not only yield the structural 
integrity of process structures but also postulations that have been brought forward 
in PR. Hence, it is the first formal analysis of the Whiteheadian notion of time that is 
not based on mereotopology. The discussion section comprises the application of 
both structures. Knowledge structures will be used to model a use-case in medical 
data science. An exemplary information system is outlined that is able to compare 
physical information with the results of statistical methods. This comparison will lead 
to the information system’s ability to autonomously distinguish the truth of the, thus, 
created propositions. How the aforementioned notions of subjectivity and abstraction 
are reflected is outlined. This discussion is extended to additionally address a possible 
modelling of this concepts as OWL classes.  
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Moreover, process structures are considered as a foundation for mereotopology. 
This can be accomplished without the basic formalism of topology, which is a main 
feature of all other reconstructions of mereotopology based on PR. We introduce the 
notion of a spatiotemporal regions as well as axioms that integrate this notion into the 
presented structures. Finally, a connection to the common region calculi based on PR 
are established. For such regions we define mereological concepts like the parthood, 
sum, and intersection of regions as well as topological definitions like the general and 
external connection of regions. The notion of relativity, as it is used in theoretical 
physics, is central in PR and was necessary to establish a connection to quantum 
physics in the context of process structures. Whereas time in process structures is 
linear, which means that parallel events occur at the same point in time, we discuss an 
extension that allows parallel events to occur to different points in time. This 
extension is based on the preliminary reconstruction of the Whiteheadian notion of 
time in GFO. Although this discussion is highly speculative, we outline how it can be 
used provide an interpretation of time dilatation by allowing events to have different 
locations in spacetime. 
It is clear, that the complete investigation of this topic cannot be realised in the 
limited context of this work. It is rather the foundation of a research program that 
will have topics for years of formal ontological research. Many categorial terms are 
introduced that have a unique semantics in PR. This semantics is not common in any 
research field—including philosophy—and many possibilities for further research 
that needs to be conducted are mentioned. Process structures can be defined in a 
dedicated formal language, whereas knowledge structures are introduced only in an 
informal manner due to open questions, which need an extended consideration. An 
integration of both structures into a complete formal interpretation of the 
Whiteheadian process ontology is a topic that has to be investigated as the final goal 
of this research program that will lead to a formal ontological approach to machine 
learning in the context of data science. The application of formal ontological 
investigations can lead to a great step forward in knowledge representation. Computer 
science is able to benefit from interdisciplinary approaches and the believe that this is 






2. Materials and Methods 
In the following, we will discuss the incorporated methods that are necessary for 
our investigation of PR. During this discussion we will introduce the categorial system 
and foundational structure of GFO. This comprises the unique view on process and 
objects as well as their integration into a unified view. Moreover, the notion of 
spacetime individuals is elucidated as well as the connection to the spatiotemporal 
entities that occupy space and the processes of which project to time intervals. 
Furthermore, we will give a short introduction to PR and explain how its categorial 
system has to be understood based on an explanation that uses GFO as reference 
framework. We will discuss relevant interpretations and already existing applications 
in computer science and, finally, draw conclusion of the connection between GFO 
and PR, which will turn out to be very similar in their basic assumptions. The 
remaining part concerns a use-case in medical data science that we will use to outline 
the applicability of the framework to be presented in the next chapter. 
2.1. GFO 
GFO is a top-level ontology that allows modelling everything that has a mode of 
existence. For this purpose the universe is subdivided into four ontological regions 
that are called strata: (1) the material stratum that comprises everything that exists 
physically, (2) the social stratum that includes everything entailed by the non-physical 
relations in the material stratum, (3) the psychological stratum that comprises all mental 
activities executed by physical entities, (4) the ideal stratum that subsumes entities being 
independent from space and time—including mathematical objects and Platonic 
universals. The first three strata can be attributed to Poli (2007), who explicates them 
as the levels of reality that need to be distinguished from the levels of interpretation, 
to which the material stratum belong to due to the epistemological aspects of this 
stratum.  
The most basic distinction in GFO is between sets and items, which means that 
every entity is either a set or an item. The empty set is the only set that is presupposed 
to any ontological analysis since it is used to construct the theory of the Zermelo-
Fraenkel-Mengenlehre (ZFC). ZFC is the common ground of most mathematical 
disciplines that is rejected only by intuitionist mathematicians, the first of whom was 
Brouwer (1975). The basic relations of ZFC, i.e. set membership and identity, and a 
fragment of its axiomatization are contained in GFO. Items are defined as the 
urelements of sets and, thus, the only elements a set can have as member except for the 
empty set. All items have a mode of existence and, therefore, a place in the universe.  
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This notion of sets and their urelements allows the modelling of basic 
mathematical knowledge but still establishes a strict distinction between existing 
entities and sets. The ontological character of set theory can be reduced to the notion 
of the singleton function and mereology—a topic still under discussion (Lewis, 1993).  
Items can be distinguished into categories and individuals; a distinction that has 
already been discussed in the last chapter. Categories can be: (1) Universals, which are 
the categorial invariants of the universe and either platonic universals that exist a 
priori or aristotelic universals that exist in individuals. (2) Concepts, which are categories 
that can be attributed to individuals as a formulation of their individual knowledge, 
(3) Symbolic structures, which are the mediators between the concepts of different 
individuals that refer to the same universal. Categories can be instantiated, whereas 
individuals cannot be instantiated. Likewise, every individual has to be instance of 
some universal and every universal has instances. However, concepts do not 
necessarily need to have an instance in order to exist, i.e. the concept of a unicorn does 
not have any instances but can be conceived by individuals.   
2.1.1. Spacetime Individuals 
Individuals can be distinguished into concrete resp. spatiotemporal individuals 
that exist in space and time, as well as spacetime individuals that represent spatial or 
temporal regions. It is obvious that the notion of space and time is presupposed to 
the notion of anything existing in it. Thus, we will elucidate spacetime individuals 
initially before we proceed to explicate how they are applied to describe the 
individuals that are in the spatiotemporal reality. The classification distinguishes time 
individuals, the theory of which has been expounded by Baumann et al. (2014) under 
the moniker of GFO-Time, and space individuals, a first analysis of which has been 
conducted by Baumann et al. (2016) under the moniker of GFO-Space. The therein 
discussed notions of chronoids and topoids are inspired by the works of Brentano (1976) 
about the continuum and by Chisholm (1983) about the boundaries of regions. They 
were intended to describe the phenomenal appearance of time and space allowing the 
modelling of relations between continuous rather than discrete individuals.  
Time entities are classified into temporal regions and time boundaries. Temporal 
regions have an extension and are bounded by time boundaries. These can be called 
points in time since they represent singular instants of time. The most important of 
which are the left and the right boundary resp. the extremal boundaries of a temporal 
region. If such temporal region has exactly one left and exactly one right time 
boundary, it is referred to as a chronoid. Chronoids are the atoms of a mereological 
calculus that allows constructing all types of temporal regions. Since temporal regions 
are continuous individuals, it is postulated that there is always another time boundary 
between two arbitrary time boundaries. This entails the existence of infinitely many 
time points as the time boundaries in a time interval.  
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Moreover, no time boundary can exist without a chronoid, such that every time 
boundary exists as part of a linear ordering of time boundaries, i.e. there will always 
be an arbitrary time boundary that is smaller resp. bigger than a non-extremal 
boundary. The left resp. right time boundary of a chronoid will be the infimum resp. 
supremum of this linear ordering. 
A main objective of GFO-Time was to solve inter alia the issue of the Dividing 
Instant Problem that has been formulated by Allen (1983). This problem pertains to the 
modelling of instantaneous changes. GFO-Time comprises a paradigm that allows 
modelling switching on a light; which poses the question if the light is switched on or off 
at the switching point. To overcome the paradoxical solutions that are yielded by the 
answers it is switched on and off and it is neither switched on nor off, the notion of coinciding 
time boundaries has been introduced. The right time boundary of a chronoid 𝑎 and 
the left time boundary of a chronoid 𝑏 that begins directly after 𝑎 are referred to as 
coinciding. This essentially extends the notion of a continuum in which two intervals 
that follow each other share one point. The chronoids that follow each other by 
means of the coinciding time boundaries do not share any point. The switching point 
is thereby modelled as the meeting of two coinciding boundaries. Figure 3 provides 
an overview of the relevant categories and relations in GFO-Time.  
 
Fig. 3. The basic categories and relations in GFO-Time. 
Space individuals yield a more complex modelling problem since they do not only 
comprise zero-dimensional entitites, i.e. time boundaries, and one-dimensional 
entities, i.e. temporal regions, like time individuals do, but also two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional entities. Moreover, space is not purely phenomenal, it is also 
determined by some spatiotemporal individuals that occupy it. This yields a 
classification of space entities into spatial regions having three dimensions and spatial 
boundaries having fewer dimensions. Topoids are a specific type of spatial regions 
that are completely bounded by spatial boundaries; they are connected, which means 
without any gaps. All other spatial regions can be constructed by a mereological 
calculus with topoids as their atoms. Space boundaries are distinguished according to 
their dimensions: (1) surfaces having two dimensions and being the spatial boundaries 
of topoids, (2) lines having one dimension and being the spatial boundaries of surfaces 
and (3) points having zero dimensions and being the spatial boundaries of lines.   
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Since this theory is based on the continuum as well, topoids are continuous 
individuals. As such, it is possible to construct a dense set of spatial boundaries of the 
𝑛th dimension from an individual of the 𝑛 + 1th dimension. This entails that between 
two extremal boundaries of a line, i.e. the points at both ends of the line, infinitely 
many other points exist that build this line. However, there are special types of spatial 
boundaries that have no extremal boundaries, which is a difference to GFO-Time 
where every chronoid has exactly two extremal boundaries. A circle is a line that has 
no extremal boundaries; all spatial boundaries are internal and taking any of them 
away changes the circle to be a proper line instead. A sphere is a surface that has no 
extremal boundaries, too. It is completely constructed from a set of densely ordered 
circles without any gap. Thus, there are no jumps in a sphere. In contrast, a ball that 
has a sphere as its surface, has this sphere as an extremal boundary. Like a circle, a 
sphere has no extremal boundary. For this reason, it is the ball’s only extremal 
boundary.    
Finally, the coincidence of spatial boundaries is incorporated similarly to the 
coincidence of time boundaries. In GFO-Space, this theory is used to model the 
problem of two touching cubes: One of these cubes is black, one is white, and they 
are touching each other on their surfaces. The question posed by this problem is if 
the surface at which these cubes touch is black and white, black or white or neither of these 
colours. All of these solutions are paradoxical and can be overcome by GFO-Space. 
According to this ontology, the two surfaces are coinciding boundaries that touch 
each other and none of their boundaries are shared, such that there is no surface that 
is formed by the two cubes touching each other. There is nothing in between them 
that can be black and white, black or white or neither of these colours. Therefore, two distinct 
spatial regions never share any points, they are rather externally connected.  
 
2.1.2. Spatiotemporal Individuals 
Spatiotemporal individuals can be classified according to their relation to 
spacetime and their existential dependency to other spatiotemporal individuals. This 
yields a first distinction into presentials, continuants and processes. Continuants are 
persistent individuals, the existence of which is framed by a lifetime. At every point 
in this lifetime, they exhibit a unique presential that is the restriction of the continuant 
to a snapshot. Examples for continuants are ordinary objects like trees, buildings and 
animals. Their presentials are the momentary appearances that we are able to perceive 
from them. Our mind is able to construct the continuants from these presentials like 
a movie is a reconstruction from many frames. Continuants represent the four-
dimensional entities that are the essential entities in process-philosophical ontologies. 
Thus, the lifetime of a continuant is the process of its existence. This formulation 
represents the object-process-integration of GFO.  
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Processes are characterized by their temporal extensions and happen in time. 
They cannot be completely present at a point in time, which is in accordance with the 
uncertainty principle attributed to Heisenberg (1927). Everything left of a process 
after such a restriction is a mere presential without any processual features like velocity 
or acceleration. This presential is referred to as process boundary. GFO provides an 
integration law that states that each continuant corresponds to a process, which is its 
lifetime, and each process boundary of this process corresponds to a presential that 
is temporally located at this process boundary and exhibited by the formerly 
mentioned continuant.  
The integration law enables GFO to solve the following problem: Since an object 
is underpinned by a process, the causal power of this process determines which of 
the object's features may change into a different manifestation. This notion of a 
change is modelled similarly in BFO, where it would be represented as generically 
dependent continuant. However, no integration principle is defined that represents 
the causal dependence between a change and the process that caused it. 
An individual’s features are existentially dependent on this individual and called 
properties, the instances of which are attributives. An attributive depends on its 
bearer, in which it inheres in. A bearer is usually a process, a presential or a continuant. 
The properties of a continuant are persistent during its lifetime, whereas the 
properties of the continuant’s exhibited presentials can change and therefore, the 
appearance of the continuant changes over time. Processual properties can only be 
inhering in processes like the aforementioned properties velocity and acceleration, the 
bearers of which are movements that have continuants as their participants. 
According to the different types of attributives, e.g. relational roles, qualities, 
structural features, individual functions, dispositions, factual, etc., we distinguish 
quality properties resp. intrinsic properties and role properties resp. extrinsic 
properties. Role properties are classified into relational role and social role properties.  
A process 𝑎 project to a temporal region 𝑏 and all of 𝑎’s process boundaries 
project to time boundaries that are time boundaries of 𝑏. There is a basic classification 
of processes with respect to their structural constitution. Within a process, a discrete 
change occurs at two coinciding process boundaries that are exhibiting two different 
properties. A state is a process without any change. A discrete process is composed 
of discrete changes and states. A continuous change of a process can comprises more 
than two time boundaries existing at non-coinciding time boundaries. Furthermore, 
there needs to be a property that allows distinguishing all process boundaries of the 
process in which the continuous change happens. No coinciding time boundaries of 
the process must be distinguishable by this property, i.e. no discrete change can be 
defined by it. If all process boundaries of a process represent continuous changes, the 
process is referred to as continuous process. Process boundaries may be connected 
by the causality relation.   
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If a part of reality can be understood as a coherent whole, this part of reality is 
categorized as a situation, the notion of which is derived from the situation theory 
that has been developed by Barwise & Perry (1983). It has to be noted that understood 
as a coherent whole is just an informal description and not intended to ground a formal 
definition. Situations have no temporal extension and are, hence, presentials.  
Their processual counterpart are situoids that are coherent wholes with a 
temporal extension. A situoid can be restricted to a time point. The result of this 
restriction is a process boundary that happens during the situoid and happens in its 
causal nexus. It is a coherent whole except for the processual properties of the situoid 
and thus, a situation. A situation resp. situoid has constituent parts that are all facts, 
attributives, and presentials resp. continuants that are involved in its causal nexus.  
A presential that occupies space is a material structure. These material structures 
are the connection between the phenomenal space individuals and spatiotemporal 
individuals. A continuant that exhibits material structures only is a material 
continuant. If two material structures 𝑎 and 𝑏 occupy spatial regions that have 
coinciding boundaries, 𝑎 and 𝑏 touch each other phenomenally. Although they 
happen in time and space, processes do not occupy any space directly. The space in 
which they take place is rather defined by the participating presential and the 
presentials of the participating continuants. If these participants are material 
presentials resp. continuants, the space that they occupy is the space in which the 
process they are participating in is happening.  
 
2.1.3. Data and Knowledge 
Per GFO-Data (Herre, 2016), three levels of information are distinguished:  
(1) phenomenal data, (2) factual data, and (3) propositions, whereas the term information is 
used informally to cover both data and knowledge. Data depend on their bearers, and 
we assume that these bearers are concrete individuals. Atomic data are covered in 
GFO-Data by attributives and the corresponding properties; they are constituents for 
complex data. The elementary form and the origin of phenomenal data are sense data, 
but also data which can be measured by instruments. These data correspond to 
qualities. With respect to the bearers, we distinguish between object-data and processual 
data. Object-data inhere in objects. For instance, this red or the weight of this ball 
being an object.  
The bearers of processual data are processes. Processual data are characterized as 
presentic or global. Presentic processual data are associated to process boundaries. The 
global qualities of processes are the richest class of qualities of processes. Their main 
feature is that it does not make any sense to specify them at a process boundary. One 
type of such qualities is abstracted from time series in form of curves. Examples are 
electro-cardiograms or a long-term blood pressure measurement. 
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The non-phenomenal data open a rich field of data. From this field, we will 
consider relational data as the only representative relevant for the herein presented 
work. Relational data are based on relations, which are categories, the instances of 
which are relators. Such relator, being a cognitive creation, is an attributive that is 
composed of roles. Let us consider the following expression 𝐺 ∶=
 “𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛′𝑠 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟”. The subterm “𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘” represents a relation, denoted by 
𝑅𝑒𝑙(𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘). Let 𝑝 be an instance of 𝑅𝑒𝑙(𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘), then from this we may derive two 
roles, the role 𝑞1, that of the drinker, and the role 𝑞2, that of the drunken. John plays 
the role of the drinker and the beer plays the role of the drunken. These constituents 
are composed to a complex entity, a relational fact, expressed by 
“𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛′𝑠 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟”; the fact, denoted by this expression 𝐺, is denoted by 
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺).  
The bearers of a relator are determined resp. specified by the players, which play 
the corresponding roles. The roles themselves occur as unary attributives, though they 
cannot be separated from the relator of which they are a part. Being more abstract 
than phenomenal data, relators and roles are considered as attributives, e.g. qualities. 
These data cannot be accessed by perception and measuring instruments. Relators 
can be classified with respect to the bearers; the role players may be objects or 
processes. We hold that propositions are more abstract parts of the world than facts. 
Elementary relational propositions correspond to relational facts. Let us consider the 
fact 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺), associated to the expression 𝐺 ∶=  “𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛’𝑠  𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟. ”  
By an operation of abstraction the mind transforms the fact 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺) into the 
proposition 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺)) ∶=  “𝐽𝑜ℎ𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑟. ” The modes of 
existence of 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺) and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺)) are different: 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺) is a part of spatio-
temporal reality, whereas 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝐺)) is an abstract entity, the relation to reality 
of which is indirect and mediated by the corresponding fact. Propositions can be 
satisfied or disproved. As such, they can be true or false.  
We emphasize that the interface between data and knowledge occurs at the 
transformation from facts to propositions. Relational propositions are very simple 
expressions which can be used to represent small pieces of knowledge. The 
development of a full-fledged ontology of knowledge, which includes complex 
propositions, theories and knowledge fields, is an important task for the future. Figure 
4 summarizes the basic categories of GFO-Data. The syntax of data uses symbolic 
structures and tokens, which can be saved on a material medium, for example a hard 
disc. The relation between the semantics and syntax of data was investigated by Uciteli 
et al. (2011) where an ontological foundation of the notion of a data element, in the 
sense of the ISO standard 11179, is established which includes the main aspects of 
the Information Artifact Ontology (IAO) introduced by Ceusters & Smith (2015). 
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Fig. 4. Categorial basic structure of GFO-Data 
An ontology about the creation of knowledge is a novel approach that is not 
reflected in any other top-level ontology related research program to the best of our 
knowledge, e.g. BFO, DOLCE or SUMO. If we broaden our scope to the 
organization of knowledge, we can mention the Simple Knowledge Organisation 
System (SKOS) (Miles et al., 2005), which is a widely used W3C standard for the 
organization of knowledge. As its name signifies, this ontology is rather primitive— 
one could say ontologically empty—and provides relations to order a system of 
concepts. SKOS in its entirety is easily reconstructible in GFO with its own notion 
of a concept. There are some extensions of this ontology, that allow making more 
complex propositions about concept systems (Tao et al., 2012). Also, the quality of 
knowledge systems defined with SKOS is discussed by Suominen & Mader (2014). 
Nevertheless, there is no approach that allows creating new knowledge leveraging the 
notion of a concept in SKOS—it remains a tool for organization only. Thus, our 
presented approach is the only work that pertains to a formal ontological notion of 
knowledge. 
2.2. Process Philosophy 
Whitehead’s Process and Reality (denoted by PR) establishes a metaphysical system 
which describes reality as a continuously changing world. It is Whitehead’s opus 
magnum which has a broad scope and concerns the dynamic meaning of being as 
becoming and occurrence, the conditions of spatiotemporal existence, the types of 
dynamic entities and the relationship between mind and the world. The therein 
presented work is considered the principal work of process philosophy with far-
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reaching applications in many areas of science as diverse as ontology, neuro-
psychological foundation, quantum physics, but also in the field of religion.  
Whitehead introduced a system of categories to describe the interrelations 
between all things that have a mode of existence. The Category of the Ultimate specifies 
the fundamental principles, which are presupposed for the three other categories. The 
Category of Existence subsumes all types of existing entities whereas the Category of 
Explanation and the Category of Obligation describe the notions behind the Category of 
Existence, i.e. their basic functions and the relations between instances of the types 
mentioned therein. The most important type included in the category of existence 
subsumes the notion of actual entities, the becoming of which is the crucial part of 
the ontology in PR. Actual entities, being in space and time, are the only components 
reality consists of from a physicalist point of view. All other entities are parts of actual 
entities resp. encoded in them. These parts form the inner structure of each actual 
entity and determine its perceivable attributes. What Whitehead refers to as process 
lies in the becoming of each actual entity and plays an integral part in how the inner 
structure of such entity is established. 
Whitehead refers to the cycle of perceiving and being perceived as the principle of 
advance. Each actual entity plays two roles in the process of becoming. Firstly, in its 
role as a subject of its own becoming it transforms data into knowledge. Secondly, in 
its role as an object it provides this knowledge as data for the becoming of actual 
entities that exist in its future. The process itself is the transformation of data into 
knowledge. Data is a result of perception and no object is perceived directly but rather 
grasped by its attributes. Likewise, an actual entity does not directly perceive other 
actual entities; it perceives its surrounding world as prehensions about the actual entities 
the world consists of. Therefore, each attribute will be reflected as a part of the 
prehension that has been effected by its carrying actual entity. This part is the 
universal property instantiated by the perceived attribute. 
Whitehead calls these concepts eternal objects since they are accessible by any actual 
entity independent to its position in time and thus, comparable to platonic universals 
existing a priori and independent to any existing individual. Each of them is used 
relatively to the prehending subject whereas an object-universal is the same for each 
subject. As an example, we consider the situation that a dog is prehended as 
frightening. The eternal object, used by the subject to describe this dog, is not the 
object-universal dog only. The corresponding eternal object is a composition of the 
object-universal dog and fear as a subjective emotional component which is another 
eternal object. This possibility of composition implies a binary relation over the set of 
all eternal objects. We argue that this relation is a partial ordering; it partially resembles 
the ordering of concept lattices introduced by Ganter & Wille (1999) and ontologically 
investigated by Herre & Loebe (2005). 
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If an actual entity 𝑎 perceives the actual entities 𝑏 and 𝑐 and prehends them by 
means of their common attributes 𝑋 only, then 𝑏 and 𝑐 are perceived as a single entity 
𝑛, because 𝑎 cannot distinguish them and assumes them to be the same. Such unifying 
entities like 𝑛 are the first step in the process of knowledge creation. They are referred 
to as nexūs (sing. nexus). As Whitehead states, they are “Public Matters of Fact”, which 
means they are representations of reality’s facts and every actual entity can access 
them. Based on prehensions an actual entity aggregates a set 𝑆 of entities into a nexus 
representing the unity of 𝑆. This unification is based on the eternal objects instantiated 
by all 𝑋 and relating all members of 𝑆. All these entities carry the same informational 
content and can be identified as unity. This unification represents the unifying relation 
described by Guarino & Welty (2000) that distinguishes a set of individuals from the 
rest of the world. All these entities can be reduced to the same informational content 
and identified as unity. Moreover, this unity necessarily exists from the subjective view 
of the prehending subject only. However, to answer the question if nexūs represent 
phenomenal wholes in the vein of Rescher & Oppenheim (1955) is a considerably 
more complex problem that needs a deeper analysis that cannot be conducted in the 
presented work. 
2.3. Relations between GFO and PR 
We argue that there are similarities between the Whiteheadian process ontology 
and GFO that go beyond an ontology of data and knowledge. For instance, the 
obvious correspondence between eternal objects and categories must be mentioned, 
as well as the assumption that all other types of existence can be mapped to partitions 
of individuals as defined in GFO. Atomic presentials, i.e. presentials without further 
parts, correspond to actual entities and complex presentials to purely spatial nexūs 
without temporal extension. Moreover, continuants are corresponding to nexūs that 
consist of several purely spatial nexūs that can be identified as belonging together 
throughout time by means of a set of attributes that is complex enough to ground 
this identity for an actual entity perceiving these nexūs. The justification of this claim 
needs a deeper analysis of the structural aspects of Whitehead's process ontology 
within the GFO framework.  
In the present work, we not only focus on a representation of the presentic 
perspective of an actual entity and how it processes the sense data from the past. We 
also give a description that additionally comprises the future and will define a 
relational structure, in which a continuously evolving reality in the Whiteheadian sense 
can be represented. Figure 5 displays the relevant components that are associated with 
the perceptual system. This can be described by using the notion of an actual entity, 
the relation of prehension, and eternal objects, which correspond to attributes being 
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universals. Up to this point, we have used the term to perceive interchangeably with to 
prehend because it suited our examples. However, there is a tremendous difference 
between these terms in PR. To prehend something is the simplest relation that refers 
to the reception of data. To perceive something is a more complex relation that refers 
to a conscious reception of a nexus that is synonymous to a proposition and a 
corresponding prehension functioning as truthmaker for this proposition. We will 
address this notion of truth in the presented work and briefly discuss how 




Fig. 5. Physical entity 𝑃 being electromagnetic waves, excitation pattern on the retina 𝑅, and the mind 
𝑀, being dependent on the brain, are actual entities, which are connected by the prehension relation 
whereas the vase 𝑉 is a perceptual object, which is created by the mind by integrating the input of 
the retina and certain eternal objects, to which 𝑀 has access. The perceptual object belongs to the 
internal structure of the mind 𝑀. In the picture, those attributes (resp. eternal objects) of the vase are 
left out which refer to the tactile phenomena. Parts of this figure were created by digitalbob8 (2009). 
In the context of temporal relations, only two of the categories of existence need 
to be explained further: (1) actual entities and (2) prehensions. Reality is conceived as 
continuous flow of information that is processed and caused by actual entities. These 
entities are the only ones which actively participate in reality. All other entities are 
parts of actual entities and consequently, represented as prehensions according to 
PR’s ontological principle which states that there is nothing that cannot be attributed 
to an actual entity. The spatiotemporal location of an actual entity is not determined 
initially. It is rather result of the process of becoming after which it becomes an actual 
occasion, i.e. an actual entity that has some spatiotemporal extension. 
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Naive Reconstruction 
In a strict Whiteheadian sense, the non-temporal extensiveness implies these 
presentials to exists at coinciding time boundaries. To avoid inconsistencies, there 
needs to be a time interval 𝜖 > 0 between the becoming of two subsequently existing 
actual entities. Otherwise, the whole universe would exist at the same time point or 
no actual entity would have an immediate successor, which must be presupposed in 
order to allow changes in the world to occur. However, we prefer a different 
approach, in which these two presentials do not exist at coinciding time boundaries. 
A consideration of these states as presentials entails that an actual entity is a 
continuant that exists at one time point only, which contradicts the axiom of 
continuants having a lifetime represented as a time interval. If we stuck with this strict 
interpretation of a non-extensional becoming, an actual entity would be an 
instantaneous change according to GFO. Furthermore, we had to represent the actual 
entity's initial and final state themselves as the coinciding process boundaries. An 
example for this reconstruction is shown in figure 6. 
Realist Reconstruction 
For explanatory purposes, we propose an approach in which the two presentials 
are exhibited at the left and right boundary of a time interval having an extension 𝜖′ >
0 that can be considered minimal resp. a chronon as defined by Levi (1927). 
Subsequently, the interval is virtually divisible only. This does not contradict the 
ontology of time in GFO explicated by Baumann et al. (2014) since the underlying 
theory copes with phenomenal time rather than physical time on which Whitehead 
claimed to have grounded his work.  
 
 
Fig. 6. The time boundary 𝑎 (resp. 𝑐) coincides 
with the time boundary 𝑏 (resp. 𝑑). 𝐴 (resp. 𝐵) 
is an actual entity, the becoming of which 
happens as instantaneous change between 𝑎 
and 𝑏 (resp. 𝑐 and 𝑑). 𝑐 − 𝑏 >  0 holds. 
   
Fig. 7. The actual entity 𝐴 (resp. 𝐵) is a 
continuant that projects to the time interval 
[𝑎, 𝑏] (resp. [𝑐, 𝑑]). 𝑏 − 𝑎 >  0 (resp. 𝑑 − 𝑐 >
0) holds and defines [𝑎, 𝑏] (resp. [𝑐, 𝑑]) to be a 
special type of time interval called chronon. The 
time boundaries 𝑏 and 𝑐 are coinciding. 
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By means of this representation, we can analyze the Whiteheadian notions in a 
single system that allows distinguishing between the microscopic view concerning the 
becoming of only one actual entity and the macroscopic view concerning the 
spatiotemporal relations between a set of actual entities. An example for this 
reconstruction is shown in figure 7. In PR both views are separated: the first view is 
investigated in the genetic analysis of actual entities, whereas the second view is 
investigated in the morphological analysis of actual entities. The notion of 
extensiveness as generalization of extension helps to overcome the issue of a missing 
connection between both views. 
Strict Reconstruction 
At this point, it makes no sense to represent actual entities as continuants for 
other purposes than explanation. Actual entities do not have any lifetime after their 
becoming because they lapse instantaneously. It has to be noted that lapse is not 
synonymous with vanish. Lapsed actual entities will be analyzed by future actual 
entities and the results of this analysis integrated into their inner structure. 
Furthermore, what is perceivable for other actual entities is not the process of 
becoming but rather the final state of a becoming only. Hence, the most meaningful 
way is to provide a mixed approach unifying both formerly mentioned approaches 
into a representation that comprises the presentic view of one actual entity.  
A necessary feature for this analysis is spatiotemporal extension, which is not 
existent during a becoming since this extension is determined by a subject’s 
concrescence that marks the end of the becoming. Thus, an actual entity is not able 
to prehend its own spatiotemporality since it is not existent yet. It will only be 
accessible by actual entities in its future. To overcome this issue, the term extensiveness 
has been introduced in PR that abstracts from spatiotemporal extension and allows 
describing the becoming of actual entities. This process has no temporal extension 
and, hence, contradicts the notion of a process in GFO. Consequently, it is necessary 
to create an abstract notion of processes that does not only subsume processes with 
a temporal extension but also processes that rather have an extensiveness only. This 
notion can be embedded into GFO by the means of extensiveness intervals that exist 
between two coinciding time boundaries if an instantaneous change happened at these 
time boundaries, which was caused by the concrescence of an actual entity and the 
resulting occurrence of an actual occasion. Figure 8 outlines this relationship between 
extensiveness intervals and time intervals. 
In this figure, an instantaneous change is shown that occurs between the time 
boundary 𝑡0 and 𝑡1. This change is the occurrence of an actual occasion 𝑎 at 𝑡1. 𝑎 was 
not existent at 𝑡0 but occurs at 𝑡1 and will be existent at all time boundaries after 𝑡1. 
We call 𝑎’s past, i.e. all entities existing at 𝑡0, a closed world 𝑊𝐶 since all actual entities 
that lie in this world have an immutable inner structure and some spatiotemporal 
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extension, which qualifies them to be called actual occasions. Thus, 𝑊𝑐 is not able to 
change anymore and immutable itself. Furthermore, we call 𝑎’s present that happens 
between 𝑒0 and 𝑒1 and includes 𝑊𝑐 as well as all actual entities 𝐶 that are 
contemporaneous to 𝑎, an open world 𝑊𝑜 because the inner structure of 𝑎 as well as 
the inner structures of all  𝐶 are still subject to change. 
 
 
Fig. 8. The time boundary 𝑡0 coincides with the time boundary 𝑡1. The actual entities 𝑎’s process of 
becoming 𝐴 results in 𝑎’s occurrence as actual occasion at the time boundary 𝑡1. 𝑎 emerged during 
the extensiveness interval [𝑒0, 𝑒1], which is 𝑎’s present. 𝑒0 coincides with 𝑡0 and 𝑒1 coincides with 
𝑡1. 𝑎's occurence at 𝑡1 caused an instantaneous change between 𝑡0 and 𝑡1. Furthermore, 𝑡0 is the last 
time boundary of 𝑎’s past and 𝑡1 is the first time boundary of 𝑎’s future. 
The beginning of the existence of 𝑎 and all 𝐶 is the transition of 𝑊𝑐 into 𝑊𝑜 and 
happens between 𝑡0 and 𝑒0. Between 𝑡0 and 𝑡1 the process 𝐴 of 𝑎‘s becoming 
happened. To describe such processes that result in an instantaneous change, the 
extensiveness interval [𝑒0, 𝑒1] has to be imagined between 𝑡0 and 𝑡1. 𝐴 can be 
projected to this interval, such that 𝑎’s inner structure is formed during [𝑒0, 𝑒1]. This 
qualifies 𝐴 to be an extensive process. 𝑎 prehends all actual occasions in 𝑊𝑐 as well as all 
𝐶, which Whitehead call 𝑎’s presentational immediacy resp. the extensive relations of its 
present. 𝑊𝑐 and all 𝐶 are the potential that 𝑎 concretizes by means of prehensions 𝑃 
forming the inner structure of 𝑎. All these 𝑃 are existent at 𝑒1, such that 𝑎’s inner 
structure is complete.  
The concrescence of 𝑊𝑜 into a new closed world happens between 𝑒1 and 𝑡1 and 
includes the individual concrescence of 𝑎, which is qualified to be called actual 
occasion from 𝑡1 onwards. In the spatiotemporal world, 𝑎 initally occurs at 𝑡1 and 
exists at each time boundary succeeding 𝑡1. This implies in particular that the term 
actual entity makes sense in context of an extensiveness interval only, whereas actual 
occasions exist in the spatiotemporal world only. In extensiveness intervals, they are 
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exclusively represented by prehensions. An axiom integrating the notion of 
extensiveness into GFO is: If there are arbitrary time intervals 𝑥 and 𝑦 and the last 
time boundary 𝑢 of 𝑥 coincides with the first time boundary 𝑣 of 𝑦, then there exists 
an extensiveness interval, the first extensiveness boundary of which coincides with 𝑢 
and the last extensiveness boundary of which coincides with 𝑣.  
This integration axiom is inconsistent with GFO-Time. Yet, one can modify the 
theory GFO-Time to a new theory GFO-Time with extensiveness chronoids (GFO-
TimeExt) which includes the integration axiom and which can be proved to be 
consistent. In GFO-TimeExt there are two kinds of chronoids: (1) phenomenal chronoids 
and (2) extensiveness chronoids. Furthermore, a modification of the classification of time-
boundaries is needed as well as the introduction of a classification of coincidence 
relations. We must distinguish (1) phenomenal boundaries and (2) extensiveness boundaries 
and various kinds of coincidence relations pertaining to combination of boundary 
types. We intend to formalize a new theory of time in GFO, which we assume to be 
a consistent extension of ℬ𝒯𝒞. The final state of actual entities in the process of their 
becoming and the prehensions that emerged during this becoming are important for 
the presented research. This final state in its representations as an actual occasion and 
this actual occasion’s parts, which are prehensions, can be captured as a complex 
presential. The introduction of these novel notions is necessary to describe 
Whitehead’s concept of a non-temporal becoming and corroborates his comparison 
between actual entities and monads (Leibniz, 1998), which entails an infinitesimal 
character of actual occasions that can be captured by extensiveness intervals. 
2.4. Related Work 
The work of Palomäki & Keto (2007, 2010) deals with the application of 
Whiteheadian philosophy in software engineering. The proposed process ontology is 
a framework that will augment existing models by embedding them into it. In contrast 
to our work, they use connectivity of events as a causal relation between them. Our 
approach considers prehensions, which are the foundation of each becoming event. 
Without considering prehensions, the becoming of entities is limited to the final state 
as actual occasion and no temporal relations can be derived formally.  
The extensive abstraction of events is highly influential in the research area of 
Qualitative Spatial Reasoning. An extension of these approaches is investigated by 
Vakarelov (2010, 2014). He creates a dynamic mereotopology by incorporating the 
epochal theory of time into contact algebras. In contrast to a mere consideration of 
the spatiotemporal representation of reality, our work used an interpretation of actual 
entities and how they obtain prehensions as well as their final concrescence which 
forms reality. Moreover, the architecture of PACIS is worth mentioning and was 
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based on ontological categories discussed by Simons (1994). These categories were 
inspired by the categorial system introduced in PR.  
A use case to apply an ontology of perception is given by Galton et al. (2016), 
which is based on BFO and IAO. Galton et al. emphasize the processual nature of 
relations inherent in the processing of histological images. The reduction of 
information immanent in these processes allows a qualitative conceptualization of 
data items. This reduction closely resembles how nexūs are created to abstract from 
exhaustive granularity. Although the terminology is rather technical, their ontological 
layers can be mapped easily onto layers of perception as shown in figure 7. However, 
we argue that a formal ontology can be regarded as foundation of computer vision 
and image processing only if it is based on human perception rather than a technical 
substitute. 
Apart from an immediate usage in computer science, we mention work that copes 
with an ontological analysis of PR. As already elaborated in the second section, there 
are two ways to analyze the becoming of actual entities: by either regarding their 
genetic or their morphological aspects. Henry (1993) discusses an implementation of 
the genetic character of actual entities in the programming language PROLOG, which 
is, best to our knowledge, the only analysis of these aspects. The representation of 
prehensions is very different to our approach since they already include the notion of 
subjective forms inherently. Each subjective form is a subrelation of the relation 
𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑎, 𝑏), which denotes that 𝑎 prehends 𝑏, and, additionally, corresponds to 
an eternal object which implies a redundancy in the nomenclature. However, the 
included programs do not represent a foundational analysis but rather show the 
possibility of such implementation in PROLOG as well as its implications.  
The morphological aspects of actual entities are discussed in many works, the 
most recent conducted by Simons (2000) and Ridder (2002), with some of them 
pertaining to an application as the foundation of mereotopology. These works refer 
to the extensiveness of events that has been introduced in works prior to PR 
(Whitehead, 1920). Ridder and, additionally, Casati & Varzi (1999) as well as Clarke 
(1981), analyze the dedicated region calculus in PR, which was inspired by the work 
of de Laguna (1922). This calculus has a different basis since the notion of an event 
has become negligible in PR; it is reduced to an arbitrary set of actual entities. The 
notion of a region is based on nexūs. Nexūs are the only objects in PR that are able 
occupy space. A region is the phenomenal representation of such space that is 
occupied by a nexus. We, however, do not focus on such analysis of how actual 
entities perceive their world spatially but rather how they perceive it conceptually, 
which is the foundation of spatial representation.  
Similarly, the notion of time in process philosophy is a topic that has never been 
analyzed formally best to our knowledge. It has been subject of the philosophical 
enquiries of Mays (1972), Brennan (1974) and Wiehl (1975). However, the topic is 
Materials and Methods 29  
 
discussed seldom nowadays with the exception of Griffin (2001). The main purpose 
of these works is a categorization of the notion of time as it is experienced by humans, 
i.e. phenomenal time that is relative to an observer. This subjective notion of time is 
to be distinguished clearly from physical time, which denotes time as it is objectively. 
The characterization of physical time is either just a vehicle to retrieve the subjective 
interpretation via the method of extensive abstraction, which has been introduced in 
PR, or the characterization is completely disassociated from physical time as in the 
approach of Schwer (2008). An application of the epochal theory of time, as 
Whitehead called his approach to phenomenal time, to the field of psychology has 
been presented by Teixeira (2011). Thus, the presented reconstruction of this theory 
is the first attempt to realize such formal interpretation.  
2.5. Medical Data Science 
The framework to represent the relationship between data and knowledge, as 
presented in thesis, is applied to a use case in medical informatics which is inspired 
by the projects of the Leipziger Forschungszentrum für Zivilisationserkrankungen 
(LIFE) (Löffler et al., 2015). In the course of this project, several studies are carried 
out which provide a perfect example for our discussion. In the discussion part of this 
work, we will describe how study data, like these data which have been collected in 
LIFE, need to be represented according to our approach and how meaningful data 
clusters can be generated based on Whiteheadian notions. These clusters are based 
on medical concepts, e.g. weight, height and sex, as well as on the results of three-
dimensional whole-body scanners, which has been summarized by Löffler-Wirth et 
al. (2016).  
Several empirical methods that can approximate the body surface of humans have 
been applied to the study data. The results of these methods were tested by 
Kuehnapfel et al. (2017) against the results of the body scanners. We use these 
methods as the means of knowledge creation and interpret their results as 
propositions about study data.  
The term information system has been defined as a group of components that 
interact to produce information (Kroenke, 2015), which we understand as knowledge 
according to the argumentation of GFO-Data. The internal representation of data 
and the produced knowledge is determined by a data model that functions as 
vocabulary. Current data models are designed to capture presentic data like a snapshot 
rather than taking into account the possibility of changing individuals, which is an 
issue that we address in this work. This is especially important in the context of 
distributed information systems that comprise several processing units that are 
distinct spatially and content-wise, although their content can be redundant. Inspired 
by the data model of the LIFE database, we outline an exemplary information system 
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working with our framework. Thus, no real patient data has been used. This 
information system will show how knowledge can be represented according to our 
presented framework. Therein, a classification into percentiles, as defined by 
Langford (2006), will be used to the aggregate study participants into meaningful 
classes. 
Definition A 𝑃𝑡ℎ percentile value is a number which puts at least 𝑃 percent of the data values at 
that number or below and at least (100 −  𝑃) percent of the data values at that number or above. 
If more than one such number exists, there will be an entire interval of such and we choose the 
𝑃𝑡ℎ percentile value to be the midpoint of that interval. 
Based on this definition of percentiles, we chose a common classification based 
on the 5th percentile, 50th percentile and 95th percentile with respect to the height, 
weight and body surface, which allow a partitioning of the study participants based 
on extreme and average values. The body surface has been measured by a three-
dimensional whole-body scanner. Additionally, the information system will use 
formulas to generate propositions about study participants. We mention formula (1), 
which was presented by Anderson et al. (2013), and formula (2), which was presented 
by Mosteller (1987), as examples for such formulas. The generated propositions can 
be validated against the measured body surface values, which represent factual data: 
 
𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒1  =  0.0239 × ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
0.417 ×  𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡0.517 (1) 
𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒2  =  0.0167 ×  ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
0.5 ×  𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡0.5 (2) 
 
Finally, we will compare this representation of knowledge as propositions to a 
representation as concepts in the sense of OWL. OWL is the state-of-the-art ontology 
language and thus, the first choice for knowledge engineers to model knowledge 
about a domain. This language allows defining classes of study participants that extend 
concepts relevant for LIFE, e.g. the class of all participants whose weight is smaller 
than the 5th percentile. A proposition can be defined as such class. In a Semantic Web-
based data model, this would usually be modelled as OWL class and an equivalent 
anonymous class that form an equivalence axiom. We assume 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 and 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 to be such classes and 𝐡𝐚𝐬_𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐲 to the object property 
defined in GFO. The extension 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡, of the concept 
instantiated by participants having the minimum weight, is modelled by the 
equivalence axiom 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 and  
𝐡𝐚𝐬_𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐲 some 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡. We will consider several aspects of these 





3. Knowledge Structures 
Whitehead's Category of Existence subsumes all types of existing entities. The 
subsequent Category of Explanation and Category of Obligation describe the notion 
of these types and their basic functional properties as well as relations between their 
instances. We summarize how the main categories that are subsumed by the Category 
of Existence, i.e. actual entities, prehensions, eternal object, nexūs, and propositions, 
must be specified to support applications in the theory of data and knowledge. This 
summary will implicitly use the postulations and assumptions in Category of 
Explanation and the Category of Obligation. Moreover, we will discuss the notion of 
subjective truth that a proposition can have for subject prehending it. This discussions 
includes a comparison of this notion regarding its counterpart that has been proposed 
in GFO-Data. 
3.1. Actual Entities 
Actual entities can play two different roles. The first role pertains to the process 
of spatiotemporal reality in which actual entities represent events, whereas the other 
refers to an actual entity's own process of becoming as a subject. If a reference is 
made to an actual entity's extensiveness, i.e. its position in time or space, we are talking 
about its corresponding actual occasion. Since it has no temporal extension, we argue 
that each becoming resembles an instantaneous change between two actual entities 
both of which can be understood as presentials of the same continuant. This notion 
of a continuant is used in a more general sense than in GFO. We assume that two 
actual entities that have attributives with a sufficient similarity can define a continuant, 
the lifetime of which is a chronon; they can be composed to a minimal continuant. 
An effected change is only to some degree specific to the actual entity, because an 
external determination exists due to the nature of eternal objects that will be explained 
later. 
It seems intuitive that an actual entity corresponds to a phenomenal entity that 
can be perceived directly at a certain point of time, e.g. the presential of an apple or a 
car. Quite contrary to this conception, actual entities can be found in the microscopic 
realm of reality, such that all atomic presentials, which are parts of the presential of a 
car, are actual entities. The car itself is in fact a nexus, the notion of which we want 
to elucidate later. However, in the context of information systems, the analysis of data 
is done by information systems only. Hence, we restrict our notion of becoming actual 
entities to these systems. An actual entity is a state of such information system and its 
becoming is the analysis of phenomenal data.  
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Obviously, Whitehead could not have foreseen this usage of his vocabulary and 
accordingly, we do not want to use the term actual entity to categorize information 
systems. Such systems are rather artificial actual entities that have been created by 
humans. However, not all artificially created things are just assembled from actual 
entities like the aforementioned car, whereas information systems are able to produce 
information, which qualifies them as a novel kind of actual entity. Therefore, we 
introduce the term artefactual entities if we talk about actual entities that have been 
created artificially and are themselves able to produce information. In the simplest 
case, this pertains to a single processing unit only. In the context of distributed 
information systems, it is possible to grasp each processing unit as artefactual entity 
that not only concludes its own data but also the data of other processing units.  
The becoming of actual entities, about which data is collected, is not part of an 
information system; the results of their becoming are processed by the information 
system. To represent the becoming of an actual entity external to the information 
system seems to be non-plausible since it is impossible to reconstruct it correctly. 
Consequently, we only have to discuss their representation within an artefactual entity 
according to PR. This representation does not need to be exhaustively granular. The 
notion of mereological atomicity completely depends on the use case for which the 
information system has been implemented.  
This use case and the kind of knowledge the information system is intended to 
produce will be reflected in its data model. For instance, the presential of a car can be 
understood as atomic if it does not have any parts, which qualifies the car to be 
modelled as actual entity. A data model does not need to be defined more granulary 
if the produced knowledge should only pertain to cars as wholes. If the information 
system has to answer questions about the car's parts too, it is not an actual entity but 
rather an aggregate of entities. Then, we understand each of its atomic elements as 
actual entities. All non-atomic elements, i.e. entities that are aggregates themselves, 
are analyzed likewise until the car is completely disassembled into atoms, i.e. all actual 
entities the car is assembled of. 
3.2. Eternal Objects 
The sense data of a presentic actual entity represents lapsed actual entities in form 
of prehensions. In a strict Whiteheadian sense, this refers to all lapsed actual entities. 
Therefore, attributes inhering in such lapsed actual entity 𝑎 will be reflected in the 
prehension 𝑎 effects in the prehending actual entity. This pertains to the universal, 
which the attribute instantiates, since prehensions do not comprise universals only 
but also emotional components.  
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As an example, we consider the situation in which a dog is prehended as 
frightening. The eternal object used by the subject to describe this dog is not the 
object-universal dog only. It is a composition of this object-universal and fear as a 
subjective emotional component which is another eternal object. Thus, there exists a 
class of entities that is referred to as eternal objects according to Whitehead. Each of 
them can be used relatively to a prehending subject, whereas an object-universal will 
be the same for each subject. In PR, these compositions are called subjective forms. 
Subjective forms resemble aspectual derivatives as presented and discussed by Herre 
(2013). However, attributes that can be reflected in a prehension are restricted by the 
spatiotemporal distance between the actual entity they are inhering in and the 
prehending actual entity.  
A single eternal object can describe actual entities exhaustively and thus, the 
analysis of a becoming subject results in information as a composite eternal object, 
which is an eternal object itself. The existence of such complex objects implies an 
ordering between all eternal objects enabling actual entities to evaluate their analysis 
regarding the relevance of the results. Whitehead presupposes the existence of a 
unique actual entity which has no predecessors, i.e. the only actual entity which does 
not prehend any actual occasion. It rather prehends all eternal objects; it exists at each 
left extensiveness boundary and its internal structure implies a binary relation over 
the set of all eternal objects. We argue that this relation is a partial ordering. To a 
certain extend, this ordering resembles the ordering of concept lattices that was 
introduced by Ganter & Wille (1999) and ontologically investigated by Herre & Loebe 
(2005). The system of eternal objects, together with a binary relation ≤, is called 
ontology structure and is represented by the pair 𝑂𝑆 = (𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙, ≤). We stipulate 
that ≤ is the already mentioned partial ordering over the set of all eternal objects. 
This stipulation allows us to use the notions of mereology to describe the 
interrelations of eternal objects. Assume a car that instantiates the categories green 
and cabriolet. Both categories correspond to eternal objects. The existence of a 
mereological sum of these two eternal objects indicates a complex eternal object 
describing green cabriolets. This composition has a higher informational value than 
its parts on their own or can be trivial, e.g. the sum of the eternal objects cabriolet and 
four-wheeled, which yields that four-wheeled must be neglected if we assume that all cars 
have four wheels. If a sum exists, we say that both eternal objects intensify each other. 
If, on the other hand, there is no eternal object as their least upper bound, they are 
contradictory, e.g. there is no upper bound for the eternal objects four-wheeled and 
motorbike. This implies that ontology structures are no classical extensional models 
according to the classification of mereological systems by Simons (2000). 
Nevertheless, it is inevitable to prove if the axioms of minimal extensional mereology 
hold to justify ontology structures as proper mereological systems, which have to be 
investigated in our further works.  
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In PR, eternal objects can be analyzed as granular as actual entities. Indeed, the 
problem shown in figure 5 on page 33 does not necessarily yield the perception of an 
eternal object that corresponds to the universal vase but rather a set of more simple 
eternal objects. This set describes the vase’s surface structures and how they are 
demarcated by fiat boundaries between them and separated from the surroundings by 
bona fide boundaries, as defined by Smith & Varzi (1997). Each of these surfaces 
instantiates an ideal mathematical universal, e.g. rectangle, circle, square, etc., that 
corresponds to an eternal object. These eternal objects that can be composed to the 
eternal object corresponding to the universal vase resp. can be abstracted to the 
proposition that there is in fact a vase. We argue that this abstraction can already be 
understood as knowledge and hence, is more than plain physical data. However, since 
we do not exhaustively analyze actual entities, it is unnecessary for ontology structures 
to include eternal objects that exceed the granularity of an underlying data model. 
More precise, the subset of atomic eternal objects in 𝑂𝑆 exactly reflects the data 
model of an information system that implements our approach. 
For each actual entity 𝑒 there is a unique eternal object, called subjective aim. This 
aim helps 𝑒 to choose valuable data during its becoming by providing the abstraction 
of an ideal outcome. This can be specific pieces of information that an artifactual 
entity needs to produce until it stops to process its provided data. In addition, this 
aim determines which eternal object 𝑜 is selected by 𝑒 to give meaning to a datum, 
i.e. another entity 𝑒′, which does not necessarily need to be an actual entity. This 
general notion of an entity will be introduced later. We argue that this notion is an 
important addition to distributed information systems in which each processing unit 
serves a different purpose. Otherwise, we could assume that subjective forms are 
selected without any restriction apart from 𝑂𝑆.  
The eventual assignment of 𝑜 to 𝑒′ is called objectification of 𝑒′ and thus, 
establishes a subject-object-relationship between 𝑒 and 𝑒′. This relation characterizes 
𝑒 as subject and 𝑒′ as object. 𝑜 provides a potential representation of 𝑒′ in the internal 
structure of 𝑒, as well as a valuation of 𝑒′, regarding the subjective aim of 𝑒. 
Subsequently, a subjective form is a possible composition of eternal objects 
representing an objectified entity and its value for a specific subject. Since each 
composition of eternal objects is an eternal object too, the subjective form 𝑜 is a 
complex eternal object. 𝑜's role of being a subjective form existentially depends on 
the actual entity 𝑒 playing the role of a subject and the entity 𝑒′ playing the role of an 
objectified entity. This relation is a basic relation, which is denoted by 
𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑓), i.e. 𝑠 prehends 𝑒 by means of the form 𝑓. 
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3.3. Prehensions 
Informally, a prehension is an act of grasping something either by means of sense 
or mind. During the process of becoming, an actual entity creates composite entities 
forming its internal structure. Each of these entities is a reaction to other actual 
entities and to the eternal objects characterizing this reaction. We intend to formalize 
these notions in the context of relational structures 𝐾𝑆 = (𝑊, 𝑂𝑆, 𝑅𝑒𝑙). 𝐾𝑆 are 
referred to as knowledge structures, because they include the main components taken 
from Whitehead's philosophy which are crucial for the elucidation of data and 
knowledge. Here, 𝑊 denotes the world, consisting of spatiotemporal entities, which 
subsumes the set of all entities that are no eternal objects, e.g. actual entities, 
prehensions, nexūs and propositions, 𝑂𝑆 is an ontology structure as introduced above 
and 𝑅𝑒𝑙 a set of binary relations between elements of 𝑊 ∪  𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙. We will refer 
to 𝑊 ∪  𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 as the universe, the elements of which are called entities.  
In this section, we additionally introduce three binary relations 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑙, such that: (1) 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) denotes that an actual 
entity 𝑎 is the subject of a prehension 𝑏, (2) 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚(𝑎, 𝑏) denotes that an entity 𝑎 is 
the datum of a prehension 𝑏, (3) 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑎, 𝑏) denotes that an eternal object 𝑎 is the 
form of a prehension 𝑏. 
3.3.1. Subject and Object 
The earlier mentioned relationship between subject, object and form is crucial to 
the definition of prehensions. A subject objectifies a datum by assigning a subjective 
form to it. In this context, objectification means making a datum graspable by 
assigning abstract universals and emotions to it. The instances of these universals are 
inhering in the datum resp. the datum itself is instantiating them. All these universals 
are composed into a complex eternal object that is used as a subjective form that 
represents an objective interpretation from the perspective of the subject. 
Prehensions are reifications of the relation between subject, datum and subjective 
form, and encode such objectifications, i.e. how entities produce information out of 
data.  
In this section, we focus on those entities described in PR, which are relevant for 
the analysis of data; these are prehensions of actual entities, and eternal objects. These 
types are sufficient to describe the acquisition of phenomenal data. The process of 
objectification results in prehensions, the representation of which we will explain as 
elements of knowledge structures in the following. Moreover, we will paraphrase the 
axioms that must hold in knowledge structures. The set of all prehensions 
𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a subset of the formerly mentioned world 𝑊 and its members shape 
the internal structure of actual entities.  
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The relation 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠, 𝑝) relates a subject 𝑠, which is an actual entity, to a 
prehension 𝑝. 𝑝 is existentially dependent on 𝑠 and 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 is an inverse functional 
relation. Thus, we can define a function 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑝) =  𝑠 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠, 𝑝). The 
relation 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚(𝑑, 𝑝) relates a datum 𝑑, which is an element of (𝑊 ∖
𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) ∪ 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙, to a prehension 𝑝 that is prehended by its subject 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑝). 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚 is an inverse functional relation like 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, such that we can 
define another function 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚(𝑝)  =  𝑑 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑑, 𝑝). 
According to the type of their datum, we distinguish between physical and 
conceptual prehensions. Both have different sources. Physical prehensions emerge 
from actual sense data, whereas conceptual prehensions are products of an actual 
entity's psychological processes during its becoming and represent relational data. All 
other prehensions are called impure because they integrate both types of data. The 
question arises how it is possible to acquire relational data. According to Whitehead's 
ontological principle, every datum is derived from an actual entity. Thus, there is a 
connection between the ontology structure 𝑂𝑆 and the actual entities. The answer is 
given by the Category of Conceptual Valuation, which states that every physical 
prehension is reproduced as a conceptual prehension functioning as its corresponding 
conceptual valuation. 
3.3.2. Subjective Form 
The subjective evaluation of a datum by a subject is modelled likewise. The 
relation 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑓, 𝑝) relates the subjective form 𝑓, which is a composite eternal 
object, to a prehension 𝑝. Since a prehension is an act of grasping a datum, the 
subjective form is the result of this act. We argue that 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 is also an inverse 
functional relation, since it is specific to the uniquely defined 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑝) to which 𝑝 
is existentially dependent. Without the subject, the subjective form would be nothing 
more than a mere eternal object. Thus, we define the function 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑝) =
 𝑓 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑓, 𝑝). In future works, we want to analyze the mechanism of this 
composition more thoroughly since they have to be completely reflected in ≤.  
If 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 exclusively consists of concepts, which project to a two-valued 
domain, i.e. the truth value of an instantiation relation, 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 could be analyzed as 
a set of mere property universals. However, if we consider property universals, the 
size of which projects to an arbitrarily large value domain, the character of a subjective 
form can only be captured if we assume 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 to be a set of tuples (𝑢, 𝑣) of 
property universal 𝑢 and a value 𝑣 that belongs to 𝑢’s value domain. This is the reason 
why Whitehead emphasizes the vector character of subjective forms—𝑢 pertains to 
a specific component and 𝑣 to its value. In GFO, such tuple is reflected as property 
individual 𝑝 with its instantiated property universal and a value belonging to the 
universal property’s value domain.  
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In PR, there is no such elaborate distinction, since the only involved notion is 
that of an eternal object. In fact, (𝑢, 𝑣) itself is a complex eternal entity 𝑢 + 𝑣 which 
has 𝑢 and 𝑣 as its parts. This behaviour must be followed strictly in a formal 
description of ontology structures. Nevertheless, we want to refer to subjective forms 
as property vectors that are data an information system captures about another entity. 
It is obvious that physical prehensions will be evaluated differently than conceptual 
prehensions. Moreover, according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, the 
subjective forms of conceptual prehensions represent the evaluation of physical 
prehensions. This yields that the instantiated universal property 𝑝𝑢 of the individual 
properties 𝑝𝑖 inhering in a physical datum 𝑑 are the components of its subjective form 
according to a prehending subject. The value of 𝑝𝑢 is the instantiated value of 𝑝𝑐's 
value. This resembles the way we understand physical appearance. Assume an apple 
in which the individual property 𝑟𝑒𝑑 inheres in, which instantiates a property 
universal red. Our mind processes this individual property and represents it by red 
which is our conceptual interpretation of 𝑟𝑒𝑑. We argue that, in GFO, this is the way 
how entities of the ideal ontological region and entities from the material region can 
be semantically integrated into the psychological region. 
Obviously, this example was simplified to explain the interrelation between 
property universals and individual properties in the context of prehensions. The 
colour red is no physical datum but rather the conceptualization of a physical datum 
in the psychological region of an actual entity. Thus, red would be the subjective form 
of a conceptual prehension 𝑐. Its corresponding physical prehension 𝑝 has the 
subjective form 𝑓𝑝  =  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑝) that is a vector based on the physical individual 
properties inhering in the datum 𝑑 =  𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚(𝑝). The subject 𝑠 =  𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑝) 
perceives 𝑑’s individual properties as their universal counterparts in form of 𝑓𝑝. The 
Category of Conceptual Valuation effects a conceptual prehension with 𝑠 as its 
subject, 𝑓𝑝 as its datum and an eternal object 𝑓𝑐 as its form. 𝑓𝑐 is the conceptual 
interpretation of the physical data and the psychological representation of the colour 
red that defines the appearance of 𝑑 from 𝑠’s perspective. Since 𝑓𝑝 and 𝑓𝑐 are in an 
injective relationship, there needs to be an evaluation function ‖⋅‖: 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ×
𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙, such that ‖𝑓𝑝‖ = 𝑓𝑐 holds. The possibly endomorphic character of this 
function needs further formal ontological investigation in later works to integrate it 
into ontology structures. Moreover, ‖⋅‖ implies a restriction of 𝑂𝑆 that is isomorphic 
to the formerly mentioned categorial parthood relation that has been investigated by 
Herre et al. (2006). 
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3.3.3. Example 
Let us consider an observer 𝑜 and a loudspeaker 𝑙1 facing him. 𝑙1’s emission of a 
sound wave 𝑠 is an attributive and observable as a phenomenal datum by 𝑜. 
Furthermore, assume a second loudspeaker 𝑙2 next to 𝑙1 which emits the same sound 
wave as 𝑙1. According to the stereo effect, 𝑜 will recognize the emission of a unique 
sound wave 𝑠′ as phenomenal datum. 𝑜 is unable to distinguish between the sound 
waves of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2. But, because 𝑜 faces them directly, it may distinguish these 
concrete individuals visually by grasping further phenomenal data provided by these 
loudspeakers. Applying the formalism, we define 𝑜, 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 as actual entities and 𝑜 
has prehensions 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 corresponding to the respective loudspeakers. 
The spatial positions and sound emissions of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 are encoded by the 
property vectors 𝒍𝟏 and 𝒍𝟐. Figure 9 shows both physical prehensions 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, 
which are perceived by 𝑜. The datum of 𝑝1 (resp. 𝑝2) is 𝑙1 (resp. 𝑙2). The subjective 
form of 𝑝1 (resp. 𝑝2) is 𝑙1 (resp. 𝑙2). The Category of Conceptual Valuation follows 
the existence of conceptual prehensions 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 with 𝑠 as their common subject. 
The datum of 𝑐1 (resp. 𝑐2) is 𝒍𝟏 (resp. 𝒍𝟐). Assume the existence of the eternal objects 
𝐿1, 𝐿2 and 𝑆 representing the conceptualization of the visually perceivable properties 
of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2, which identify them as distinct loudspeakers, and the sound wave 𝑠 they 
are emitting. They are referring to some components of 𝒍𝟏 and 𝒍𝟐 and how they are 
evaluated by 𝑠. Let + be the mereological sum of eternal objects based on ≤, such 
that 𝐿1 ≤  𝐿1 + 𝑆, 𝑆 ≤ 𝐿1 + 𝑆, 𝐿2 ≤  𝐿2 + 𝑆 and 𝑆 ≤ 𝐿2 + 𝑆 holds. 𝐿1 + 𝑆 and 
𝐿2 + 𝑆 denote the subjective forms of the conceptual valuations of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2. Figure 
10 shows both conceptual prehensions 𝑐1 and 𝑐2. 
Here we can detect the striking parallels between GFO-Data and PR. The 
physical prehension 𝑝𝑘  resembles the bundle 𝑏 of all phenomenal data inhering in 𝑙𝑘, 
i.e. a set of object facts, and thereby each quality 𝑜 can perceive from them. 𝑝𝑘 's 
subjective form 𝐿𝑘 + 𝑆 is the fusion of all categories instantiated by the elements of 
𝑏 as an eternal object. To perceive an individual quality of 𝑙𝑘, 𝑜 must divide 𝑙𝑘 into 
atomic parts to create more granular prehensions. The prehensions 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛 of 
𝑙𝑘 can be inherited by 𝑜 as 𝑝1
′  , 𝑝2
′  , … , 𝑝𝑛
′  with modified subjective forms. There will 
be a prehension 𝑝𝑖 in 𝑙𝑘 inherited by 𝑜 that effects its sound emission, which 
instantiates the universal sound emission corresponding to 𝑆. Thus, 𝑝𝑖
′'s subjective 
form has 𝑆 as a part. Let us extend the inheritance to contain a historical way from 
the loudspeaker over the ears and cochlear nerves up to 𝑜's brain, which can prehend 
sound emissions consciously. An analysis of 𝑝𝑖 and this historical way will enable us 
to analyze the principles of perception further. We plan to embed this procedural 
concept into GFO-Data to show how phenomenal data is acquired similarly to the 
process shown in figure 5 on page 23. 




Fig. 9. The prehensions of an observer 𝑜 
regarding two loudspeakers 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 emitting 
the same sound wave 𝑠 which make them 
indistinguishable regarding this emission. 𝑜 
perceives 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 by means of their property 
vectors 𝒍𝟏 and 𝒍𝟐 as physical data. 
 
Fig. 10. The conceptual evaluation of an 
observer 𝑜 regarding two loudspeakers 𝑙1 and 
𝑙2 emitting the same sound wave 𝑠. 𝑜 evaluates 
their physical data by means of the conceptual 
entities 𝐿1 + 𝑆 and 𝐿2 + 𝑆. 
3.4. Nexūs 
Let us reconsider the example of the observer and the two loudspeakers and 
imagine the same situation in an environment without light. 𝑜 can perceive the sound 
emission only, such that the perceivable attributives of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 are the same. Hence, 
a visual distinction is not possible anymore. The property vectors 𝒍𝟏 and 𝒍𝟐 do not 
capture any information about the visually perceivable properties of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2. Thus, 
although there are two different actual entities, 𝑜 perceives only a single entity. The 
act of grasping two concrete individuals as one entity is a specific ability of actual 
entities and yields a special category instantiated by the mind-dependent individual 𝑛 
existing for the observer of this phenomenon only.  
In PR, individuals like 𝑛 are called nexūs. The actual entities they subsume are 
referred to as their members which makes nexūs similar to relators in GFO, although 
these relators have no members but players of specific roles. The relation between a 
nexus and its members can be compared  to that between collectives and their 
members as described by Wood & Galton (2009). However, the members of a nexus 
are not only dependent on a certain time interval in which they are related to each 
other by means of an eternal object. They also dependent on the subject which 
prehends it. Additionally, a nexus is not necessarily a continuant; it is also possible 
that nexūs exist at a time instant only because they are created by an actual entity 
which exists at a single point in time, too. Therefore, it is a more general notion than 
that of a collective.  
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The purpose of nexūs is to provide abstraction from exhaustive granularity or to 
express missing differentiation between individuals for the subject prehending it. As 
Whitehead states that they are Public Matters of Fact, which means they are 
representations of reality's facts and every actual entity can access them. We introduce 
the binary relation 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑙, such that 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟(𝑎, 𝑏) denotes that an actual 
entity 𝑎 is a member of the nexus 𝑏. Based on prehensions an actual entity aggregates 
a set 𝑆 of entities into a nexus representing the unity of 𝑆.  
This unification is based on the concepts relating all members of 𝑆, which 
represents the unifying relation as described by Guarino & Welty (2000) that 
distinguishes a set of individuals from the rest of the world. All these entities can be 
reduced to the same informational content and identified as unity. Moreover, this 
unity necessarily exists from the subjective view of the prehending subject only. 
However, to answer the question if nexūs represent phenomenal wholes in the vein 
of Rescher & Oppenheim (1955) is a considerably more complex problem that needs 
a deeper analysis.  
The formerly mentioned representation of a car, which can be decomposed into 
a set of actual entities, can be analyzed as nexus. If we assume this car being red, there 
are many collocated entities 𝑆 that are conceptually evaluated as red entities. The 
common properties of the property vectors of these 𝑆 resp. the subjective forms of 
their conceptual valuations in combination with their collocation, allows an observer 
to perceive them as nexus based on their individual red color. Consequently, this 
observer is enabled to refer to all 𝑆 as a whole, which depends on its parts but can be 
prehended in abstraction to them. Due to this representation as wholes that are part 
of the physical world, a prehension is a physical prehension if its datum is a nexūs.  
In the following, we will paraphrase the formal definition of a nexus independent 
to spatial properties. In the current state of our research, we will focus on conceptual 
similarity because spatial relations are not important for the proof of concept, which 
will be presented later. Nexūs are grounded on their common element of form. This 
means that every entity that is member of a nexus 𝑛 for a given subject must be 
associated with a specific concept 𝑐. 𝑐 is 𝑛’s common element of form. Let us 
consider all prehensions having an arbitrary 𝑠 as their common subjects. All elements 
of a set of prehensions 𝑃 that have a form 𝑓, such that 𝑐 is a subconcept of 𝑓, denoted 
by 𝑐 ≤ 𝑓, will provide the set 𝑂 =  𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑚(𝑃) of their objects as the members of 
𝑛. Thus, 𝑠 will have a prehension with 𝑛 as its object and 𝑐 as its form. If there is no 
need for an information system to consider all other properties of the elements of 𝑂, 
𝑛 is their abstraction and used instead of those elements. Such nexus is used to 
describe a mereological fusion of a set of actual entities to a complex entity, according 
to their common prehensions.  
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If there is more than one 𝑐 as common subjective form of all 𝑂, it is possible to 
imagine as many nexūs, in which these 𝑂 occur together, as there are 𝑐. We hold that 
a set of actual entities should be represented by exactly one nexus only. In further 
works, this claim will be investigated with respect to the order of categories in GFO.  
3.5. Propositions 
We hold that the simplest constituents of knowledge are propositions about 
perceived data resp. how they are prehended by some subject or observer. In PR, a 
prosaic representation of propositions is given based on the notions that have already 
been examined in the previous chapters. A proposition is the datum of a prehension 
that yields a psychological interpretation of the world and goes beyond phenomenal 
data as well as their conceptual evaluations and thus, all facts of reality. Rather, they 
provide the possibility to express subjective statements and predictions about the 
world made by a subject perceiving it. Nexūs are the logical objects of propositions 
and provide an abstraction from the atomic view at the expense of accuracy. Due to 
the microscopical character of actual entities and their inherent existence as the factual 
absolute, only nexūs leave room for interpretation beyond perceivable facts. They 
provide a subject-dependent abstract representation that allows a comparison to 
similar nexūs and their properties.  
Whitehead describes propositions as lures for feelings. We introduce the binary 
relations 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑙, such that (1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑛, 𝑝) denotes 
that a nexus 𝑛 is the logical subject of the proposition 𝑝 and (2) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑜, 𝑝) 
denotes that an eternal object 𝑜 is the predicate of the proposition 𝑝. Both relations 
are inverse functional. In the simplified view of the present work, the predicate 𝑜 of 
a proposition 𝑝 can be understood as a logical unary predicate 𝑃. 𝑃 is satisfied by the 
logical subject 𝑛 of 𝑝, such that 𝑝 is encoding the logical predicate 𝑃(𝑛). The actual 
entity that prehends 𝑝 deems 𝑝 to be true. However, if 𝑜 is a composite eternal object, 
all atomic eternal objects 𝑋 that are part of 𝑜 define a logical predicate 𝑃𝑥, such that 
⋀ 𝑃𝑥(𝑛)𝑥∈ 𝑋   holds for 𝑛. An example is the vase that can be seen in figure 5 on page 
23. There is no physical resp. conceptual prehension expressing that something is a 
vase. The physical actual entities 𝑋 that constitute the phenomenal vase are prehended 
by a subject 𝑠 and valuated with conceptual prehensions. These conceptual 
prehensions allow aggregating all 𝑋 to a nexus 𝑛. If 𝑠 is able to recognize 𝑛 as a vase, 
it will prehend a proposition 𝑝 with 𝑛 as its logical subject and the eternal object vase 
as its predicate. Thus, for 𝑠 the predicate 𝑉𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑛) holds. Moreover, if 𝑠 recognizes 
𝑛 as an instance of the complex eternal object red vase, which is composed of vase and 
the eternal object red thing, 𝑉𝑎𝑠𝑒(𝑛) ∧  𝑅𝑒𝑑_𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑛) will hold for 𝑠.           
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This means a proposition 𝑝 is an assumption made about a part of reality and 𝑝 
is believed to be true for a subject 𝑠, formally reflected in a prehension, the subject of 
which is 𝑠, and the datum of which is 𝑝. Propositions are statements about collections 
of entities abstracted to a nexus 𝑛. 𝑛 is a part of 𝑠's reality and 𝑝 refers to it. Thus, 𝑛 
is the logical subject of 𝑝 and the subjective form that is assigned to 𝑛 qualifies it to 
be deemed true by 𝑠, which is the only reason 𝑝 exists for 𝑠. An assumption about 𝑛 
is the predicate of 𝑝 and a concept, which is believed to be fulfilled by 𝑛 resp. believed 
to be fulfilled in the future. This predicate is a subjective judgement about the logical 
subject and hence, a complex eternal object. We do not want to investigate why this 
eternal object is chosen as judgement. There is an obvious relation to the formerly 
mentioned ontology structure and the final state of an actual entity's predecessor. 
However, as of the current stage of our research, we do not want to conduct an 
analysis of such complex matter yet and rather utilize an approximation. We assume 
statistical algorithms that produce classification results about nexūs that are encoded 
as prehensions. These algorithms work with phenomenal data too, but neglect their 
semantic representation according to our approach. 
3.6. Truth 
Subjective judgement is the actual knowledge about reality. However, not all 
propositions, which have been created during the becoming of an actual entity, are 
chosen to constitute the internal structure of this entity, since not every conceivable 
piece of knowledge is corresponding to factual data or is consistent with other 
propositions. To reach this distinction, an actual entity distinguishes positive and 
negative prehensions. The datum of negative prehensions has no relevance for the 
subject, whereas the datum of positive prehensions has relevance. Consequently, the 
nexus to which a proposition refers to has to be prehended positively. In the case of 
propositions being prehended positively, it means that their subject deems them to 
be true. As already mentioned, not all possible propositions about the world are 
consistent with each other, which implies a mechanism that decides which subset of 
these propositions has a maximal degree of justification.  
Thus, if a subject 𝑠 prehends two propositions 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, a proposition 𝑝, which 
contradicts 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, as well as nexūs, which represent factual data that serve as 
truthmakers for these propositions, we believe that according to the methods of non-
monotonic reasoning, 𝑠 is able to reject the truth of 𝑝 in favor of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2. Based 
on the relation between the eternal object being the predicate and the subjective form 
of the logical subject, it is possible to evaluate the informational value of a proposition 
regarding 𝑂𝑆, e.g. the predicates of 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 have a higher value than that of 𝑝. This 
allows 𝑠 a more fine-grained decision about which propositions it believes to be true. 
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 The set of positively prehended propositions of every actual entity in a 
knowledge structure is its judgement about the data it prehends based on the chosen 
subjective forms. This implies that the truth of each proposition depends on its 
prehending subject, i.e. if it is true for the actual entity creating it, which does not 
imply universal truth that is independent to a perspective and hence, not relative to 
an actual entity. To describe this relation, an extended interpretation of the approach 
proposed in GFO-Data must be applied because GFO-Data makes the same 
assumption about the truth of propositions, i.e. that a proposition is true if there exists 
physical data serving as its truthmaker. Relational propositions in GFO can be 
satisfied such truthmakers. Subsequently, they are true in the part of the world that is 
specified by a truthmaker. 
We intend to evaluate these Whiteheadian notions of knowledge, i.e. prehensions 
of nexūs and propositions, regarding a usage in GFO. The entailment of further 
knowledge from propositions, which is the composition of propositions, seems to be 
a fruitful field of research to which the assumptions about propositions by 
Wittgenstein (2006) can be applied. Moreover, Whitehead proposes a granular 
classification of propositions, e.g. the distinction between consciously and 
subconsciously made propositions, that highly demands a formal ontological analysis 
and needs to be evaluated regarding possible use cases. However, the herein presented 
notions already ground a vocabulary, which is applicable in many use cases that 
presuppose a semantic representation of knowledge, in which many possible 
interpretations of a dataset need to be evaluated against each other.  
Finally, this classification of entities will allow us to formally describe the leap 
from data to knowledge based on propositions that is only hinted at in GFO-Data. 
There, three levels of data have been introduced: phenomenal data, factual data and 
propositions. These levels can be identified in PR, too. Phenomenal data correspond 
to physical prehensions, the datums of which are actual entities. Factual data 
correspond to physical prehensions, the datums of which are nexūs. This hierarchy 
including conceptual data as valuation of phenomenal data is shown in figure 11. We 
can, in fact, go even further and draw the conclusion that a nexus is based on a relation 
between all its entities that is instantiated by a relator that corresponds to the common 
element of form that constitutes this nexus. Moreover, propositions in the sense of 
GFO-Data correspond to propositions described in PR. The notion of truth is 
defined the same way. Factual data are acting as truthmakers for propositions in 
GFO-Data and physical prehensions having nexūs as their datums are acting as 
truthmakers for propositions in PR. Thus, we can conclude that the notions of data 
and knowledge in both works have significant similarities and that the Whiteheadian 
constructs describing the leap from data to knowledge can be used to extend GFO 
and complement GFO-Data with a dedicated ontology of knowledge.  
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Fig. 11. The hierarchy of prehensions according to their degree of subjectivity and existential 




4. Process Structures 
Whitehead’s Category of the Ultimate specifies the principles that are 
presupposed in the three other categories, which have been analyzed in the last 
chapter. This category is the foundation of the relational structures that represent the 
reconstruction of the temporal relations in PR. To conduct this reconstruction 
formally, we will introduce a monadic second order language, the interpretations of 
which are called occurrence structures. The ultimate principles presupposed to 
Whitehead’s investigation, i.e. creativity, novelty and advance, will be analyzed and 
reformulated as axioms, which occurrence structures have to satisfy to constitute 
process structures. The model-theoretic aspects of the herein formalized theory are 
discussed and yield our fundamental theorem, which indicates that the worlds, which 
ground the knowledge of actual occasions, are ordered linearly and equal for 
contemporaneous actual occasions. 
4.1. Formal Language 
An analysis of the becoming of a single actual entity is termed the microscopic 
view. It can be analyzed within extensiveness intervals only. The analysis of the 
becoming of the universe, in which all actual occasions participate, is called the 
macroscopic view. It needs to be analyzed based on time intervals and implies the 
spatiotemporal relations between actual occasions. Informally, a prehension is an act 
of grasping something by the senses or by the mind. According to PR, prehensions 
are Concrete Facts of Relatedness; they relate the effective facts of reality to each 
other. Facts are existing entities and their phenomenal appearances. Every appearance 
can be interpreted differently, according to its perceiver. A prehended entity is the 
datum of a prehension, whereas the prehending entity is the subject. The 
interpretation of this datum is a concept and hence, the form the datum has from the 
perspective of the subject, e.g. a bundle of attributes.  
4.1.1. Concretization 
Prehensions can be understood as triadic relation 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑓), in which 𝑠 
is a subject that prehends the datum 𝑑 in form of an eternal object 𝑓, which 𝑑 
instantiates according to 𝑠. We used a more flexible definition in which prehensions 
are entities rather than relations. The triadic relation 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑠, 𝑑, 𝑝) denotes 
that a subject 𝑠 concretizes a datum 𝑑 by means of a prehension 𝑝, i.e. the result of 
the act of prehending 𝑑. Thus, we don’t have to bother with eternal objects in the 
relational structures that we will introduce in this chapter.  
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As already mentioned in the last section, there exists a partial ordering over the 
set of eternal objects that needs to be considered in the axiomatic reconstruction if 
we wanted to include this kind of entities. We additionally argue that this decision 
pays respect to Whitehead’s consideration of prehensions as instances of a dedicated 
category of existence. In the vein of this simplification, a prehension is the 
representation of a datum in the internal structure of some subject and furthermore, 
a constituent of the internal structure of this subject that concretized the datum.  
This entails three dyadic relations that we will derive from 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 in the 
next section. 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑝, 𝑑) denotes that a prehension 𝑝 represents a datum 𝑑 in 
the inner structure of some actual occasion. This actual occasion uses the means of 𝑝 
to describe the character of 𝑑. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑝, 𝑎) denotes that a prehension 𝑝 is 
constituent of the inner structure of an actual occasion 𝑎. These constituents are 
atomic, i.e. they have no further parts. This implies that 𝑎 is a whole, the structure of 
which is actually flat. The conceptual structure that spans over all of 𝑎’s constituents 
is created based on the form of 𝑝, which is some eternal object, and in turn, not part 
of the discussion. Furthermore, we can derive a simplified prehension relation from 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠, i.e. (3) the relation 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑠, 𝑑) denotes that a subject 𝑠 prehends 
a datum 𝑑, which results into a prehension. This relation does not include the result 
of the process of prehending the datum described with an eternal object, which is the 
reason this dyadic relation can be derived from the triadic relation 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠. The 
most basic prehensions are simple physical prehensions that represent physical data 
inhering in some actual occasions that are concretized by a prehending subject. All 
other prehensions are entailed by these simple physical prehensions and not necessary 
for an axiomatic reconstruction of space and time in process philosophy. However, 
we will briefly introduce them if they are necessary for a discussion of the axiomatic 
reconstruction of the basic categories in PR. 
4.1.2. Concrescence 
According to Whitehead, creativity, many and one are the fundamental terms that 
are preliminary to express the notion of an entity. In the Category of the Ultimate, 
which comprises the first formulation of informal definitions in PR, these three 
notions are the only terms used to define the complex term actual occasion, which is 
presupposed in all further definitions and axioms. A formal language can only be 
deemed capable of capturing the fundamental ideas of Whitehead, if it can adequately 
reflect the terms creativity, many as well as one and thereby, ensure an unambiguous 
understanding of our postulations. As it seems obvious to grasp one and many as 
quantification about single and multiple entities, we must find a more elaborated way 
to syntactically express creativity. Whitehead states: 
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“[...] creativity [...] is characterized by the datum from the past; and it meets 
this dead datum [...] by the vivifying novelty of subjective form selected from 
the multiplicity of pure potentiality. In the process, the old meets the new, 
and this meeting constitutes the satisfaction of an immediate particular 
individual.” (Whitehead, 1929, p. 164)  
It is clear that creativity is a specific relation between two kinds of entities. The 
first kind describes all actual occasions that are in the past of some actual entity and 
their potential representations for becoming actual entities in form of eternal objects. 
The term dead is used in order to signify the immutability of these actual occasions. 
The second kind refers to an eternal object which describes how a becoming actual 
entity 𝑎 prehends this object, i.e. the eternal object 𝑎 chooses from these potential 
interpretations as a subjective form. Therefore, a simple formal interpretation of 
creativity 𝒞 is 𝒞 ⊆  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚, where 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 is the set of actual occasions, 
and 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 the set of potential subjective forms that can be assigned to them. 
The Category of Ultimate does not enclose a notion for subjective forms. Also, 
temporal relations between entities are not described explicitly. In contrast to that, we 
want to deal with both notions without changing much of the original content. 
Creativity is the vehicle that allows the world to give birth to novel actual entities and 
thus, is preliminary to any processual advance, which is the concrescence of actual 
entities defined by their inner structure. The crucial step to obtain a consistent 
characterization of creativity is to unify both the microscopic view of extensiveness 
intervals and the macroscopic view of time intervals into a consistent view. Hence, 
we must define this relation as a specific relation between a set of actual occasions on 
the one side and a single actual occasion on the other side that is the concrescence of 
this set. 
The interpretation 𝒞 ⊆  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 × 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 lacks essential information because 
there are many subjective forms an actual occasion can be bound to. Additionally, 
there is only one subjective form that is chosen for each prehended actual occasion 
by a prehending subject. We introduce the more specific interpretation  𝒞𝑧 that is 
specific to some actual occasion 𝑧 and contains an ordered pair for each actual 
occasion 𝑥 prehended by 𝑧, such that 𝑥 is paired with the subjective form 𝑦′ that 
describes the way 𝑥 is prehended by 𝑧. This means, even if there are many potential 
subjective forms 𝑦 for a given actual occasion 𝑥 such that (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝒞, there is a unique 
subjective form 𝑦′ for a given actual occasion 𝑧 such that (𝑥, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝒞𝑧 holds. 
Therefore, 𝒞𝑧 is qualified to be a functional subrelation of 𝒞 and, furthermore, every 
ordered pair (𝑥, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝒞𝑧 corresponds to the proposition 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑦’). 
According to PR, it holds that there are no two actual occasions that originate 
from the same set of actual occasions. In fact, for arbitrary actual occasions 𝑣 and 𝑤, 
the sentence 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝒞𝑣
−1 ) ≠ 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝒞𝑤
−1) has to hold. Therefore, even if all actual 
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entities in 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝒞𝑣
−1 ) ∩  𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒( 𝒞𝑤
−1) define the same subjective forms regarding 
𝑣 and 𝑤, there is at least one actual entity, which is uniquely prehended by either 𝑣 
or 𝑤, and, conequently, 𝒞𝑣 ≠ 𝒞𝑤 holds. Thus, we can identify a relation ⊳
: 2𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 × 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 which is unique for each element of its image. This relation has 
to be functional and surjective to satisfy the correct semantics that has been presented 
in the Category of the Ultimate. Both features either need to be postulated as part of 
our axiomatic reconstruction of the basic categories of PR or they need to be proven 
to show that the postulated set of axioms is a proper foundation for this 
reconstruction. Therefore, each actual occasion will be a result of the process of 
creativity that will be denoted by ⊳. This relation represents creativity determining how 
many, which are the input of this process, unify themselves into one entity, which is the 
output of this process, i.e. 𝐴 ⊳ 𝑎 denotes that actual occasions 𝐴 are concretized by 
an actual entity 𝑎 that will represent the concrescence of all 𝐴 as an actual occasion. In 
particular, the notion of many has to be strictly defined and its interpretation discussed 
regarding its counterpart in PR.  
It is evident that 𝐴 ⊳ 𝑎 can be derived from 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 resp. 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 since 
𝐴 represents the set of all actual occasions that are concretized resp. prehended by 𝑎. 
However, we want to retain a unique actual occasion 0 that exists before all other 
occasions and hence, has no predecessors. Since actual occasions are the concrescence 
of many, there always needs to be a set of actual occasions that is concretized by an 
actual entity. In first order logics this precondition must be reduced to the existence 
of an actual occasion that is concretized by all other actual occasions, which 
contradicts the property of 0 to have no predecessors. Thus, we have to use ⊳ to 
define the notion of an actual occasion and postulate that 0 indeed has a set of actual 
occasions that it concretizes, i.e. the empty set. Prehensions in contrast are not a 
concrescence of other individuals. 
4.1.3. Syntax and Semantics 
In the following, we will define a formal language that allows us to express the 
fundamental notions of process philosophy. Such formal language is specified by a 
syntax that is used to build formulas and a semantics that is used to evaluate these 
formulas. The syntax of this language is based on the signature 𝜎 = (⊳,
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠), the elements of which we have discussed in the last section. A 
predicate language ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎) = (𝐴𝑙(𝜎), 𝑇𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙), 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙)) consists of its 
alphabet 𝐴𝑙(𝜎), the set of terms 𝑇𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) and the set of formulas 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙). 
The alphabet 𝐴𝑙(𝜎) comprises the following symbols: (1) Variables for 
individuals 𝑥𝑖 with 𝑖 = (0,1,2, … ) that will be implied by 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑤, …. 
Individual variables are subsumed by the set 𝔙𝐼 of all individual variables. (2) 
Variables for predicates 𝑋𝑖 with 𝑖 = (0,1,2, … ) that will be implied by 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍, 𝑈, 𝑉, 
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𝑊, …. Predicate variables are subsumed by the set 𝔙𝐼𝐼 of all predicate variables. 𝔙 =
𝔙𝐼 ∪ 𝔙𝐼𝐼 is the set of all variables. (3) The logical quantifiers ∃ and ∀. (4) The logical 
functors ¬, ∧, ∨, → and ↔. (4) The parentheses ( and ). Let 𝐴𝑙(𝜎)∗ be the set of all 
strings over 𝐴𝑙(𝜎). If a variable 𝑥 occurs at position 𝑛 in an arbitrary string of 𝐴𝑙(𝜎)∗ 
and there is a quantifier at position 𝑛 − 1, 𝑥 is quantified over at this position, i.e. 𝑥 
is generalized if the quantifier is ∀ or particularized if the quantifier is ∃. An individual 
variable 𝑥 is called free in a string if it is contained in this string but ∀𝑥 and ∃𝑥 are 
not contained. A predicate variable 𝑋 is called free in a string if it is contained in this 
string but ∀𝑋 and ∃𝑋 are not contained. 
Since there are neither functions nor constants in 𝜎, the set of terms 𝑇𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) 
only comprises the set of all variables 𝔙. However, 𝑇𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) is necessary to 
construct the atomic formulas that ground the set of formulas 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙). An atomic 
formula is a string of 𝐴𝑙(𝜎)∗ that matches one of the following patterns: (1) 𝑋𝑖 ⊳ 𝑥𝑖, 
(2) 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑥𝑘) or (3) 𝑋𝑖(𝑥𝑗). 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) is the smallest subset of 𝐴𝑙(𝜎)
∗, 
such that it contains all atomic formula and is closed regarding the following three 
conditions: (1) if 𝜙, 𝜓 ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙), then  ¬𝜙, (𝜙 ∧ 𝜓), (𝜙 ∨ 𝜓), (𝜙 → 𝜓), (𝜙 ↔
𝜓) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) holds, (2) if 𝜙(𝑥𝑖) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) and 𝑥𝑖 is free in 𝜙, then 
∀𝑥𝑖𝜙(𝑥𝑖), ∃𝑥𝑖𝜙(𝑥𝑖) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) holds, (3) if 𝜙(𝑋𝑖) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) and 𝑋𝑖 is free in 
𝜙, then ∀𝑋𝑖𝜙(𝑋𝑖), ∃𝑋𝑖𝜙(𝑋𝑖) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) holds. A formula 𝜙 ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) is called 
a proposition if it has no free variables in it. ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎) is called monadic since all 
predicate variables encode predicates with an arity of one. 
In the following, we will define how the formulas of a predicate language ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎) 
will be interpreted. This introduction of a semantics will be done according to 
structures. A 𝜎-structure 𝒮 is a tuple (𝔘, ⊳𝐼 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠𝐼) with a universe of 
discourse 𝔘 and an interpretation function  ∙𝐼 that maps each relation in 𝜎 to a relation 
over 𝔘, i.e. ⊳𝐼⊆ 2𝔘 × 𝔘 and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠𝐼 ⊆ 𝔘 × 𝔘 × 𝔘. The universe of a 𝜎-
structure 𝒮 is defined by 𝔘(𝒮) and contains individuals. Additionally, a function 
𝜇: 𝔙𝐼 → 𝔘(𝒮) ∪ 𝔙𝐼𝐼 → 2
𝔘(𝒮) is introduced that is called an assignment and maps an 
individual variable (resp. predicate variable) onto an individual (resp. a collection of 
individuals). For assignments 𝜇, 𝜈 ∈ 𝔘(𝒮)𝔙 and a set 𝑉 ⊆ 𝔙, we define that 𝜇 =𝑉 𝜈 
holds if and only if 𝜇(𝑥) = 𝜈(𝑥) for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉. 
The satisfiability relation ⊨𝜇 is a relation between a  𝜎-structure 𝒮 and a formula 
of 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) and is inductively defined the following way: (1) atomic formulas are 
satisfiable, if (a) 𝒮 ⊨ 𝑋𝑖 ⊳ 𝑥𝑖 iff (𝜇(𝑋𝑖), 𝜇(𝑥𝑖)) ∈ ⊳
𝐼, (b) 𝒮 ⊨
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑥𝑘) iff (𝜇(𝑥𝑖), 𝜇(𝑥𝑗), 𝜇(𝑥𝑘)) ∈ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠
𝐼  holds or if (c) 
𝒮 ⊨ 𝑋𝑖(𝑥𝑗) iff 𝜇(𝑥𝑖) ∈ 𝜇(𝑋𝑖) holds, (2) if 𝜙 and 𝜓 are formulas, it holds (a) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 ∧ 𝜓 iff 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 and 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜓, (b) 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 ∨ 𝜓 iff 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 or 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜓, (c) 
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𝒮 ⊨𝜇 ¬𝜙 iff not 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙, (d) 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 → 𝜓 iff 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜓 follows 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 and (e) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 ↔ 𝜓 iff 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜙 → 𝜓 and 𝒮 ⊨𝜇 𝜓 → 𝜙, (3) if 𝜙(𝑥) is a formula, it holds (a) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 ∃𝑥𝜙(𝑥) iff there is an assignment 𝜈 with 𝜇 ={𝑥} 𝜈, such that 𝒮 ⊨𝜈 𝜙, (b) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 ∀𝑥𝜙(𝑥) iff for all assignments 𝜈 with 𝜇 ={𝑥} 𝜈 follows 𝒮 ⊨𝜈 𝜙, (c) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 ∃𝑋𝜙(𝑋) iff there is an assignment 𝜈 with 𝜇 =𝑋 𝜈, such that 𝒮 ⊨𝜈 𝜙 and (d) 
𝒮 ⊨𝜇 ∀𝑋𝜙(𝑋) iff for all assignments 𝜈 with 𝜇 =𝑋 𝜈 follows 𝒮 ⊨𝜈 𝜙. 
A formula 𝜙 is satisfiable in a 𝜎-structure 𝒮 if there is an assignment 𝜇, such that 
𝒮 ⊨ 𝜙 holds. Let 𝑆𝑎𝑡(𝒮, 𝜙) be defined by 𝑆𝑎𝑡(𝒮, 𝜙) = { 𝜇 | 𝜇 ∈ 𝔘(𝒮)𝔙 ∧ 𝒮 ⊨𝜈 𝜙 } 
and let 𝑆𝑎𝑡(𝒮, 𝑋) be defined by ⋂𝜙∈𝑋𝑆𝑎𝑡(𝒮, 𝜙)  for a set of formulas 𝑋. A formula 
𝜙 is satisfiable if there is a structure 𝒮, such that 𝑆𝑎𝑡(𝒮, 𝜙) ≠ ∅. A formula 𝜙 is valid 
in 𝒮 if all assignments over 𝒮 satisfy 𝜙, which is denoted by 𝒮 ⊨ 𝜙. A theory 𝑇 is a 
set of formulas and a 𝜎-structure 𝒮 a model of 𝑇 if every formula in 𝑇 is valid in 𝒮, 
which is denoted by 𝒮 ⊨ 𝑋. A formula 𝜙 is entailed by a theory 𝑇 if every model of 
𝑇 is a model of the theory {𝜙}, which is denoted by 𝑇 ⊨ 𝜙. The set 𝒯 denotes the 
set of all formulas entailed by 𝑇, i.e. its deductive closure, and is defined by 𝒯: =
{ 𝜙 | 𝑇 ⊨ 𝜙 }. A theory 𝑇 is complete if for all propositions 𝜙 of ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎) either 𝜙 ∈
𝒯 or ¬𝜙 ∈ 𝒯 holds. If both propositions hold for any 𝜙 ∈ ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎), 𝑇 is referred to 
as inconsistent. A theory 𝑇 is decidable if an algorithm exists that is able to decide if 
𝑇 ⊨ 𝜙 or 𝑇 ⊭ ¬𝜙 holds for each proposition 𝜙 of ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎). 
The completeness theorem does not hold for monadic second order languages, 
which is a corollary from the incompleteness theorem. Thus, there exists no formal 
derivability relation ⊢, such that 𝑇 ⊨ 𝜙 holds if and only if 𝑇 ⊢ 𝜙 holds. We call the 
elements of a theory 𝑇 the axioms of 𝑇. A theorem is a proposition 𝜙, such that 𝑇 ⊢
𝜙 holds. Since the completeness theorem does not hold, it is impossible to use 
derivability as an instrument to compute the deductive closure 𝒯 of a theory 𝑇 to 
prove the decidability of 𝑇 based on its axioms. A metalogical analysis is necessary to 
produce such results. However, even if we cannot deduce a theorem for all logical 
sentences that are entailed by a theory, we can still produce some valid deductions 
that allow understanding the character of the axiom system to be introduced and 
hence, the implications regarding the notion of time in our axiomatization of the 
fundamental notions in process philosophy. For the presented investigations, 
completeness is not a necessary feature. 
An inherent feature of the language that is independent to any interpretation is 
the definition of equality for individuals, which can be defined according to Shapiro 
(2000), and represents the Identity of Indescernibles attributed to Leibniz (1879). Same 
holds for the equality of predicates that can be defined similarly to the extensionality 
axiom in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory originally formulated by Dedekind (2012). 
Additionally, a comprehension scheme 𝐶𝜙 is needed that postulates that for each 
Process Structures 51  
 
formula 𝜙, in which an individual 𝑥 occurs freely, there is a collection 𝑋 that includes 
𝑥 if and only if 𝜙(𝑥) holds.  
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(∀𝑋(𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑋(𝑦)) → 𝑥 = 𝑦)  (A1) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌(∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ↔ 𝑌(𝑥)) → 𝑋 = 𝑌) (A2) 
  
𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ¬𝑥 = 𝑦 (D1) 
𝑋 ≠ 𝑌 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ¬𝑋 = 𝑌 (D2) 
𝐶(𝜙) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑥(𝜙(𝑥) → ∃𝑋∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ↔ 𝜙(𝑥))) (D3) 
  
𝐶𝜙 ≔ {𝐶(𝜙) | 𝜙 ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) } (A3) 
 
The comprehension scheme 𝐶𝜙 comprises infinitely many axioms and entails that 
there is an empty collection implied by the formula 𝜙(𝑥) = 𝑥 ≠ 𝑥. 
4.2. Reconstruction 
4.2.1. Occurrence 
We will now axiomatically reconstruct the fundamental notions of process 
philosophy as described in PR. We will use the language ℒ𝒪
𝐼𝐼 being is a special type of 
the predicate languages ℒ𝐼𝐼(𝜎) that will be interpreted over occurrence structures, 
which are a special type of 𝜎-structures. For the sake of brevity, we omitted the use 
of an interpretation function and named the given relations equal to the relation 
symbols in the alphabet of ℒ𝒪
𝐼𝐼. The two main categories of individuals of occurrence 
structures are called actual occasions and prehensions. Furthermore, we introduce the 
dyadic relations 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 that were discussed 
in the last section. 
 Definition 1 An occurrence structure 𝒪 = (𝔘𝒪, ⊳, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠) consists of: 
1. universe of discourse 𝔘𝒪, 
2. the concrescence relation ⊳ ⊆ 2𝔘𝒪 × 𝔘𝒪 that exists between a collection of actual occasions and 
their concrescence as one actual occasion, 
3. the concretization relation 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 ⊆  𝔘𝒪 × 𝔘𝒪 × 𝔘𝒪 that exists between an actual 
occasion 𝑥 that prehends an actual occasion 𝑦 by means of a prehension  𝑧. 
Definition 2 An actual occasion is an individual that is the concrescence of a collection of actual 
occasions. A prehension is an individual, by means of which some actual occasion 𝑥 has been 
concretized by another actual occasion 𝑦. 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑋(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥) (D4) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑦, 𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑥)) (D5) 
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A prehension 𝑥 represents some actual occasion 𝑦 if it there is an actual occasion that concretizes 𝑦 
by means of 𝑥. A prehension 𝑥 is a constituent of an actual occasion 𝑦 if there is some actual occasion 
that is concretized by 𝑦 by means of 𝑥. An actual occasion 𝑥 prehends some actual occasion 𝑦 if 𝑥 
concretizes 𝑦 by means of some prehension. 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑧, 𝑦, 𝑥)) (D6) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑥)) (D7) 
𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) (D8) 
 
Based on occurrence structures and the dyadic relations derived from 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠, we will stipulate axioms representing the intension of Whitehead's 
Category of the Ultimate. The following axioms will provide a first characterization of 
the concrescence and the concretization relation as well as their interplay. These 
axioms represent the Principle of Novelty, which is part of the Category of the Ultimate. We 
additionally included axioms that ensure the structural integrity of occurrence 
structures and an axiom that stems from the Category of Explanation, i.e. we postulate 
that an actual occasion does not prehend itself.  
 
∀𝑥¬(𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑥))  (A4) 
∃𝑥∀𝑦(¬𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦))  (A5) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑋(𝑦) → 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦)) (A6) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 → 𝑋(𝑦)) (A7) 
∀𝑥(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∨ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥))  (A8) 
∀𝑥¬(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∧ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (A9) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (A10) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (A11) 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (T1) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T2) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) → 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T3) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 → ¬𝑋(𝑥)) (T4) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑋(𝑦) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T5) 
∃𝑥∀𝑋(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 → ¬∃𝑦(𝑋(𝑦)) (T6) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑌 ⊳ 𝑦 ∧ ¬∃𝑢(𝑋(𝑢)) ∧ ¬∃𝑣(𝑌(𝑣)) → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (T7) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)  




We postulated the existence of an individual that is the concrescence of an empty 
set of individuals. The uniqueness of this individual, which exists initially and thus, 
has no dependence to any other individual, has been proven from the initial axiom 
set. 𝟎 denotes the actual occasion Whitehead called God, which is the predecessor of 
all other actual occasions, i.e. all other actual occasions have a prehension that 
represents 𝟎. According to the axiomatization presented herein, 𝟎 does not have any 
prehensions, which is correct, since we consider prehensions of actual occasions only. 
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In PR, God prehends all eternal objects and their corresponding prehensions imply 
the conceptual structure that is the partial ordering between them. This explains how 
universals are represented in the world because their existence presupposes an actual 
occasion, in the inner structure of which they are represented. The constituents of 
god are their representation and, hence, every eternal object is accessible during the 
becoming of an actual occasion since it prehends 𝟎. 
 
𝟎 = 𝑥 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∀𝑋(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 → ¬∃𝑦(𝑋(𝑦))) (D9) 
 
∀𝑥(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝟎)) (A12) 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝟎) (T9) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑋(𝟎)) (T10) 
∀𝑥∃𝑦(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠(𝑥, 𝟎, 𝑦)) (T11) 
 
𝔘𝒪 is indexed with the symbol of the occurrence structure itself because each 
actual occasion 𝑥 ∈ 𝔘𝒪 defines its own subjective universe 𝔘𝑥 ≔
{𝑎 | 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑎, 𝑥)} from its corresponding point of view. 𝔘𝑥 is an actual 
occasion’s perspective into the past and its notion of the present, i.e. the 
representation of all actual occasions that 𝑥 prehends. The concrescence of many 
individuals is a process inherent to the universe, which constructs and chains all actual 
occasions to a continuous phenomenal process. For each individual 𝑥 that 𝑎 
concretises, there will be a prehension 𝑝 in 𝑎 that represents 𝑥. Without considering 
complex principles, e.g. the Category of Conceptual Valuation that will be introduced 
during the discussion, we postulated that these simple physical prehensions exist as 
the representation of 𝑎’s subjective universe. This is a weak assumption about the 
emergence of prehensions as result of an actual occasion 𝑎’s becoming because it 
does not say anything about the relation of the prehension to the subjective universes 
of actual occasions that are not 𝑎. To ensure that subjective universes are indeed 
subjective in their nature and thus, pairwise disjoint, which is a strong assumption, 
each prehension is unique to its prehending subject and represents one unique actual 
occasion only. 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧) → 𝑦 = 𝑧) (A13) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦)  ∧ 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑥, 𝑧)  → 𝑦 = 𝑧) (A14) 
  
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑌 ⊳ 𝑥 → 𝑋 = 𝑌) (T12) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑋 ⊳ 𝑦 → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (T13) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦∃𝑧(𝑥 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑧, 𝑥) ∧ ¬𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑧, 𝑦)) 
 
(T14) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦∃𝑧(𝑥 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑥, 𝑧) ∧ ¬𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑦, 𝑧)) (T15) 
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An example for such occurrence structure as defined by the current axioms is 
shown in figure 12. It depicts five actual occasions: 𝟎, 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑏0 and 𝑏1, as well as 
unlabelled grey coloured diamonds representing the prehensions that are their 
constituent parts. The dotted circles represent collections of actual occasions, the 
elements of which are connected arrows with dotted lines. The arrows that start at 
any of these collections of actual occasions point to the actual occasion that is the 
concrescence of this collection. Additionally, there is a prehension for each 
concretized individual as a part of its respective prehending subject. 𝟎 is in each 
collection concretized by a prehending individual and no individual is in the collection 
concretized by 𝟎. Furthermore, the introduced definitions qualify 𝟎, 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑏0 and 
𝑏1 to be actual occasions and the individuals, which are their constituents, to be 
prehension. This qualification is enforced by the axiom set, such that these predicates 
are uniquely assigned, i.e. each individual is either an actual occasion or a prehension.  
 
 
Fig. 12. An occurrence structure that satisfies the given axioms A1-A13. 
4.2.2. Temporal Relations 
An intention of our axiomatization is to allow the universe to be partitioned into 
sets of actual occasions that have emerged contemporaneously. These sets can be 
understood as states of the universe of discourse. If each concrescence implies a new 
state of this universe, it holds that an actual occasion 𝑎 can only emerge from the 
actual occasions that are elements of earlier states of the universe and therefore, have 
potential to it in contrast to the actual occasions that emerge contemporaneously to 
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𝑎 and belong to the same state of the universe as 𝑎. We can distinguish two types of 
relations between actual occasions in the following. 
The actual occasions that form the actual world of an actual occasion a and thus, 
are a’s actual parts. The concrescence of these actual occasions already has been 
completed before the becoming of a. They are all actual occasions that have lapsed 
before the left boundary of the extensiveness interval during which a emerged. All 
these entities are encoded as prehensions of a and thus, represented as constituent 
parts of the inner structure of a. The actual occasions that form the contemporary 
world of an actual occasion a and consequently, emerge contemporaneously to a. The 
concrescence of these actual occasions happened during the same extensiveness 
interval in which a emerged. Therefore, they are becoming in parallel to a. Whitehead 
defines this relation the following way: “Actual Entities are called contemporary when 
neither belongs to the given actual world defined by the other.” (1929, p. 66) The 
actual occasions of this contemporary world have not completed their becoming yet 
and their concrescence will be causally independent to a’s concrescence. 
Nevertheless, they have a passive potentiality and will be prehended. 
Definition 3 An actual occasion 𝑥 is a proper actual part of an actual occasion 𝑦 if and only if 
𝑥 is prehended by 𝑦 and 𝑦 does not prehend 𝑥. An actual occasion 𝑥 is an actual part of an actual 
occasion 𝑦 if and only if 𝑥 is a proper actual part of 𝑦 or if 𝑥 is equal to 𝑦. An individual 𝑥 is a 
proper part of an individual 𝑦 if 𝑥 is a proper actual part of 𝑦 or if 𝑥 is a constituent of 𝑦. An 
individual 𝑥 is a part of an individual 𝑦 if 𝑥 is an actual part of 𝑦 or if 𝑥 is a constituent of 𝑦. 
𝑥 < 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ¬𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑥, 𝑦) ∧ 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠(𝑦, 𝑥) (D10) 
𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 (D11) 
𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) (D12) 
𝑥 ≼ 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∨ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) (D13) 
An individual 𝑥 occurs contemporaneously to an individual 𝑦 if and only if they are equal or if 𝑥 is 
an actual occasion and does not belong to the actual world of 𝑦 and vice versa. 
𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓  (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦) 




𝐴: = { 𝑎 | 𝑎 < 𝑥 } the actual world of an actual occasion 𝑥 and 
𝔚𝑥
𝐶: = { 𝑎 | 𝑎 ∥ 𝑥 } the contemporary world of an actual occasion 𝑥. 
The occurrence of actual occasions are events of the universe and such events 
need to be ordered. We hold that the relation ≤ is a temporal order that resembles 
the B-series of time as introduced by McTaggart (1908). This means if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 holds for 
actual occasions 𝑎 and 𝑏, the propositions 𝑎 occurred earlier than 𝑏, and 𝑏 occurred later 
than 𝑎 can be assumed to be true. However, McTaggart rejected the notion of 
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contemporaneous events but rather assumed the notion of a moment representing the 
fusion of contemporaneous events, which qualifies the B-series of time to be a linear 
order. The notion of a linear order implies that the following conditions have to hold: 
(1) ≤ has to be a reflexive relation, i.e. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥 has to hold for all 𝑥, (2) ≤ has to be a 
antisymmetric relation, i.e. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦 has to hold for all 𝑥 and 𝑦, (2) 
≤ has to be a transitive relation, i.e. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑧 has to hold for all 𝑥, 𝑦 
and 𝑧, and (4) ≤ has to be a connex relation, i.e. 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 has to hold for all 𝑥 
and 𝑦. Since actual occasions represent singular events rather than moments, ≤ 
cannot be connex. In the reconstruction presented herein, moments are represented 
in the sense of contemporary worlds. Because McTaggart considered the B-series to 
be essential to time, the axiomatization must qualify these contemporary worlds to be 
ordered linearly regarding the relations occurred earlier than and occurred later than. 
The B-series of time is an implication of the A-series, which specifies the terms 
past, present and future, and the C-series, which is a mere term for linear order. The 
current definitions allow to specify past as the actual world of an actual occasion, present 
as the contemporary world of an actual occasion and future to be all actual occasions 
that are not contained in any of these worlds. It is obvious that these three notions 
are disjoint. From this follows the existence of an A/-series of time. To show the 
existence of a C-series of time, some more conditions have to be met since ≤ cannot 
be considered as this C-series. As a precondition, ≤ must be a partial order that needs 
to satisfy reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity only and ∥ needs to be an 
equivalence relation, which means that it is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
relation. The current set of axioms does not allow to show the transitivity of both 
relations, which needs some more powerful axioms that will be introduced later. 
However, the following theorems show some of the preconditions that have to be 
satisfied in order to prove the existence of a B-series of time.  
   
∀𝑥(𝑥 ∥ 𝑥) (T16) 
∀𝑥(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥) (T17) 
∀𝑥(𝑥 ≼ 𝑥) (T18) 
∀𝑥(¬𝑥 < 𝑥) (T19) 
∀𝑥(¬𝑥 ≺ 𝑥) (T20) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 → 𝑦 ∥ 𝑥) (T21) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 < 𝑦 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)  ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T22) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (T23) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(¬𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 → ¬(𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 ↔ 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦)) (T24) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T25) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∨ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (T26) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) ∨ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (T27) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (T28) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥)) (T29) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦)) (T30) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) → ∃𝑧(𝑧 < 𝑦)) (T31) 
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∀𝑥(𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → ¬∃𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥)) (T32) 
∀𝑥(𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → ∃𝑦(𝑥 ≺ 𝑦)) (T33) 
∀𝑥(𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → ∃𝑦(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦) ∧ 𝑥 ≺ 𝑦)) (T34) 
¬∃𝑧(𝑧 < 𝟎) (T35) 
¬∃𝑧(𝑧 ∥ 𝟎 ∧ 𝑧 ≠ 𝟎) (T36) 
∀𝑥(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → ¬(𝟎 < 𝑥 ↔ 𝟎 = 𝑥)) (T37) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ≺ 𝑦 ∧ ¬∃𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥) → ¬(𝑥 = 𝟎 ↔ 𝑃𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥))) (T38) 
 
An example for such occurrence structure as defined by the current axioms is 
shown in figure 13. The example depicts the same individuals and relations as the last 
example. We dropped the primitive relations to only show the relations representing 
temporal order.  
 
Fig. 13. Application of the definitions of temporal relations to the running example. 
4.2.3. Worlds  
Creativity is the driving force behind the connection of one and many; the 
concrescence of one actual occasion from many actual occasions, which are 
concretized, is its basic principle. This exhibits the intention of the Principle of 
Creativity; one novel actual occasion unifies a unique collection of many individuals. 
We introduce two features that describe this principle in the context of the introduced 
formal language. Both features define the numerical relation between a set of 
contemporaneous actual occasions and the collections of actual occasions that are 
concretized by them. The term Unification describes how many individuals are 
concretized by one novel actual occasion. In the case of weak unification an arbitrary 
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subset of the universe is unified into a novel actual occasion. Thus, events which have 
lapsed a long time ago could have a potential causal relation to the present without 
having to have potentiality to any events in between. 
Strong unification defines that an emerging actual occasion 𝑎 will concretise all 
individuals that occurred at a time boundary located before the transition that resulted 
in 𝑎’s becoming. A universe existing on that condition will have equivalent actual 
worlds for contemporaneous actual occasions. We decided to use Whitehead’s notion 
of unification, i.e. that the complete past has potential for the present, as foundation 
of potentiality for the emerging actual occasions because all lapsed actual occasions 
should have the potentiality to become an actual part of a becoming subject. Weak 
unification yields that only a subset of all potential actual parts will be unified into a 
novel actual occasion. Assume that an actual occasion 𝑥 is part of an actual occasion 
𝑦 and there exist actual occasions 𝑣 and 𝑤, such that 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦, 𝑣 ≤ 𝑦, 𝑤 ≤ 𝑣, 𝑥 ∥ 𝑤 
and ¬𝑥 ≤ 𝑣′ hold for all 𝑣′ ∥ 𝑣. In this situation, there is no reason for 𝑥 to be in the 
actual world of 𝑦. An event that is not represented in any actual occasion at a certain 
point in time should phenomenally vanish from the actual worlds of all following 
actual occasions and hence, not have a potentiality for 𝑦. We do not want to rule out 
a causal relation between 𝑥 and 𝑦 if it does not yield causality in the contemporary 
world of 𝑣. However, if 𝑥 does have influence on 𝑦, it certainly had the potential to 
affect an occasion contemporary to 𝑣.  
To postulate the Principle of Creativity, we will introduce the notion of an open world 
reflecting the world of a mereological system based on ≤, about which we have to 
show that it satisfies the notion of a mereological relation. This open world consists 
of all actual occasions which emerge contemporarily at a given point in time and 
additionally, all individuals that are actual parts of these actual occasions will be 
contained. Consequently, the parts of the emerging actual occasions which are not 
actual occasions themselves are not contained because they are not yet existent. This 
feature defines a world as open, since, no decision about the becoming of the emerging 
actual occasions has been made up to this point. An open world can be understood 
as a specific state of the universe which ends if the contained emerging actual entities 
turn into actual occasions. The set of individuals corresponding to an open world is 
a closed world. It subsumes the results of the becoming of all emerged actual occasions, 
i.e. a collection of prehensions contained in these actual occasions. A closed world is 
a state of the universe in which all actual entities have immutable inner structures and 
turned into actual occasions. An open world 𝐴 is the transition of a closed world 𝐵 and 
is its specific successor. The actual occasions in B are given to all emerging actual 
occasions in 𝐴. 𝐴’s successor is the closed world 𝐶, which we call 𝐴’s concrescence. The 
actual occasions in 𝐶 that have not been in 𝐵 have concretized all actual occasions in 
𝐵 and eventually, became immutable. 
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Definition 4 An open world is a collection of individuals that comprises an actual occasion 𝑥 and 
the parts of all proper actual parts of any actual occasion that occurred contemporaneously to 𝑥. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) 
∧ ∀𝑦(𝑋(𝑦) ↔ ∃𝑢, 𝑣(𝑦 ≼ 𝑣 ∧ 𝑣 < 𝑢 ∧ 𝑢 ∥ 𝑥))) 
 
(D15) 
A closed world is collection of individuals that comprises an actual occasion, its contemporaneously 
occurring actual occasions and their parts. 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) 
∧ ∀𝑦(𝑋(𝑦) ↔ ∃𝑧(𝑧 ∥ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑦 ≼ 𝑧))) 
 
(D16) 
The concrescence of an open world are the individuals of this open world and all of their parts. 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑋, 𝑌) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 (𝑌) 
∧ ∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ↔ ∃𝑦(𝑌(𝑦) ∧ 𝑥 ≼ 𝑦)) 
 
(D17) 
The transition of a closed world are all individuals that have parts in this closed world or that are no 
actual parts of any other individual in the transition. 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑌) 




It is easy to see that the concrescence of an open world is unique. Likewise, the 
transition of a closed world is unique. Thus, both relations are functional. We define 
the notion of the world in which an actual occasion emerged in, i.e. the relation 
between a closed world and the individuals contained in it that are maximal with 
respect to ≤ in this closed world, as well an order between closed worlds. 
 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) 




According to the Principle of Advance, there will be an open world in which actual 
occasions are emerging for each closed world in which a concrescence is the result of 
the contemporaneous becoming of many new actual occasions. To ensure the 
application of creativity to the actual occasions which are emerging based on this 
closed world, we introduce axioms. These axioms express that there is a concrescence 
into a closed world for all open worlds and that there is a transition into a novel open 
world for all closed worlds. Additionally, we postulate that there is an open world for 
each actual occasion in which this actual occasion is becoming and that 
contemporaneously occurring actual occasions emerged in the same open world. 
 
∀𝑋(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) → ∃𝑌(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑋, 𝑌)) (A15) 
∀𝑋(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) → ∃𝑌(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌)) (A16) 
∀𝑥(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑥) → ∃𝑋(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋)) (A17) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 → 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑦, 𝑋)) (A18) 
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∀𝑥∃𝑦(𝑥 < 𝑦) (T39) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑋, 𝑌) → 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑌)) (T40) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌) → 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑌))  (T41) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ 𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑌, 𝑋) → 𝑌(𝑥)) (T42) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ 𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑌, 𝑋) → 𝑌(𝑥)) (T43) 
∀𝑋(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) → ∃𝑌(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑌, 𝑋)) (T44) 
∀𝑋(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ ¬𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝟎, 𝑋) → ∃𝑌(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌)) (T45) 
∀𝑋(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∨ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) → ∃𝑥(𝑋(𝑥))) (T46) 
∀𝑋(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∨ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) → 𝑋(𝟎)) (T47) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑥 < 𝑦 → ¬𝑋(𝑦)) (T48) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑦, 𝑋) → 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦) (T49) 
∀𝑋(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝟎, 𝑋) → ∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝟎)) (T50) 
∀𝑋(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝟎, 𝑋) → ¬∃𝑌(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌))) (T51) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥) → ¬𝑋(𝑦)) (T52) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑋(𝑦) ∧ 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑌) → 𝑌(𝑦)) (T53) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ 𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 → 𝑋(𝑦)) (T54) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑋) ∧ 𝑋(𝑥) ∧ 𝑦 ≼ 𝑥 → 𝑋(𝑦)) (T55) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑌, 𝑋) 
∧ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥) → 𝑌(𝑦)) 
 
(T56) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋, 𝑌) 




An example for such occurrence structure as defined by the current axioms is 
shown in figure 14. This figure depicts the same individuals and relations that are 
shown in figure 13. However, after the application of the newly introduced definition, 
there are three open worlds: (1) {𝟎}, in which 𝟎 emerged, (2) {𝟎, 𝑎0, 𝑎1} in which 𝑎0 
and 𝑎0 emerged and (3) {𝟎, 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝑏0, 𝑏1} ∪ {𝑐 | 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑐, 𝑎) ∧ 𝑎 ∈
{𝑎0, 𝑎1}}, in which 𝑏0 and 𝑏1 emerged. The respective closed worlds additionally 
include the respective prehensions of the actual occasions, which qualifies the 
concrescence of {𝟎} to be equal to {𝟎}. It is outlined that a new open world follows, 
after the concrescence of {𝟎, 𝑎0, 𝑎0𝑏0, 𝑏1} ∪ {𝑐 | 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑐, 𝑎) ∧ 𝑎 ∈
{𝑎0, 𝑎1}}. It has to be noted that the existence of an open world without any new 
actual occasions would be a contradiction to the postulated axioms. Thus, it is 
impossible that the flux of actual occasions stops or proceeds without any new events. 
Moreover, there is an open world for each actual occasion, such that nothing exists 
independent to the process of reality. Temporal relations can be categorized as being 
inter-world relations, which holds for <, and intra-world relations, which holds for ∥.  
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Fig. 14. Application of the definitions of open world and closed world to the running example. 
4.2.4. Process 
Since we want to stipulate how a collection of individuals forms a concrescence, 
we have to define a specific second order predicate that defines this unique collection 
𝑋 of individuals in the universe that will be concretized by a specific actual occasion, 
which is their concrescence. With respect to an open world 𝑌, these 𝑋 are all 
individuals in 𝑌 despite a unique actual occasion which has not become yet and these 
𝑋 are supposed to be concretized by this individual. This stipulation is necessary to 
ensure that an actual occasion does not only prehend its past, i.e. its actual world, but 
also its present, i.e. its contemporary world. We will call these individuals a potential, 
since it is the set of individuals which are given to an emerging actual occasion initially 
and have a potential to play a role in its inner structure, i.e. to be the subject of a 
prehension. 
Definition 5 A potential 𝑋 of an open world 𝑌 are all actual occasions in 𝑌 despite a unique 
individual which is no proper actual part of any individual in 𝑌. 
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋, 𝑌) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑(𝑌) ∧ ∃𝑥(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑌) 
∧ ∀𝑦(𝑋(𝑦) ↔ 𝑌(𝑦) ∧  𝑦 ≠ 𝑥 )) 
 
(D20) 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑌(𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋, 𝑌) (D21) 
 
These two definitions allow describing the unification of many into one regarding 
a certain state of the universe. It is clear, that individuals can only form a novel 
concrescence if they are existing at a particular time instant and, thus, their existence 
as many constitutes a particular state of the universe. We will understand this state as 
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an open world. The many are the potentials with respect to this state and the one 
actual occasion, which is the individual, in which the many are unified. The following 
final axioms resemble the Principle of Creativity that states that many will be unified by 
a single entity. These many are the potential that will allow the actual entity to 
concretize these entities by means of prehensions.  
 
 
∀𝑋, 𝑥(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) → ∃𝑌(𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑌, 𝑋) ∧ ¬𝑌(𝑥)) (T58) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌(𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋, 𝑌) → ∃𝑥(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑌) ∧ ¬𝑋(𝑥)) (T59) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑌 ⊳ 𝑦 ∧  𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑋(𝑧) → 𝑌(𝑧)) (T60) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑋(𝑧) → 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦) (T61) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑧) (T62) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥, 𝑦(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) → (𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ↔ 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑦, 𝑋))) (T63) 
∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥(𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑋) ∧ 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑖𝑛(𝑥, 𝑌) → 𝑋 = 𝑌) (T64) 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ∥ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ∥ 𝑧) (T65) 
¬∃𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 < 𝑥 → ∃𝑧(𝑦 < 𝑧 ∧ 𝑧 < 𝑥)) (T66) 
 
These theorems prove the power of this notion of potential. It uniquely defines 
which individual are concretized by an actual occasion and thus, qualifies the relations 
of temporal succession (resp. actual parthood) and contemporaneity to be transitive. 
Finally, it ensures that there are no limit points, which implies linear process structures 
to be examples of quantified time rather than continuous time. The application of 
these definitions and axioms can be seen in figure 15. This figure depicts that the 
collections of individuals of the running examples that are concretized by the actual 
occasions are potentials.  
4.3. Metalogical Analysis 
𝑇ℎ𝑃 = 𝑇ℎ(𝐴1 − 𝐴20) is the theory of linear process structures. Each 
occurrence structure 𝒫, such that 𝒫 ⊨ 𝑇ℎ𝑃 holds, is a linear process structure. 
Therefore, we will understand the unification of many as the inherent process that 
defines a linear process structure. This process constructs and chains all actual 
occasions to a continuous phenomenal process. The inner structure of an actual 
occasion is based on the appearance of its concretized actual occasions that were a 
potential for it. We will show that each actual occasion emerges from a unique open 
world. 
 
∀𝑋, 𝑌(𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋, 𝑌) → ∃𝑥(𝑌(𝑥) ∧ 𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥)) (A19) 
∀𝑋, 𝑥(𝑋 ⊳ 𝑥 → 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑋)) (A20) 
Process Structures 63  
 
 
Fig. 15. Application of the definition of potential to the running example. 
Theorem 1 Let 𝒫 be a linear process structure and 𝔓 ≔ { 𝐴 | 𝐴 ⊆ 𝔘𝒫 ∧
∃𝑌(𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝐴, 𝑌))}  be the set of potentials. The restriction ⊳ |𝔓 of  ⊳ is an injective function 
and it holds ⊳ |𝔓 = ⊳. 
Indeed, the concrescence relation is corresponding to an injective function with 
the set of potentials as its domain and the set of actual occasions as its range. We can 
even say that it is a bijection since each actual occasion is an image of ⊳. This implies 
that creativity transforms potential into unique novelty. Each set of given information 
is formed into a unique new piece of information which is added to the universe. 
There are no two pieces of information based on the same set of original information, 
a fact which also is common sense. You are not able to develop the same opinion 
another person has if you do not meet the same preliminaries and you are not able to 
understand another opinion if you are not able to comprehend the information which 
it is based on. A more basic implication is that each actual occasion in a linear process 
structure has to be based on a potential. There is no actual occasion which is able to 
emerge with such presupposition. 
Proposition 2 𝒫 is a linear process structure. ≤ is a partial ordering over 𝔘𝒫 . 
Proof: Since reflexivity and antisymmetry of ≤ can be easily deduced from the axioms 
regarding ⊳, we will show transitivity only. Assume the existence of actual occasions 
𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝔘𝒫 such that 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧. We know that 𝑥 ∈ 𝔚𝑦
𝐴 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝔚𝑧
𝐴 holds. 
If two of these actual occasions are equal, the conclusion follows from the reflexivity 
of ≤. Thus, we consider that they are pairwise unequal. In dependence to the open 
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world 𝑍 in which 𝑧 emerged, there exists a potential 𝑃𝑧 , of which 𝑧 is the 
concrescence, that contains 𝑦. We have to show 𝑥 is contained in 𝑃𝑧 . 
If we assume that 𝑥 < 𝑧 does not hold, we can distinguish two cases: (1) 𝑧 < 𝑥 
does not hold and (2) 𝑧 < 𝑥 holds. In case of (1), 𝑥 ∥ 𝑧 holds because of the definition 
of contemporaneity. It follows from 𝑦 ∈ 𝑍, that additionally 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 holds. Since ≤ is 
antisymmetric, we can deduce 𝑦 = 𝑧, which is a contradiction to the assumption that 
𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 are pairwise unequal. In case of (2), 𝑥 < 𝑦 < 𝑧 < 𝑥 holds, which implies a 
cycle. 𝑥 emerges in an open world that can be reached by countable compositions of 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 and 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 of a closed world 𝑌 that was the concrescence of the 
open world in which 𝑦 emerged. Because all parts of 𝑦 belong to 𝑌 and there is only 
one unique transition of 𝑌 as well as its following closed worlds, 𝑥 < 𝑥 holds, which 
contradicts the irreflexivity of <. Thus, ≤ can be considered transitive and a partial 
order over 𝔘𝒫 . ∎ 
Proposition 3 𝒫 is a linear process structure. ∥ is an equivalence relation over 𝔘𝒫 . 
Proof: Since reflexivity and symmetry of ∥ can be easily deduced from the axioms 
regarding ⊳, we will show transitivity only. Assume the existence of 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝔘𝒫 such 
that 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ∥ 𝑧 holds. If two of these actual occasions are equal, the conclusion 
follows from the reflexivity of ∥. Thus, we consider that they are pairwise unequal. 
Since ∥ is a symmetric relation, we can consider 𝑥 < 𝑧 without loss of generality to 
show the hypothesis. There exists an open world 𝑌 in which 𝑦 emerged. From the 
definition of open worlds follows that 𝑥 and 𝑦 are both contained in 𝑍. Since these 
two actual occasions are contemporaneous to 𝑦, we know that they emerged in 𝑌, 
too. Thus, they are both maximal in 𝑌, which means that no actual occasion in 𝑌 is a 
proper actual part of 𝑧. This proposition contradicts the assumption 𝑥 < 𝑧. As a 
conclusion, ∥ is transitive as well as an equivalence relation over 𝔘𝒫 .  ∎ 
Lemma 4 𝒫 is a linear process structure. For an arbitrary 𝑎 ∈ 𝔘𝒫  and the corresponding 
equivalence class [𝑎] of the quotient set 
𝔘𝒫 
∥⁄ , the set 𝔚[𝑎]
𝐴  is well-defined.  
Proof: Assume 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝔘𝒫  such that 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦. There exists an open world 𝑋 which 
constitutes the potentials that 𝑥 and 𝑦 are the concrescence of. 𝑥 and 𝑦 are not equal 
to 𝟎 resp. to each other because, in these cases, the conclusion is trivial. This open 
world 𝑋 is the transition of a closed world according to T41 and this closed world is 
the concrescence of an open world 𝑌 according to T42. This open world 𝑌 contains 
all actual occasions which are not maximal with respect to ≤ in the originary open 
world 𝑋 according to the definitions of a transition and a concrescence. We further 
know that 𝑋 is unique by the definitions of a transition and a concrescence. Therefore, 
it holds 𝑧 ≤ 𝑥 and 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦 for an arbitrary 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋. Assume, there is an actual occasion 
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𝑧 in the actual world of 𝑥, such that 𝑧 is not contained in the actual world of 𝑦. From 
the definition of actual occasions follows 𝑧 ≤ 𝑥, and since 𝑧 will be contained in 𝑋, 
the contradiction 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦. Without loss of generality, this yields the conclusion.  ∎ 
Corollary 5 𝒫 is a linear process structure. If and only if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 holds for arbitrary actual 
occasions 𝑎 and 𝑏, 𝔚[𝑎]
𝐴 ⊆ 𝔚[𝑏]
𝐴  holds for the actual worlds that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are constituting as 
representatives of their corresponding equivalence classes.  
Theorem 6 𝒫 is a linear process structure. ⊆ is a linear ordering over  
𝔚𝐴: =  { 𝔚𝑎
𝐴  | 𝑎 ∈
𝔘𝒫 
∥⁄ }.  
Proof: Since ⊆ is a partial ordering, we only must show that for arbitrary 𝑉, 𝑊 ∈  𝔚𝐴 
either 𝑉 = 𝑊, 𝑉 ⊆ 𝑊 or 𝑊 ⊆ 𝑉 holds. Assume, 𝑉 ⊈ 𝑊 and 𝑊 ⊈ 𝑉 . 𝑉 resp. 𝑊 
are defined by an equivalence class [𝑣] resp. [𝑤], which is again defined by a 
representative actual occasion 𝑣 ∈ 𝔘𝒫  resp. 𝑤 ∈ 𝔘𝒫  because 𝔚[𝑣]
𝐴  resp. 𝔚[𝑤]
𝐴  is 
well-defined. 𝑣 ≰ 𝑤 and 𝑤 ≰ 𝑣 follows. Therefore, 𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 holds because of the 
definition of actual occasions. The direct implication 𝑉 = 𝑊 contradicts the premise 
and thus, the conclusion follows.  ∎ 
A direct application of this theorem is a graphical representation of linear process 
structures as shells. Since the actual worlds are ordered linearly, each actual world is a 
shell that includes all preceding actual worlds. All actual occasions 𝑋 that are elements 
of an actual world 𝐴 and no elements of a preceding actual world 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐴 have 
emerged contemporaneously. These actual occasions can be represented as belonging 
exclusively to a shell that represents 𝐴. 
All actual occasions that are actual parts of an 𝑋 can be mapped to their 
corresponding actual world in which they have emerged. The shells represent the 
temporal order ≤ over the universe of a linear process structure. Figure 16 shows a 
reduced shell model for a linear process structure 𝒫. Furthermore, this theorem 
qualifies the order of contemporary worlds to be a C-series in the vein of McTaggart. 
Thus, we have an A-series and a C-series, which implies a B-series of time in which 
moments can be interpreted as contemporary worlds. For actual occasions 𝑎 and 𝑏, 
the moment 𝔚[𝑎]
𝐶  occurred earlier (resp. later) than the moment 𝔚[𝑏]
𝐶  if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏 (resp. b 
≤ a) holds. It has to be mentioned that McTaggart used these notions to show the 
unreality of time. One of his main assumptions is that the term present cannot specify 
a time instant but rather a dynamic time interval that is phenomenally continuous. He 
favours this notion of a specious present over an objective present. However, GFO as well 
as PR hold that the present of an object is indeed instantaneous resp. extensive rather 
than temporally extended. Furthermore, both systems provide tools to create the 
specious present of an entity as a mereological fusion of entities that are connected. 
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These fusions are not part of the physical world but rather products of the mental 
capabilities of these entities. Thus, McTaggart’s argument does not hold in GFO or 
PR, and the presented axiomatization qualifies the relation ≤ to be understood as an 
objective representation of a temporal series. 
 
 
Fig. 16. The first five shells of the shell model for the linear process structure 𝑃 with four actual 
occasions in each shell. Prehensions and relations have been omitted for the sake of simplicity.  
In the following, we summarize only some meta-logical results of the elementary 
theories associated to substructures of a linear process structure 𝒫. The considered 
substructures are 𝒫< ≔ (
𝔘
∥⁄ , <) and 𝒫<,∥ ≔ (𝔘, <, ∥). The structure 𝒫< represents 
the formerly investigated linear ordering over 𝒫 that has the order type of the natural 
numbers 𝜔. We consider two theories above the already introduced basic theory 
𝑇ℎ𝒫 = 𝑇ℎ(𝐴1 − 𝐴20): (1) 𝑇< that is interpreted regarding the substructure 𝒫< of 
some linear process structure 𝒫 and (2) 𝑇<,∥ that is interpreted regarding the 
substructure 𝒫<,∥ of some linear process structure 𝒫. 𝑇< contains the order type of 
the natural numbers as a standard model. This standard model can also be obtained 
by adding the following axiom to 𝑇ℎ𝒫, which specifies that every equivalence class 
regarding ∥ has a cardinality of 1, as it is depicted in figure 17. 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 → 𝑥 = 𝑦) (A21) 
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Fig. 17. A linear process structure with 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝔘) = ℕ. {𝑎 | 𝑎 < 𝑥} ⊳ 𝑥 holds for all 
actual occasions 𝑥. Prehensions and their relations to actual occasions have been omitted for the sake 
of simplicity. 
It is easy to see that 𝑇ℎ𝒫 + A21 is a complete extension of 𝑇ℎ𝒫 that is decidable 
regarding the theories 𝑇< and 𝑇<,∥. However, we can show some more interesting 
propositions that are based on well-known results. The first proposition represents 
the already mentioned features of 𝑇ℎ𝒫 + A21, which can be abstracted to all models 
of 𝑇<. We believe that this abstraction of decidability is valid for 𝑇<,∥, too, but a 
complete proof would go beyond the scope of the herein presented work and needs 
to be elaborated on its own. The second proposition is based on the cardinality 
restriction of the equivalence classes regarding ∥ and implies a way, in which other 
models can be constructed by using sequences of natural numbers to specify the 
cardinality of these equivalence classes, e.g. the cardinality of [𝑎] is 2 for an arbitrary 
actual occasion except 𝟎. 
Proposition 7. The theory 𝑇< is decidable and complete. 
Proof: Follows from the results presented by Läuchli & Leonard (1966) ∎ 
Proposition 8. The theory 𝑇<,∥ has uncountably many complete extensions. 
Proof: Let 𝑆𝑒𝑞 = (𝑛(1), … , 𝑛(𝑘), … ) be an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers. 
We construct a model of 𝑇<,∥ by putting exactly 𝑛(𝑘) many elements in the 𝑘-th 
equivalence class that is not [𝟎] since this equivalence class has to have the cardinality 
#[𝟎]=1 in every model of 𝑇<,∥. These conditions can be formalized by a first-order 
theory 𝑇(𝑆𝑒𝑞) with infinitely many sentences. Obviously, two different sequences 𝑖 
and 𝑗 generate two different theories 𝑇(𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑖) and 𝑇(𝑆𝑒𝑞𝑗). From this follows that 
the number of complete extensions of 𝑇<,∥ equals the cardinal number of the set of 







In the last chapters, we introduced the notions of knowledge and process 
structures that represent the internal data structures of an information system’s 
processing unit as well as the interaction of several processing units over time. We 
will discuss the introduced vocabulary and the formal axioms that define these 
relational structures. This discussion comprises the applicability of knowledge 
structure to a use-case in medical data science and a comparison to the alternative 
approach of knowledge creation in OWL. Process structures are reviewed regarding 
their values as foundation for the modelling of theoretical problems. We consider the 
reconstruction of mereotopological relation based on the notion of a nexus that will 
be introduced in the course of this discussion. Moreover, a realignment of process 
structures is presented that formally grasps physical time. Finally, its capability to 
represent the phenomenon of time dilatation is investigated.     
5.1. Knowledge Structures 
Prehensions are entities that have a subject, an object and a form; all three defined 
by the dyadic relations 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 and 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚. Thus, prehensions are 
comparable to triples in the vein of RDF, which, likewise, concern subject, object and 
predicate, whereas a form is like a predicate with the important difference that it 
pertains to a subjective interpretation rather than an assumed objective truth. Hence, 
prehensions are more than just triples, which can be transformed to the physical 
prehensions of an information system in the context of which they are assumed to be 
true. In such system, no additional object properties are needed. It is based completely 
on a hierarchy of concepts and the vocabulary introduced in the preceding section. 
Since our relations are dyadic, they can be represented in OWL and RDF, such that 
both are utilized as metalanguage of systems implementing our approach. The OWL 
axioms that are necessary for such implementation are shown in figure 18. We can 
simply compare the concepts, which define the forms of a subject’s prehensions, to 
gain deeper insights about the data in such system. Thus, we directly relate objects 
that have been interpreted similarly to a unifying nexus.  
Kuehnapfel et al. (2017) examined the reliability of body surface area calculated 
by a 3D body scanner, as well as the validity of published and commonly used 
empirical formulae compared to the body scanner calculation. 18 different formulae 
were analyzed, which typically require height, weight, or both. The evaluation was 
carried out based on the data available from the population-based LIFE-Adult study. 
Classical anthropometric assessments as well as 3D anthropometric scans were 
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performed on almost all LIFE participants. The investigation has shown an excellent 
reliability of 3D laser-based body surface assessments, but there are also empirical 
formulae showing excellent results. A small improvement can be achieved by a 




Fig. 18. The categorial structure of an OWL ontology implementing the semantics of knowledge 
structures. The basic object properties are depicted as edges, the head resp. tail of which is the domain 
resp. range of this property. Conjunctions in these property axioms are depicted as distinct edges.  
5.1.1. Representation 
We want to use the database of the LIFE-study as example to outline the 
application of the presented approach to a real-world example. An information 
system based on the LIFE database is an artefactual entity being a subject, which 
prehends all data that has been collected about the participants of the study. All these 
data are stored as physical data resp. phenomenal data. These physical data are a set 
of prehensions that corresponds to the set of patients about which the data has been 
collected. Each patient is the datum of exactly one prehension and this prehension 
has exactly one patient as its datum. The patients themselves are actual entities resp. 
actual occasions. The subjective forms are complex eternal objects and corresponding 
to the fusion of a set of individual properties. We will refer to these complex eternal 
objects as property vectors. In GFO, an individual property instantiates a property 
universal 𝑎 and has a value 𝑏 that is in the value domain of 𝑎.  
In the presented approach, both entities form a tuple (𝑎, 𝑏) that is part of a 
subjective form resp. a component of a property vector. Thus, no individual property 
in the sense of GFO exists, but rather a prehension that can be deduced from the 
existence of this individual property. We argue that a representation in GFO is more 
expressive. Yet, we want to stick with the Whiteheadian approach to investigate its 
applicability. For the LIFE database, the property vector of a patient 𝑝 is called 𝑝's 
properties and its components are instances of the property universals height, weight 
and body surface, which pertains to the measurements produced by the 3D body 
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scanner. In figure 19, an example of this data model is given for some participants 
that could be part of a study database like the one in LIFE. 
 
 
Fig. 19. The exemplary study data for the participants Maria, Adam, Susan and Peter is represented 
as prehensions, the subjects of which is the information system that processed these data and makes 
them accessible. The participants themselves are the datums of their corresponding prehension. The 
form of each prehension is a property vector having a tuple of an object universal as its part as well 
as a property value belonging to the universal's domain. In this example, height, weight and body 
surface are maintained for each patient. Because the datum of each prehension is an actual entity, 
these prehensions are physical prehensions. 
According to the physical data prehended by the information system about the 
study participants, it can conceptually valuate them. Subsequently, conceptual 
prehensions are created that represent a classification according to percentiles. To 
structure the test data in our example, we have chosen the 5th, 50th and 90th percentile. 
A percentile yields an eternal object that conceptually valuates an individual property 
and—together with its instantiated property universal—forms a part of the complex 
concept that valuates the property vector. Moreover, if an individual property has a 
value that is smaller than the 50th percentile of the property, it is also smaller than the 
95th percentile thus, only the eternal object corresponding to the 50th percentile is 
chosen as subjective form of a property vector because the informational value of this 
eternal object is higher, as already described in the last section. In summary, each 
complex concept will have up to three parts. The more granular the chosen percentiles 
are, i.e. more than just the 5th, 50th and 95th, the more fine-grained is the conceptual 
valuation. This interpretation of the physical data provided by the study participants 
is shown in figure 20. 
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Fig. 20. Based on the physical data, the information system evaluates the study participant's individual 
properties as prehensions. The values of the property vectors are compared to the values that refers 
to percentiles of each property, hence, abstracted to evaluating resp. linguistic concepts that are 
known to the information system. These concepts are the form of the created prehensions. Because 
their datums are eternal objects, they are conceptual prehensions. Thus, the form of these conceptual 
prehensions are the concepts that the actual entities of the originary physical prehensions instantiate 
for the information system. 
5.1.2. Abstraction 
In our approach, such classes that defined by percentiles would be represented 
as nexūs. Every meaningful concept 𝐶𝑝 corresponds to an eternal object 𝑝 in 𝑂𝑆 that 
is the subjective form of a prehension. 𝐶𝑝 grounds a nexus 𝑛𝑝 with 𝑝 as its common 
element of form. For instance, the nexus of all study participants whose weight is 
lower than the 5W percentile is the set of all individuals fulfilling the formerly 
mentioned concept. The more complex the nexus, the fewer members it will have. In 
the most extreme case, i.e. a singleton nexus, it consists of one actual entity only. This 
behaviour resembles the complexity of concept lattices, which have been mentioned 
earlier, i.e. the extension of a concept is smaller if it has more conceptual parts.  
In the herein presented interpretation, only ontologically founded sets of 
individuals would exist as conceptualization of physical data resp. extensions of 
concepts. No extension would exist otherwise. This distinction is made by the already 
existing knowledge in a system, since only known concepts can be used. Furthermore, 
if a nexus 𝑛 with a complex element of form 𝑓 exists and it has the same elements as 
the nexus 𝑛′ with 𝑓 ′ ≤ 𝑓 as its element of form, we can grant 𝑛 a higher relevance 
than 𝑛′. Hence, 𝑛 would be the more important nexus to use in further research since 
it yields a higher informational content and 𝑛′ could be eliminated. Some nexūs that 
can be prehended by the information system in LIFE as well as their members and 
common elements of form are sketched in figure 21. 
 
Discussion 73  
 
 
Fig. 21. The conceptual prehensions are used by the information system to aggregate the study 
participants into nexūs resp. to what could be referred to as meaningful classes. This aggregation is 
encoded into prehensions, the datums of which are nexūs. Thus, these prehensions are physical 
prehensions and represent factual data. The concepts that constitute these nexūs are the forms of 
their prehensions. The most primitive among them pertain to singleton nexūs including only a single 
member. 
The aggregation of entities by subjective assumptions is the key to abstraction. 
By separating relevant from irrelevant properties, the human mind creates theories 
about its environment. These theories concern sets of entities rather than single 
entities. Those sets come into life by abstracting from single entities based on their 
common properties. Continuants in the sense of GFO are formed as an aggregation 
of temporally consecutive actual entities that are similar enough to be recognized as 
the same temporal entity. Processes are formed as an aggregation of continuants 
perceived this way, if their actions can be comprehended into a causal whole. Thus, a 
nexus is a unity representing an abstracted view on a set of entities. Furthermore, a 
nexus is an entity that, in contrast to a class, has a mode of existence for its prehending 
subject. A representation as classes might allow the same view as an abstraction of 
elements. However, the notion of nexūs allows us to treat them as a unification for 
the entities it represents rather than a linguistic representation and its interpretation 
only.  
This raises the question if a class can exist if there is no element fulfilling it. 
Similarly to collectives, nexūs are existent only if they have members, i.e. actual entities 
fulfilling the eternal object resp. concept that defines the nexus. In OWL ontologies, 
classes exist a priori and not as abstraction of entities that fulfil a concept. They can 
be empty with the justification of the Open World Assumption (OWA), which states 
that each class has members but their existence is not known yet or, if their existence 
is known, their class membership is not known yet.  
A class is a hybrid entity that has members and is the extension of a concept 
representing the intensional meaning of this class. Sometimes classes are 
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idiosyncratically equated with the concepts they extend, which leads to confusion 
especially in the context of ontologies that define a class, the members of which are 
concepts, e.g. GFO, DOLCE or SKOS. From set theoretic perspective, all empty 
classes are equivalent to the empty set and thus, also to each other according to the 
axiom of extensionality and the axiom scheme of replacement (Devlin, 1993). Hence, 
they represent a contradictory or not satisfiable condition for artefactual entities or 
individuals, which is of no informational value—one could say empty classes are 
nonsensical. Lewis (1991) defines this principle even more strict, as his notion of a 
class comprises the necessary existence of members.  
Based on this understanding, we argue that nexūs resemble the notion of classes 
better than OWL classes, which only fulfil it insufficiently because OWA is not able 
to rule out that there are indeed no valid members. Some of the formerly mentioned 
ontologies allow having individuals that are instances of OWL classes that are called 
class resp. set to function as extension of a concept based on their vocabulary. 
However, there is no semantical definition of a class membership that exceeds a 
manual definition. Furthermore, it is not expedient to have a class for all possible 
concepts that pertain to knowledge about study data as this yields a semantic overload. 
Each combination of these concepts would need a class extending it to make 
propositions about it. If one of these classes is empty, it should not exist because it 
does not fulfil any ontological truth. Moreover, it should be noted that OWL is not 
able to express the notion of 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡, i.e. smaller than the 5th percentile, 
cannot be expressed directly since it is no constant value but rather dependent on the 
system's data. Thus, it must be assigned by some mechanism independent to the OWL 
ontology and the used reasoning engine. 
5.1.3. Judgement 
The class of all study participants having a weight below the 5th percentile can be 
thought of as a nexus and hence, forms a unity we can make propositions about. For 
all study participants belonging to this group and having a height higher than the 50th 
percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile, it is possible that their body surface is 
below the 5th percentile,, which defines a proposition 𝑝 declaring that “All study 
participants having a weight below the 5th percentile and having a height higher than the 50th percentile 
but smaller than the 90th percentile, have a body surface below the 5th percentile.” The nexus 𝑛 of 
all citizens having a weight smaller than the 5th percentile and having a height higher 
than the 50th percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile is the logical subject of the 
proposition 𝑝. It is existent in the system because its common element of form, 
namely the mereological sum of the eternal objects “weight smaller than the 5th percentile” 
and “height greater than the 50th percentile but smaller than the 90th percentile” is defined. Both 
eternal objects exist, are parts of the common element of form of 𝑛, and intensify 
each other. Additionally, there is the eternal object “body surface smaller than the 5th 
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percentile”. This eternal object is contradicting “body surface not smaller than the 5th percentile” 
and is the predicate of the proposition 𝑝. The proposition turns out to be true, if all 
members of 𝑛 have a body surface that is below the 5th percentile.  
We apply this approach of modelling knowledge to the given use case of body 
surface approximations based on the formulas tested by Kuehnapfel et al. (2017) to 
match the values produced by the 3D body scanners that we interpret as physical data. 
In the propositions that will be created, the study participants are represented as 
singleton nexūs. The common element of form of a singleton nexus is the subjective 
form 𝑓 of the conceptual valuation of the physical prehension of its sole member. 
These nexūs are the logical subjects of these propositions and the results of the 
formulas are their predicates. For the participant 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎, as mentioned in the 
example, the results are 𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒1(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎)  =  1,3701 and 
𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒2(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎)  =  1,3771 according to the formulas (1) and (2) on page 
30. Depending on the percentile these values imply an eternal object chosen as 
predicate of the proposition.  
It is obvious that for similar values the eternal object will be corresponding to the 
same percentile that is implied by the 3D body scanners and thus, allow the 
information system to come to the judgement that both propositions are true. To 
outline how information systems can judge propositions as their knowledge, the given 
classification is sufficient. An implementation can work with customizable accuracy 
defined in its ontology structure and judge about the truth of the results of all formulas 
mentioned by Kuehnapfel et al. An exemplary output of this information system as 
well as the evaluation of propositions based on given facts can be seen in figure 22.  
Apart from the judgement about produced physical data, information systems 
should be able to deduce knowledge based on conceptual valuations. If a high amount 
of the members of a logical subject fulfil a certain predicate, the other members 
possibly fulfil this predicate too, either because the given physical data is incomplete 
or because the conceptualization is too narrow. If, for instance, the BMI of some 
study participants is given, then the BMI of others which are in a common nexus 
should be the same. Moreover, if we extend our example by data about pre-existing 
diseases like arterial calcification or diabetes mellitus, such common nexus can imply 
the possibility of undiagnosed illness or the disposition of the study participant to 
develop such illness. Pragmatically, such propositions can be expressed as OWL 
classes, too. Let us assume an OWL class 𝑐𝑃∪𝑃′ that extends another OWL class 𝑐𝑃, 
which is the extension of a property 𝑃. 𝑐𝑃∪𝑃′ expresses the belief that an instance of 
𝑃′ inheres in the members of 𝑐𝑃, which expresses the given use case of an 
undiagnosed illness if 𝑃′ pertains to the phenotype of such illness. 
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Fig. 22. The propositions that have been created by the empirical algorithms, defined by formulas 
like (1) and (2) on page 30, are encoded into prehensions, the datums of which are propositions. Each 
proposition has two parts: (1) the logical subject and (2) the predicate that assumed to be true for 
logical subject by the subject of the prehension, which is the information system. The form of these 
prehensions is the judgement of the information system regarding the factual data. In the given 
example of two propositions, one of them is true, whereas the other one is false. The proposition 
about Maria is true. 
The semantics of OWL prove this method wrong. Assume that the information 
system comes to the judgement that an instance of a universal property 𝑃′ is possibly 
inhering in a study participant 𝑎 ∈ 𝑐𝑃. This entails that 𝑎 ∈ 𝑐𝑃∪𝑃′ holds. Furthermore, 
assume that the existence of an individual property that is instantiating 𝑃′ and inhering 
in 𝑎 is not stated explicitly. The semantics of OWL entails an anonymous individual 
property 𝑥 that instantiates 𝑃′ and inheres in 𝑎. A reasoner will disallow the 
proposition ¬𝑎 ∈ 𝑐𝑃′ to be factually incorrect although 𝑎 ∈ 𝑐𝑃∪𝑃′ only represents a 
disposition. An additional postulation of this incorrectness will effect the data to be 
contradictory to the entailed knowledge. For the case of an illness that can be 
developed by a study participant, an elegant approach is presented by Röhl & Jansen 
(2011) that allows the modelling of dispositional facts. However, this approach does 
not concern propositions about the possible truth of such facts but rather focuses on 
the modelling of facts itself, which is a foundation of dispositional knowledge only 
and does not include a solution to the herein discussed problem.  
5.1.4. Consciousness 
An interesting aspect about artefactual entities is implied by the notion of truth 
that we have defined in the last section. In PR, a proposition, prehended by an actual 
entity that additionally prehends the truthmaker of this proposition, is said to be 
prehended consciously. Thus, if a piece of knowledge that is prehended by an actual 
entity 𝑎 and is deemed to be true by 𝑎, is not only prehended but actually perceived 
by it; this distinction has been discussed in the second section. But is it possible to say 
that artefactual entities can have something like consciousness based on the definition 
of a consciously made prehension? Because the theory of orchestrated objective 
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reduction as discussed by Hameroff & Penrose (2014) is based on Whiteheadian 
philosophy also, this question should be addressed—if only briefly.  
Hameroff and Penrose distinguish between three distinct theories of 
consciousness. (1) The scientific-materialistic view in which consciousness is not emerging 
as independent quality but is a consequence of brains and nervous systems that has 
been developed evolutionary. This view is adopted and defended by Dennett & 
Kinsbourne (1992) as well as Wegner (2002). (2) The dualistic-spiritualistic view in which 
consciousness is based on the distinction of matter and mind as two substances. In 
this view, which can be attributed to Descartes (1993), mind is independent to matter 
and able to influence it. We mention the work of Chopra (2001) as a contemporary 
example. (3) The scientific view defended by Hameroff and Penrose that locates 
consciousness in an orchestrated set of physical events, the emergence of which is 
not yet fully understood but seems to be integral to the physical laws and thus, 
intrinsic to the universe. These physical events are based on actual entities as 
described in PR and their intrinsic character allows drawing parallels to the panpsychistic 
view (Brüntrup, 2017). 
While it may be non-plausible to discuss artefactual entities from the first and 
second perspective, it makes sense to adopt the third perspective and debate if 
consciousness can be attributed to them. Whitehead distinguishes two types of actual 
entities with respect to their ability to psychologically process physical data into 
propositions and how intense the reliance on these propositions is for the becoming 
of actual entity. A nexus is termed living organism if its members are centred around 
such actual entities that can prehend consciously and use this knowledge to steer their 
becoming. The bearers of data are hard disk drives and memory chips, which can be 
easily interpreted as multitudes of actual entities that exclusively contain physical data 
based on an electrical load, which is very close to the descriptions of insensate actual 
entities in PR.  
Artefactual entities read data, process them to create new knowledge and store 
the semantic representation of this knowledge in hard disks and memory drives. Thus, 
there is a relation that constitutes a nexus between these hard disks and memory drives 
as well as the artefactual entity that uses them as storage and orchestrates them, which 
effects a sequence of physical events that are causally connected. One might argue 
that this is an indicator for life and consciousness, but artefactual entities are not 
naturally using the Whiteheadian categorial scheme; they will rather emulate it as a 
meta-language to simulate the creation of knowledge and thus, are only artificially 
living organisms. Moreover, according to an interview with Paulson (2017), Penrose 
holds that consciousness in the vein of orchestrated objective reduction is nothing a 
computer system can be capable of. Artefactual entities are hence, examples of 
artificial intelligence according to the physical system hypothesis introduced by 
Newell & Simon (1976). 
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5.2. Process Structures 
5.2.1. Mereotopology 
In applied logics, the most influential part of PR is certainly its informal 
introduction of a foundation for mereotopology. The respective chapter includes a 
calculus of regions that allows to describe the phenomenal character of reality 
interpretable as part-whole theory. This calculus is an extension of the event calculus 
introduced in earlier works of Whitehead (1920) in Concepts of Nature, which will 
abbreviate with CN. Instead of events, the individuals that are investigated in PR are 
regions. This shift in perspective is inspired by the calculus of solids developed by de 
Laguna (1922). This shift of focus is easily understandable due to the nature of events 
as described in PR. An event is a presential that is exhibited by an enduring object 
that is participating in the process of reality. This implies that, in addition to arbitrary 
sets of actual occasions, single actual occasions themselves are events, too. Events 
can cover each other which resembles being part of one another according to Simons 
(2000). 
However, to retain a connected universe, it is inevitable to postulate that all events 
in the universe are somehow connected. Simons criticizes the justification of this 
assumption of universally connected events and states that it cannot be formulated 
within the context of mereology alone; it presupposes the notions of topology. 
Moreover, events in the sense of CN are atomless individuals, which means that there 
are no events that do not cover another event. We argue that this assumption is not 
true from the perspective of PR because actual occasions imply singleton events that 
only cover themselves and thus, are atoms, which is contradicting the notion of 
atomless events in CN.  
The evolution of this calculus that has been introduced in PR overcomes this 
issue since it investigates regions and their connectedness, which allows to utilize the 
notions of topology. The final purpose was the foundation of a point-free geometry 
that can be used to describe the nature of spatiotemporal reasoning as performed by 
the human mind. The informal representation proved to be inconsistent but had an 
exemplary function for the mereotopological works of Clarke (1981), Casati & Varzi 
(1999) as well as Ridder (2002). These works represent axiomatizations of region 
calculi inspired by PR and analyze them regarding their logical and ontological validity. 
The main difference is that regions are not collections of actual occasions themselves, 
as it was presupposed in CN, but rather the phenomenal space—in the sense of 
GFO—that these actual occasions occupy from a certain perspective. An application 
has been developed by Vakarelov (2010), who investigated the dynamic character of 
spatially changing enduring objects and the continuous morphing of their occupied 
region in consideration of PR’s epochal theory of time. 
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The postulation of universal connectedness is not necessary anymore since 
enduring objects are no arbitrary sets of actual occasions but conceptually and 
temporally connected actual occasions that appear to be a whole from a subject’s 
perspective. Thus, the arbitrariness that has been circumvented in CN has been 
replaced by the causality that is inhering in the composition of a nexus according to 
PR. The notion of a nexus we will be analyzed further in this section. Moreover, the 
infinite separability of events that is ontologically flawed has been reduced to a simple 
assumption: the space occupied by a nexus is a phenomenal entity and continuously 
separable by a subject that prehends this nexus. By this means, separation is a mental 
process and it results in solely virtual entities that do not need to have a representation 
in the actual world. They can be represented as prehensions in the inner structure of 
some actual occasion. The connection between the mereotopological aspects in PR 
and its processual foundations, the axiomatic representation of which was presented 
in the last chapter of this work, has never been conducted to the best of our 
knowledge and is the topic of the following discussion. The missing link is the notion 
of a nexus and how such nexus comes to life. 
Prehensions are the parts of actual occasions that are no actual parts, i.e. no actual 
occasions. However, they represent the inner structure of this actual occasion. All 
actual occasions that are elements of this world effected a prehension that is part of 
the prehending subject. A formal analysis of this effect has been presented by 
Siemoleit & Herre (2016) and will be applied to informally extend linear process 
structures in this section. A simple physical prehension can be reduced to three different 
aspects: (1) the prehending subject of which it is a part, (2) the prehended actual occasion, 
i.e. its datum that is part of the prehending subject’s actual world, and (3) the conceptual 
valuation of the datum, to which it is referred to as a subjective form. The first two 
aspects do not need a further elucidation, since they have already been analyzed 
sufficiently. The latter is an eternal object, i.e. a specific concept that encodes the 
prehending subject’s reaction to the datum. Reactions do not only include universals 
that can describe the universal character of the datum but also a possibly emotional 
reaction like fear or enjoyment. These reactions to its environment allow the 
prehending subject to evolve into the actual occasion it will be in the spatiotemporal 
world. Eternal objects resemble the usage of concepts in GFO. However, the 
subjective form of a physical prehension has to be understood as the conceptual 
counterpart of a physical datum, i.e. a property universal. 
These property universals are the datum of a second type of prehension that 
likewise consists of three parts: (1) the prehending subject, (2) the property universals 
representing the physical data provided by a physical prehension as its datum, and (3) 
the concept that has been chosen by the prehending subject as its subjective form. 
This type of prehension is referred to as conceptual prehension. Physical and conceptual 
prehensions are distinguished according to their datum. Physical prehensions have 
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actual occasions as their datum, whereas conceptual prehensions have eternal objects 
as their datum. In PR, it is postulated that such conceptual prehension exists for each 
physical prehension as its conceptual valuation. This valuation is used by the prehending 
subject 𝑠 to fuse all actual occasions in its actual world that are evaluated by means of 
the same concept into an abstract individual being a nexus. Such nexus is the fusion 
of actual occasions that are conceptually connected due to their valuation into a new 
type of individual that serves as a substitute for them. According to Whitehead, a 
prehending subject can formulate propositions about nexūs and thus, express 
knowledge about its actual world. However, there is no need to delve this deep into 
PR to express the term of connectedness. Hence, we will propose a shortcut that can 
be applied directly to linear process structures. 
It is obvious that the dichotomy of physical and conceptual prehensions can be 
simplified into a singular prehension that shares the same prehending subject and is 
defined by the datum of the physical prehension as well as the subjective form of the 
conceptual valuation of this physical prehension. Furthermore, the subjective form 
depends on the prehensions that are part of the actual occasions that have been 
prehended. Hence, we can assume that a nexus is sufficiently defined by the common 
prehensions of its elements. Thus, these results will not consider the perspective of a 
prehending subject but rather represent the spatial connections of the actual world in 
an objective manner, i.e. how they can be prehended by some subject. Since actual 
worlds are well-defined for a set of contemporaneous actual occasions, all these actual 
occasions can prehend the same spatiotemporal connectedness that characterizes 
their common subjective universe. The collection of prehensions that constitutes a 
nexus will be called a common element of form and will be maximal, i.e. there is a 
unique nexus for the same collection of actual occasions. To capture the notion of a 
region, process structures must be extended to process topologies 𝒫𝑇 = (𝔘𝒫𝑇 , ℜ, ⊳
, ∵, ≃) that additionally include a set of spatiotemporal regions ℜ, and the relation ≃
: 2𝔘𝒫𝑇 × ℜ. 𝑁 ≃ 𝑟 denotes that a nexus 𝑁 occupies a region 𝑟. Nexūs and their 
common element of form are defined the following way. 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑠(𝑋) ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑦∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ↔ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥) (D20*) 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑋, 𝑌)  ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓  𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑠(𝑌) ∧ ∀𝑥(𝑋(𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑦(𝑌(𝑦) 




We additionally extend the formal language ℒ𝒪
𝐼𝐼 to the formal language ℒ𝒪ℛ
𝐼𝐼 , such 
that its alphabet includes region variables 𝑥?̃? with 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3, … }, which are implied 
by 𝑥, ?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?, …. The set of region variables is 𝔙ℜ and 𝔙 = 𝔙𝐼 ∪ 𝔙𝐼𝐼 ∪ 𝔙ℜ is 
the set of all variables. A region variable 𝑥 is called free in a string if it is contained in 
this string but ∀𝑥 and ∃𝑥 are not contained. ℒ𝒪ℛ
𝐼𝐼  includes the atomic formulas of ℒ𝒪
𝐼𝐼 
as well as 𝑋𝑖 ≃ 𝑥?̃?. Furthermore, the set of formulas also has to be closed under the 
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condition: if 𝜙(𝑥?̃?) ∈ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) and 𝑥?̃? is free in 𝜙, then ∀𝑥?̃?𝜙(𝑥?̃?), ∃𝑥?̃?𝜙(𝑥?̃?) ∈
𝐹𝑚(𝜎, 𝔙) holds. The semantics of this extension is assumingly clear, such that we 
can proceed to formulate the equivalence between region variables analogous to the 
equivalence of individual variables. However, since we only have individual predicates 
rather than region predicates, we use the notion of spatial occupation for this 
definition. 
We additionally introduce the standard relations of mereology: (1) the parthood 
of regions ≪ ∶ ℜ × ℜ, (2) overlapping of regions ∘ ∶ ℜ × ℜ, and (3) disjointness of 
regions ≀ ∶ ℜ × ℜ that will finally lead to the topological relations of: (4) external 
connection of regions ⋈  : ℜ × ℜ and (5) connection of regions ≬ ∶ ℜ × ℜ. 
Integration axioms that establish the bijective relation between nexūs and the regions 
they occupy are presented as well as an axiom that ensures the structural integrity of 
≃. 
 
?̃? = ?̃? ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∀𝑋(𝑋 ≃ ?̃? → 𝑋 ≃ ?̃?) (D22*) 
𝑥 ̃ ≪ 𝑦 ̃ ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∀𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑥(𝑋 ≃ 𝑥 ̃ ∧ 𝑌 ≃ 𝑦 ̃ ∧ 𝑋(𝑥) → 𝑌(𝑥)) (D23*) 
?̃? ∘ ?̃? ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ∃𝑧(?̃? ≪ ?̃? ∧ ?̃? ≪ ?̃?) (D24*) 
?̃? ≀ ?̃? ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ¬?̃? ∘ ?̃? (D25*) 
?̃? ⋈ ?̃? ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ?̃? ≀ ?̃? ∧ ∃?̃?(?̃? ≪ ?̃? ∧ ?̃? ≪ ?̃? ∧ ∀?̃?(?̃? ≪ ?̃? → ?̃? ≪ ?̃? ∨ ?̃? ≪ ?̃?) (D26*) 
?̃? ≬ ?̃? ↔𝑑𝑒𝑓 ?̃? ∘ ?̃? ∨ ?̃? ⋈ ?̃? (D27*) 
 
∀𝑋, ?̃?(𝑋 ≃ ?̃? → 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑠(𝑋)) (A21*) 
∀𝑋(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑢𝑠(𝑋) → ∃?̃?(𝑋 ≃ ?̃? ∧ ∀?̃?(𝑋 ≃ ?̃? → ?̃? = ?̃?))) (A22*) 
∀?̃?∃𝑋(𝑋 ≃ ?̃? ∧ ∀𝑌(𝑌 ≃ ?̃? → 𝑋 = 𝑌)) (A23*) 
∃𝑥∀𝑦(𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑦) ∧ 𝑦 ≠ 𝟎 → 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑜𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥)) (A24*) 
 
The last axiom A24* seems counterintuitive and needs to be discussed more 
thorough. It postulates the existence of an overarching nexus that includes the 
complete actual world of a prehending subject. From a mereological point of view, 
the existence of this nexus debatable. However, in PR, god is the bearer of all eternal 
objects and thus, any other actual entity has to prehend 𝟎 in order to evaluate the 
universal aspects of its actual world correctly. Hence, the existence of such 
prehensions can safely be assumed from a Whiteheadian perspective and was proved 
in the last chapter. A formal logical analysis of these definitions and axioms will be 
presented elsewhere but they are expressive enough to outline how the connection 
between linear process structures and mereotopology has to be established. This 
connection will tie the macroscopic and microscopic perspective on actual entities 
that Whitehead introduced in PR together into a consistent whole that has not been 
presented therein. Such missing link allows overcoming the issue of the insufficient 
expressiveness of mereology to define the mereotopological notions in PR like spatial 
connection as brought up by Casati & Varzi (1999).  
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This issue is completely resolved since the external connection of regions is 
definable in process topologies. Like Clarke, we did not intend to define an atomless 
region calculus, in which regions can be divided by will. Objectively, there is a 
boundary that is set by actual occasions as the atomic elements of nexūs. Actual 
occasions can only be divided mentally by a subject. These subdivisions have no 
equivalent in the actual world. If we allows such ontologically flawed division, we 
would likewise have to consider principles like the unrestricted fusion of regions, 
which also is always mentally possible as discussed by Lewis (1991). Such highly 
expressive notions of mental operations should not be part of this foundational 
analysis. Generally, we have no doubt that such extension can be made with an 
alternate notion of connectedness that is not solely based on nexūs but rather 
implements an injective relation between nexūs and the regions they occupy. 
5.2.2. Physical Time 
According to Whitehead himself, his proposed ontological system is inspired by 
the general theory of relativity introduced by Einstein (1921). Moreover, Whitehead 
(2010) developed his own interpretation of this topic that is still controversially 
discussed until today as recently done by Gibbons & Will (2007). A crucial feature of 
the theory of relativity is that it fuses space and time into a four-dimensional 
continuum that is spacetime. This introduces the notion of relative time into 
theoretical physics, which differs fundamentally from the notion of absolute time that 
was introduced by Newton (1999). Absolute time is uniform and independent to any 
observer, i.e. each observer experiences the same phenomenal time. In contrast, 
relative time is different for each observer, i.e. each observer experiences his own 
phenomenal notion of time. 
According to the speed at which an entity travels through space, this entity has a 
specific position in spacetime that can be visualized in diagrams attributed to 
Minkowski & Gutzmer (2007), an example of which can be seen in figure 23. The 
depicted triangle that is spanned by the grey lines above the 𝑥-axis is called the future 
light cone of 𝑆 and the triangle that is spanned below the 𝑥-axis is called the past light 
cone of 𝑆. Since 𝑆 represents the spacetime location of the sun at a timepoint 𝑡0. 
Every event that is located in the future light cone can be potentially influenced by 
the sun at 𝑆. In contrast, every event that is in the past light cone of 𝑆 had a potential 
influence on 𝑆. This yields especially that if the sun dies at 𝑡0 , the earth will be without 
any light at 𝑡0 + 8min. Everything else that the sun has emitted, i.e. electromagnetic 
or particle radiation, will stop after this timepoint, i.e. 𝑡0 + 8min + 𝑥 min. Indeed, 
this phenomenon can be proven by the experiment of Michelson & Morley (1887). 
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The theory of relativity is contradicting the instantaneous effect of gravitation, 
since it postulates that nothing is faster than light, which has to hold for gravitation, 
too. This yields that even the gravitational field that disappears if the sun dies at 𝑡0 
will start to decrease not before 𝑡0 + 8min. Finally, such gravitational field influences 
all observers that are in it. The time that these observers measure will be slower 
compared to the time that they would measure if they are not under the influence of 
any gravitational field. This can be applied to our investigation in the following way: 
If an enduring object travels through time without any spatial movement, the actual 
occasions that constitute this object occur on the time axis of a Minkowski diagram, 
i.e. the space-component of their spacetime-position is zero. 
 
 
Fig. 23. In a Minkowski diagram, the four-dimensional character of spacetime is simplified to two 
dimensions. The 𝑥-axis approximates the three dimensions of space and the 𝑐𝑡-axis represents time. 
𝑆 is the spacetime location of the sun at the timepoint 𝑡0.  𝐴𝑈 is the astronomical unit, i.e. the distance 
between the sun and the earth. 𝑐 represents the speed of light and, in this figure, has been chosen to 
be equal to 1. Thus, every photon that travelled from or travelled to the sun is located on the grey 
lines that go at a 45-degree angle to the diagram's axes. This implies that it takes 8 minutes for a 
photon to travel from the sun to the earth. 
If an enduring object is spatially moving, its actual occasions occur on the left 
resp. right side of the 𝑐𝑡-axis, i.e. the space-component of their spacetime-position is 
not zero. Hence, the space-component of the spacetime-position of an actual 
occasion 𝑎 is smaller than the space-component of the spacetime position of an actual 
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occasion 𝑏 that is temporally following 𝑎. If the velocity of an enduring object is 
constant, all of its actual occasions are located on an imaginary straight line. In 
contrast to the time-component, the space-component is bounded. If an actual 
occasion is occurring in a location that is located nearer to the space axis than to the 
time axis, then the enduring object it belongs to is travelling faster than the speed of 
light, which is physically impossible. In fact, all actual occasions belonging to enduring 
objects travelling with the speed of light are positioned inside the light cone. Thus, if 
an enduring object is moving with an acceleration, the spacetime locations of the 
actual occasions that constitute it will converge to the borders of the light cone and 
the acceleration will decrease once this happens.  
Visualizations like Minkowski diagrams are used to depict the effects of 
phenomena like time dilatation, which is the direct implication of the special theory 
of relativity that we already have outlined. If we assume two enduring objects that 
travel through spacetime with different velocities without any acceleration, the actual 
occasions of both enduring objects are located on different straight lines, which can 
be used to represent these enduring objects. The line of a stationary object is located 
on the time axis. According to the mentioned phenomenon, a travelling enduring 
object is aging slower than a stationary enduring object, i.e. there are fewer actual 
occasions constituting the travelling enduring object than there are to constitute the 
stationary enduring object. This leads to the conclusion that the distance between two 
actual occasions on the line of the enduring object 𝑎, which is travelling through space 
and time, have a higher distance than two actual occasions on the line of the enduring 
object 𝑏 that is stationary.  
With the help of the nomenclature that has been discussed as possible extension 
of GFO-Time, we can express the phenomenon of time dilatation by the simple 
assumption that extensiveness intervals can have different lengths according to the 
position in time that an actual occasion has. To adopt a more general view, the 
becoming of each actual occasion 𝑎 projects to its unique extensiveness interval that 
represents the specific duration of 𝑎’s becoming, which can be longer than the 
extensiveness interval of another actual occasion 𝑏’s becoming. Although the first 
extensiveness boundaries of these intervals coincide with the same last time boundary, 
both actual occasions have the same parts. However, from 𝑏’s perspective the last 
time boundary of the extensiveness interval of 𝑎 lies in the future. Hence, there can 
be actual occasions that have 𝑏 as their actual parts but not 𝑎, despite 𝑎 and 𝑏 having 
the same actual parts. Figure 24 shows these actual occasion 𝑎 and 𝑏 as well as their 
extensiveness intervals of their becomings. 
The theory of linear process structures is not able to represent this notion 
accordingly because of its own notion of a potential that is based on contemporaneity. 
In the previous sections, we assumed that all contemporaneous actual occasions 
emerged during extensiveness intervals of the same length and, additionally, have 
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coinciding time boundaries with the same time intervals. Assume actual occasion 𝑎 
and 𝑏, such that 𝑏 is an actual part of 𝑎. If there is a third actual occasion 𝑐, as depicted 
in figure 25, the extensiveness interval of which is overarching both 𝑎’s and 𝑏’s 
extensiveness intervals, it is correct to deduce that 𝑐 is contemporaneous to 𝑎 and 𝑏.  
 
 
Fig. 24. This diagram depicts the extensiveness 
intervals 𝐴 and 𝐵 during which the actual 
occasions 𝑎 and 𝑏 emerged. The first 
extensiveness boundaries of 𝐴 and 𝐵 coincides 
with the last time boundary of the time interval 
𝑡0. The emergence of 𝑎 took longer than the 
emergence of 𝑏. 
 
Fig 25. This diagram depicts the extensiveness 
intervals 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 during which the actual 
occasions 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 emerged. 𝐶 is completely 
overarching 𝐴 and 𝐵, because 𝑐’s emergence 
took longer than the combined emergence of 𝑎 
and 𝑏. 
 
The transitivity of contemporaneity, which is followed from the definition of 
potentials, leads to the contradiction that 𝑎 is contemporaneous to 𝑏. A possibility to 
avoid such contradictions, is to drop axiom A18. Up to now, the potential that is 
concretized by an actual occasion includes all its contemporaneous actual occasions. 
In the formerly used example, this implies that 𝑏 is in the actual world of 𝑐, which is 
impossible since 𝑏 has not been existing, when 𝑐 started to emerge. However, it is 
evident that 𝑏 must be contemporaneous to 𝑐 nevertheless. Dropping the formerly 
mentioned axiom leads to a system in which being based on the same potential actual occasions 
is not equivalent to existing contemporaneously. We are still left with the proposition that 
having the same actual world implies contemporaneity but the other direction does 
not hold anymore. Existing contemporaneously is possible without having the same 
actual world and hence, having a different causal dependency. It has to be noted in 
this context that the notion of a light cone that implies this causal dependency is not 
axiomatized yet and needs some further investigation. Yet, such result would further 
prove the expressiveness of the herein presented language. 
Except for the different notion of contemporaneity and open worlds, the 
possibility of limit points arises, since the different lengths of extensiveness intervals 
allow a set of actual occasions that emerged at the same time instant, i.e. they have 
the same parts, but the lengths of their respective extensiveness intervals can be 
ordered densely. In models of 𝑇ℎ𝑃
′ , in which axioms A1 − 17 and A19 − 20 have to 
hold, there must be arbitrary contemporaneous actual occasions 𝑥 and 𝑦, such that 
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there is an actual occasion 𝑧, which is parallel to 𝑥 and an actual part of 𝑦. Assume an 
actual occasion 𝑧 that exists in between 𝑥 and 𝑦. 𝑧 is contemporaneous to both of 
them as well to the actual occasion 𝑥′. 𝑥 is an actual part of 𝑥′ that is contemporaneous 
to 𝑦. If an individual 𝑧′ exists that is contemporaneous to 𝑦 and of which 𝑧 is an 
actual part, there is a dense order of all actual occasions that emerged in the same 
open world, which is formalized in axiom A21′. This axiom can be added to  𝑇ℎ𝑃
′  to 
retrieve densely ordered contemporaneous actual occasions as outlined in figure 26. 
 
∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧(𝑥 ∥ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ∥ 𝑧 ∧ 𝑥 < 𝑧 






Fig. 26. This diagram depicts the extensiveness intervals 𝐴, 𝐴′, 𝐵, 𝐵′ and 𝐶 during which the actual 
occasions 𝑥, 𝑥′, 𝑦, 𝑦 and 𝑧 emerged. 
This axiom can be used to retrieve a smaller set of models of 𝑇ℎ𝑃
′ , the 
expressiveness of which is not only capable of interpreting the special theory of 
relativity. It also captures the decrease of acceleration of an enduring object, the 
velocity of which converges to the speed of light. Since this acceleration decreases 
constantly without the enduring object’s velocity reaching the speed of light, there 
must be infinitely many positions in spacetime in which this enduring object is located 
before it finally reaches the speed of light after an infinitely long decrease of 
acceleration. Furthermore, the notion of shells of contemporary worlds does not hold 
anymore. In particular, axiom A21′ implies an infinite collection of open worlds for 
a set of contemporaneous actual occasions with different maximal elements with 
respect to ≤. 
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Regarding the connection between the special theory of relativity and PR, it is 
crucial to discuss the importance of the notion of extensiveness. Without this 
connection, extensiveness is no necessary abstraction from extension in a 
spatiotemporal sense but seems rather equivalent to the spatiotemporal extension of 
an actual occasion the becoming of which projects to a time quantum as introduced 
by Levi (1927). The presented approach allows to understand extensiveness as a tool 
to ground different extensions of a time quantum according to the spacetime position 
of some actual occasion. Quantified time is an important topic in contemporary 
theoretical physics as expounded in the works of Wilczek (2012), Maldacena & 
Susskind (2013) as well as Unger & Smolin (2015), which we mention as examples for 
the manifold research ongoing in quantum physics that also comprises the application 
of Whiteheadian ideas as summarized by Epperson & Zafiris (2013).  
Extensiveness can be used as metaphysical tool to explain the phenomenon of 
time quanta having different projections to time regions in phenomenal time 
according to an actual occasion’s position in spacetime. Without this notion, such 
highly complex phenomena could not be explained although it has been implied in 
PR that the therein presented system is capable of describing them. However, the 
notion of physical time is a well-investigated topic in theoretical physics that is already 
used in many practical applications that affect our everyday life. Satellites are less 
influenced by the gravitational field of the earth than anything that is located on its 
ground. The time that is measured by satellites is faster than the time that any clock 
that is located on the earth is able to measure. Nelson (1999) explains the effect on 
the satellites of the GPS system, which has to locate anything on the earth with a 
precision of five meters in order to function as intended. This precision is distorted 
by 30cm for each nanosecond that the satellite’s atomic clock runs faster than a clock 
on the ground. However, time dilation effects a difference of about 30 microseconds 
per day which results into huge differences that are not negligible anymore. Ashby & 
Nelson (2009) presented a set of methods to mitigate the posed problem, which 
corroborates the mentioned irrelevancy of an application of the presented results. 
A fruitful field for the application is the current research of the fundaments of 
theoretical physics. Indeed, the research community is strongly focused on theories 
that are falsifiable in the vein of Popper (2005), i.e. they have to yield meaningful 
experiments that are able to deliver counterexamples. However, the presented work 
yields no experiments and must be embedded into physical theories that try to explain 
and predict physical phenomena. An example for such theories is the contemporary 
logic-based research of Dowker (2014) and Clements et al. (2017), who presented 
causal sets as a foundation for the theory of quantum gravity. This theory is expected 
to unify the contradictory dichotomy of general relativity and quantum mechanics. 
The presented approaches are based on becoming spacetime quanta that create 
physical time, which is surprisingly like the Whiteheadian notion of actual occasions.  
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Extensiveness is an ideal addition to such theories that try to ground theoretical 
physics on an alternative to Euclidean resp. Minkowski spaces. It does not only 
inherently support the notion of the becoming quanta, it also prevents holes between 
time quanta that naturally occur if they are embedded in continuous resp. dense 
systems, which in particular holds for the four-dimensional extension of Minkowski 
spaces that defines time as a real number. In such Minkowski space, time quanta are 
projected to elements in ℝ. However, not all elements of ℝ can represent quanta 
without contradicting this notion. Fusing our approach with the likewise logic-based 
approach of Dowker and Clements et al. would not only corroborate the connection 
between Whiteheadian process philosophy and theoretical physics, but also the 





In the presented work, an approach to bridge the gap between data and 
knowledge as well as its applicability to information systems has been discussed. The 
usage of Whiteheadian philosophy has been expounded to outline the process of 
knowledge creation as a construction of propositions. This result is the first step on 
the way to a new paradigm of data science that connects formal ontology and machine 
learning, the synergies of which can lead to a kind of artificial intelligence that is able 
to create and comprehend its knowledge based on the data given to it. Information 
systems that follow this paradigm are equipped with semantically interpretable models 
that explicate knowledge and reasoning as white boxes and thus, can be 
comprehended by humans too, as well as altered over time if the conclusions about 
the underlying data change. Hence, this paradigm addresses the technical debt that 
current black box approaches to machine learning pose.  
For this purpose, we introduced the notion of knowledge structures based on a 
dedicated vocabulary that allows describing an individual’s reception of its 
surrounding worlds according to its subjective understanding of other individuals’ 
appearances. This vocabulary is based on the Whiteheadian notion of a prehension, 
which is a reification of physical and conceptual reception. A prehension has a subject 
that prehends its content, a datum that is prehended by the subject and a form that is 
the subjective interpretation of the mentioned datum. This notion of a prehension 
allows describing cognitive phenomena that span over the reception of sensual, 
conceptual and relational data, as well as propositions about these data. Knowledge 
structures outline how an information system is able to produce knowledge. This 
creation of knowledge has been discussed as an abstraction from datasets and the 
usage of machine learning techniques to make propositions about clusters of 
individuals, which is the basic meaning of knowledge as to our argumentation. 
The notions of nexūs and proposition have only been elucidated briefly as of the 
current works. We advocated the need of this novel notion of a proposition based on 
nexūs, its difference to the state-of-the-art representation as OWL class and discussed 
the ontological and semantical correctness in comparison to OWL classes. A set of 
such propositions is closer to the notion of knowledge than a knowledge graph could 
be. The possibility of subjective interpretations that results in this described process 
has been discussed, which connects it closely to the human methodology of concept 
creation and knowledge organization. However, the presented work only comprises 
the possibility to see propositions as unary predicates that fit a set of individuals. This 
is not a shortcoming of this analysis but rather a limitation of PR, since its 
philosophical discourse only concerns this limited type of statements about 
individuals. 
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A more precise analysis has to yield the interpretation of propositions as 𝑛-ary 
predicates with dedicated roles that define each individual fitting into such predicate. 
The discussion of such extended approach is necessary and could be enriched with 
the notion of propositions according to Wittgenstein (2006). Furthermore, the 
composition of propositions needs to be considered because this abstraction from 
facts is a main aspect in abstract argumentation that has been heavily influenced by 
the work of Dung (1995). In abstract argumentation, judgement about propositions 
is made without any relation of fact but rather according to their relation to each other 
hence, the human way of decision making and reasoning. We argue that this is one of 
the key mechanism that is used to decide, which propositions are deemed true by an 
individual if there is evidence for the truth of contradictory propositions. This relation 
between non-monotonic reasoning and knowledge structures needs further 
consideration in future works to grasp the consistency of knowledge.   
An interpretation in GFO is pending as well as a formal interpretation of 
Whiteheadian propositions. We deem the relation 𝑝𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 a meaningful extension 
of GFO that is able to connect the psychological and material stratum, which is a 
presupposition to model that knowledge is valid from the perspective of an 
information system. The integration of the prehension relation into GFO is the next 
step to extend this foundational ontology with the presented results and to provide a 
companion to GFO-Data that bridges the leap between data and knowledge. 
Additionally, this extension will use ideas described by Herre (2013) that allow a direct 
relation to and the incorporation of the methods established in knowledge 
organization. The results that have been brought forward in the context of this 
research field will, in particular, help to further elucidate ontology structures that have 
been analyzed as mere partial orderings only. A more expressive axiom system needs 
to be developed that explains the mereological relations between categories.    
An axiomatic reconstruction of the notion of time in process philosophy has been 
proposed according to the foundational investigation in PR. This reconstruction is 
based on a formally introduced language that is capable of describing the basic notions 
behind actual occasions and prehensions. Temporal relations and predicates have 
been defined to elucidate what actual worlds and contemporaneous worlds are and 
how they are constructed. Finally, the notion of a potential was used to establish the 
transitivity of causality and contemporaneity. We proved the structural integrity of 
linear process structures that were defined as 𝜎-structures satisfying the formulated 
axiom system, which led to the interpretation of shell models. This discussion allows 
to grasp how the content of knowledge structures behave in the context of distributed 
information systems. This discussion is the first presentation of the temporal aspects 
of Whiteheadian process philosophy that is not based on the phenomenal character 
of time but rather an approach to the physical time that is underlying all processes in 
PR.   
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The connections to mereotopology have been discussed and a formal integration 
of regions has been proposed as link that allows introducing spatiotemporal 
connection without topological presuppositions. Thus, this discourse is the first 
attempt to reconstruct the foundations of the mereotopology proposed in PR without 
topological notions as a prerequisite. We argued that the mereotopology in PR is not 
a stand-alone calculus but rather entailed by the character of nexūs and the space that 
they occupy. This space is a continuum and used to construct all other spatial regions 
that an individual can perceive phenomenally. Finally, the connections to theoretical 
physics have been discussed and an alternate definition of potential has been 
proposed to express phenomena inherent to the special theory of relativity within the 
presented framework. This alteration of the original axioms leads to a new notion of 
contemporaneity, which is completely based on causality, and the postulation of 
infinitely many actual occasions that emerge in the same actual world but reach their 
concrescence at different phenomenal points in time. This allows a correspondence 
between actual occasions and spacetime positions for an enduring object in a 
Minkowski diagram. 
In future work, we intend to conduct a metalogical analysis of linear process 
structures. We suspect an essential undecidability that needs to be proven based on 
the similarity of the natural numbers and process structures with one actual occasion 
in each actual world. This result will be inherited by all of the presented extensions 
and alteration in the discussion section. Additionally, the mentioned extension of 
GFO that includes extensiveness intervals needs to be elaborated thoroughly and 
analyzed regarding its possible implementation into the integrative realism that 
characterizes GFO. It is not clear yet, if this integration will lead to an enhanced 
expressivity of GFO since extensiveness intervals have a very distinct use case that 
only possibly transcends the interpretation of the categories presented in PR. 
However, this extension and the introduction of prehensions will enable the top-level 
ontology to represent the notion of changing truth of a proposition that has been 
created by an information system in the vein of PR. This holds especially for the more 
general case of distributed information systems. 
It is clear that the presented results, as well the herein proposed future work, are 
just fragments of a greater research program. This research program needs to realize 
the integration of all discussed fragments into a unified framework that is able to 
incorporate the semantics of both knowledge and process structures. Thereby, a new 
kind of models for machine learning algorithms can be developed based on 
ontological discourse that will be robust to changing data and can work in distributed 
information systems and thus, the technical debt, which has been formulated by 
Sculley et al. (2015), will be made negligible. We believe that this framework will be a 
great step forward in knowledge representation and show how computer science is 
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